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I N T R O D U C T I O N 
By HARRY ELMER BARNES 
THE NATURE OF CONTEMPORARY IMPERIALISM 
WHAT is usually k n o w n as modern economic imperial-
ism is one of the most characteristic and important histori-
cal developments of contemporary times. I t is not only a 
leading phase of modern commerce and investment, but 
has also profoundly affected many non-economic aspects 
of our life. I n the field of politics it has involved: (1) the 
development of a foreign policy conditioned by overseas 
ambitions and colonial dominion, and (2 ) the reaction of 
this type of foreign policy upon the domestic political 
institutions of those states which have participated to any 
extensive degree in imperialistic ventures. A s L . T . H o b -
house long ago made clear, no country can expect to de-
vote a part of its energy and resources to the acquisition 
and domination of lands and peoples overseas and still 
hope to keep its domestic politics free from the respon-
sibilities and handicaps imposed by overseas dominion. 
I n the field of social institutions far-reaching modifica-
tions have been produced both at home and abroad 
through the impact of widely different cultures. L i k e -
wise, culture and intellectual life have been deeply influ-
enced by that interaction of divergent cultures upon each 
other which has been produced through the contacts pro-
moted by modern imperialism. 
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Therefore, it may be contended with full assurance of 
accuracy and moderation that one who fails to acquaint 
himself with the nature and achievements of contempo-
rary imperialism wi l l have ignored one of the most signifi-
cant phases of our present civilization. Inattention to 
contemporary imperialistic activity not only marks one 
out as deplorably ignorant of vital current issues but also 
renders one incapable of coping intelligently w i th many 
of the more pressing and baffling problems of contempo-
rary politics and international relations. I t represents a 
type of ignorance which is not only humiliating but actu-
ally dangerous. Almost worse than blank ignorance, 
however, is that Pol lyanna attitude of benign trust and 
cosmic complacency which is born of acquaintance wi th 
the issues of modern imperialism solely through the 
medium of our conventional journals or party spokesmen. 
These give assurance of the unmitigated benevolence of 
investors, and also emphasize the deaf ear which foreign 
offices and state departments turn to all appeals to put 
the force of an imperialistic nation behind the summons 
of interested investors and merchants. 
M u c h heat and dogmatism has been developed in the 
efforts to define and assess contemporary imperialism. 
Some regard it chiefly as a benevolent and unselfish 
civi l izing process; to others it seems the most brutal and 
heartless manifestation of modern capitalism and the 
spirit of acquisitiveness. T o the writer it appears that it 
is best to abandon, for the time being, any of the old 
single-track dogmas concerning imperialism and make a 
careful study of the actual facts, in order to find out just 
what contemporary imperialism really amounts to. I n so 
doing, we may learn that some of our older dogmas are 
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completely discredited, while other assumptions may be 
verified and extended. W e have conventionally assumed 
that the imperialistic process is essentially the following: 
1. Merchants and bankers recognize the opportunities 
for pecuniary gain in certain relatively backward political 
and economic areas. 
2. The ir penetration is followed by appeals to the 
foreign offices of their respective states. 
3. These requests ultimately lead to mil i tary interven-
tion and the political administration of such areas. 
Such a sequence, while not unknown, is by no means 
inevitable. I n many cases there is no political or mil itary 
intervention at all because the bankers and merchants feel 
that they can carry on their activities to better effect w i th -
out the embarrassment of political friction. Hence, what 
is most needed is a careful and realistic study of imperial-
ism in action. This does not imply that we shall emerge 
as eulogists of imperialism. W e may end by formulating 
a more vigorous indictment of imperialism than that con-
ventionally offered by socialistically inclined writers or 
we may discover that in some respects the imperialistic 
process is mitigated by the achievements. W h a t we need 
are the facts before we can construct either a convincing 
condemnation or a telling defense of imperialism. Af ter 
all, the most useful definition of a thing is a description of 
what it does. 
Further, it is certainly a mistake to conceive of modern 
imperialism solely in economic terms. There is no doubt 
that modern industrial states are impelled to build up an 
export trade and to seek sources of raw materials, but this 
does not necessarily force them to annex territory. O u r 
largest customers are Canada and European and South 
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Amer ican states, over which no one proposes that w e 
should exercise or attempt to exercise political control. 
L i k e population growth, economic expansion has led to 
imperialism in considerable part because of nationalism 
and the nationalistic pride in colonies. The F r e n c h Kongo 
and Indo-China have been white elephants on the hands 
of the French, and the same is true of the Ital ian posses-
sions in Afr i ca . T h e German colonial empire was cer-
tainly more a product of nationalism than of economic 
expansion. Amer ican and British imperialism have been 
caused more exclusively by economic motives. 
Moreover, we need to relinquish the somewhat simple-
minded hypothesis of the conscious, overt, and undeviat-
ing diabolism of contemporary imperialism. There is no 
doubt that, as society is organized today, we have certain 
definite economic needs which can be met only by ob-
taining markets overseas and by securing r a w materials 
from foreign areas. W e have accumulated a large surplus 
of capital for investment which wi l l inevitably seek an 
outlet beyond our national boundaries. W e have to con-
sider frankly such economic realities. We are l ikely to be 
faced for a long time with the problem of the contact of 
higher and lower cultures, of so-called superior and infer-
ior economic systems. As long as the prevailing types of 
political organizations and economic systems continue we 
shall have to confront this issue of economic penetration 
and political dominion. I f we desire to modify or el imi-
nate this situation we shall have to operate, in part at least, 
indirectly in the way of changing the nature of the 
economic, political, and social organization of humanity . 
I n studying the progress of contemporary imperialism 
it is necessary to place the emphasis somewhat differently 
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from that employed in any treatment of the expansion of 
Europe from 1500 to 1800. I n the earlier period the more 
notable results were to be observed in the effect of the ex-
pansion movement upon Europe itself. There was rela-
tively slight penetration of the overseas areas by E u r o -
peans. T h e most far-reaching influences were to be dis-
covered in the reaction of overseas products, practices, 
and ideas upon Europe. This reaction, in the large, 
brought about the decline of the medieval order and the 
establishment of modern nationalism and capitalism, to-
gether with many important cultural changes. Af ter 
1870 there was a far more extensive movement of Europe 
overseas. Europeans carried the new technology and 
other aspects of western civilization abroad and trans-
formed the living conditions of the majority of those 
dwelling in overseas areas. Therefore, in the same w a y 
that world politics from 1500 to 1800 were of conse-
quence chiefly in regard to European transformations, so 
after 1870 world politics found their most notable ex-
pression in the movement of European populations and 
civilization to overseas areas. This should not be taken, 
of course, as any denial of the importance of European 
expansion abroad after 1500 or of the reaction of the 
imperialistic process upon Europe after 1870. I t is merely 
a matter of the relative significance of expansion and re-
action in these two periods. 
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
One of the most striking phases of the modern dynamic 
age has been the rise of the new national imperialism since 
1870. B y this is meant the development of European or 
American control over the territory or the resources of 
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the less highly developed or the less powerful peoples out-
side of Europe and the United States, accomplished usually 
w i th the sanction or the armed intervention of the states 
of which the traders were citizens. A s a movement, this 
has varied greatly, extending all the way from simply a 
dominating control over the commerce of a given area to 
ultimate political absorption. 
Perhaps the most conspicuous phase of modern im-
perialism has been the great swiftness of this European 
expansion and occupation. More territory has been actu-
ally procured for white occupation of one sort or another 
within fifty years than was appropriated in the three 
centuries of the old colonial movement. I n 1800 about 
four-fifths of the land area of the world had not been 
opened to civilized man through exploration, and as late as 
1870 more than half of the habitable surface of the earth 
had not been touched by Europeans. B y the beginning 
of the twentieth century the whole planet outside of the 
extreme polar regions had been traversed by the white 
man and its resources and potentialities for exploitation 
had been catalogued. Afr ica had been explored and parti-
tioned. Oceania and Australasia had been occupied, and 
a commercial hegemony of Europe and the Uni ted States 
had been established in Asia and Lat in America . 
T h e forces or causes lying back of this expansive move-
ment are conventionally classified as economic, political, 
social, religious, and psychological. T h e economic causes 
of expansion grew directly out of the Industrial Revolu-
tion. While this movement had affected E n g l a n d and 
France at a somewhat earlier period, the era of greatest 
industrial development in Germany and the Uni ted States 
came in the years following 1870. This new industry, 
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carried on by mechanical processes under the factory 
system, gave rise to an unprecedented increase in produc-
tivity and to an enormous accumulation of capital avai l -
able for investment. T h e economic basis for the develop-
ment of modern imperialism is well revealed by the i n -
creased wealth and income of the United States since 
1850: 
T O T A L W E A L T H OF UNITED STATES 






The total income of the United States increased from 
$31,400,000,000 in 1910 to $72,000,000,000 in 1920 and 
$89,000,000,000 in 1928. A t the same time, the vast i m -
provement in the technique of land and water transpor-
tation made possible the growth of world trade on a scale 
which exceeded anything before known. B y 1928 the 
total volume of transactions between the citizens of the 
United States and the rest of the world amounted to more 
than $11,000,000,000. T h e distribution of these trans-
actions is indicated by the following tables: 
I. TRANSACTIONS LEADING T O PAYMENTS T O AMERICANS 
Goods exported $5,129,000,000 
Freight payments received 143,000,000 
Foreign Tourists in U. S 168,000,000 
Int. on Am. investments abroad 817,000,000 
War debt rec. U. S. Treasury 1 «0,000,000 
Motion picture royalties 70,000,000 
Insurance transactions 80,000,000 
II. TRANSACTIONS L E A D I N G T O PAYMENTS BY AMERICANS 
Goods imported $4,091,000,000 
Freight payments 227,000,000 
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Americans traveling abroad 782,000,000 
Interest on foreign-owned investments in U. S 252,000,000 
Remittances sent back by immigrants to U. S 217,000,000 
Missionary and charitable contributions 52,000,000 
Insurance transactions 70,000,000 
A s modern industrialism has developed, the impulse to 
imperialism, which resides in the search for markets for 
finished products, has been powerfully augmented by 
the desire to secure control of the supplies of indispensable 
raw materials. Rubber and petroleum have become par-
ticularly important in this regard in recent years, w i th 
the great development o f the internal combustion engine 
and the growing popularity of automobiles. I t may safely 
be said that no other factor is so potent in contemporary 
diplomacy as the ambition to secure and safeguard an ade-
quate supply of petroleum and rubber. T h e desire to ex-
ploit Russian oil reserves was the main factor in the British 
recognition of Russia. W i t h the eclipse of the British 
interests and the growing ascendancy of the Standard 
O i l Company in the Russian fields, we find the spokesman 
of the Rockefeller interests discovering much to com-
mend in the Bolshevist experiment. T h e British restric-
tion of the supplies of raw rubber proved sufficient to 
provoke decidedly anti-British protests from M r . Herbert 
Hoover, certainly a m a n not previously known for anti-
British proclivities. T h e oil reserves of Colombia were 
sufficiently rich and essential to Amer ican needs to induce 
even adamant Rooseveltians like H e n r y Cabot Lodge to 
repudiate by implication Roosevelt's Panama policy and 
to enter into an arrangement to indemnify Colombia. 
T h e diplomatic tension over the rubber supply has been 
somewhat lessened through the fal l in the price of rub-
ber, and private oil companies are work ing out agreements 
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which reduce the competition between them. These great 
international oil cartels w i l l constitute a real danger, h o w -
ever, unless they are subjected to adequate international 
control through public agencies. 
Because of cheap transportation, the rapidity w i t h 
which shipments could be made and the decreased propor-
tion of losses in ocean shipments, commerce grew by leaps 
and bounds. A l l of these developments inevitably led to 
a scramble for foreign markets and to large-scale invest-
ment of capital in overseas areas. These markets and 
areas for investment were sought, when possible, in 
colonies carved out of backward and unoccupied tracts 
and, when these were not available, in seats of older c i v i l -
izations w h i c h had not yet passed into the modern i n -
dustrial age. 
Political causes cooperated wi th the economic in p r o -
ducing the new movement of expansion. T h e growth of 
modern nationalism stimulated and intensified the desire 
to secure and control colonial areas. I ta ly and G e r m a n y 
had just achieved national unification in 1870 and had 
developed an intense patriotic fervor w h i c h derived satis-
faction f r o m foreign expansion. F r a n c e turned to for-
eign areas to secure compensation for the loss of Al sace -
Lorraine. Russia , not satisfied w i t h a vast area sti l l 
awaiting exploitation and development, turned south-
ward to seize more terri tory in As ia . E n g l a n d had long 
staked her future on maintaining her supremacy as a c o m -
mercial and colonizing nation. E v e n the Uni ted States, 
before the close of the nineteenth century , had occupied 
all the available free land wi th in its boundaries and turned 
to the Spanish-American area for a new region of invest-
ment and exploitation. T h i s process natural ly produced 
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as a sort of psychic compensation the notion of the "c iv i l -
izing mission" or the "white man's burden," and gave rise 
to sharp national jealousies over the relative extent of 
external possessions. 
There was, likewise, a strong sociological motive which 
combined with the political impulses to favor expansion. 
For some set of causes not yet well understood, but which 
center about modern industrialism and the growth of 
medical science, the population of Europe increased from 
about 175,000,000 to over 450,000,000 between 1750 
and 1915. This led in many countries to a real pressure 
of population on the means of subsistence and emigration 
was stimulated, i f not necessitated. I t was natural that 
the mother country should desire to retain political control 
over its emigrants and this could be achieved only when 
they migrated to colonies. I n this way the socio-biological 
factor of population growth was l inked up with the polit-
ical drive from patriotism. 
Again , the religious motives for developing overseas 
areas had not declined, but had increased instead. T o the 
Catholic missionaries, who had never ceased activity since 
the beginning of expansion, were added an ever-increasing 
number of Protestants. T h e appeal of the missionaries 
was further strengthened when it became possible for 
them to carry with them not only "the word which 
maketh wise unto salvation," but also modern industrial 
arts and the blessings of sanitary and medical science. 
Final ly , psychological impulses have served to extend 
the interests of Europe overseas. T h e love of adventure 
has operated as ever, and the compelling power of scienti-
fic curiosity has not abated. Aga in , the social prestige 
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usually attaching to colonial service has acted as an i n -
centive to the movement. Further, the various psycho-
logical aspects of modern aggressive nationalism have been 
utilized in the propaganda of skilful and unscrupulous 
imperialists to effect a popular espousal of their program. 
T h e newer movement of expansion has been national 
rather than one of persons of privileged companies, and its 
chief field of operation has been the eastern hemisphere, 
rather than the western, which was the case with m u c h of 
the activity in the earlier period of exploration and colon-
ization. A f r i c a , Oceania, and Australasia have been 
forcibly colonized, while economic exploitation has been 
vigorously cultivated in Asia . Thi s statement does not, 
however, ignore the extensive commercial exploitation 
of Lat in America by European nations and the Uni ted 
States. T h e significance of this more recent period of 
expansion has been v iv id ly described by Professor Shot-
well: 
Conquistadors, clad in khaki or glittering in helmeted 
display, have proclaimed to most of the savages of the 
globe that they belong henceforth to European nations. 
On the wharves of London there are goods from German 
workshops for the merchant adventurers of today to 
carry off to Bantus or Negritos. Piles of coal from 
Cardiff lie inside the coral reefs of Australasian islands, 
for the ships which come to break the silence of farther 
Hebrides that Wordsworth dreamed of. But for the his-
torian there is more significance than romance in such 
events. The men whom Joseph Conrad and Kipling 
describe are responsible for the transformation of Africa 
and Asia. And that transformation in its turn is mainly 
responsible for those policies of imperial expansion, of 
commercial and colonial rivalries which underhe the 
causes of the present [European] war. 
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T h e following table w i l l provide an excellent summary 
statement of the territorial expansion of the western states 
up to the time of the W o r l d W a r . 
COLONIAL EMPIRES OF T H E W O R L D IN 1914 
Area (sq. mi.) Population 
Country Number Mother Colonies Mother Colonies 
of Colonies Country Country 
United Kingdom 55 120,953 12,044,000 46,052,700 391,582,528 
France 29 207,076 4,110,409 39,602,000 62,3 50,000 
German Empire 10 208,830 1,231,000 64,926,000 13,075,000 
Belgium 1 11,373 910,000 7,571,000 15,000,000 
Portugal 8 35,500 804,440 5,960,000 10,021,000 
Netherlands 8 12,761 762,863 6,102,000 37,410,000 
Italy 4 110,623 551,250 35,239,000 1,396,000 
United States 6 3,026,000 125,610 98,781,000 10,021,000 
T h e chief transformation wrought by the W o r l d W a r 
was the seizure of the German colonial empire and its 
division among the Entente victors, primarily the British 
Empire , Japan, and France. 
T h e effects of the new imperialism upon the political 
and diplomatic events and tendencies of the last half-
century in Europe have been most profound. Scarcely a 
dominating alliance or an armed conflict has existed which 
has not been more or less directly affected by overseas 
policies and ambitions, while these policies have very fre-
quently determined even the characteristics and trends 
of domestic politics, as well as the destinies and careers 
of statesmen. 
Whi le it cannot be doubted that much of the older 
policy of thoroughgoing exploitation has been carried 
over into the new imperialistic movement since 1870, it 
is certain that a somewhat higher moral level has prevailed 
in the activities of the colonizers. There has been at least 
some rhetorical, though often hypocritical, recognition 
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of a moral obligation in the "white man's burden" and of 
the duty of elevating the cultural standards of the na-
tives. T h i s moral progress has not been uniform, how-
ever, as there is little or nothing in the history of the P u r i -
tan relations with the Indians to match the wholesale 
assassinations, cutting off of hands, and other "peace 
committed by Leopold's agents in the Belgian Kongo, 
time" atrocities committed by Leopold's agents in the 
Belgian Kongo. 
THE UNITED STATES IN MODERN IMPERIALISM 
It is obvious that the particular manifestation of con-
temporary imperialism most interesting and relevant to 
Americans is the expansion of Amer ican capital and 
colonial power beyond the ancient boundaries of the 
United States. I t has often been stated by patriotic ora-
tors that the United States is the one state which resolutely 
stood aloof from the imperialistic orgy of the last half-
century. Y e t the truth would seem to be that we were 
conceived in imperialism and dedicated to the principle 
of expansion. Founded as a phase of the first great period 
of imperialism and colonialism, we have always been an 
imperialistic country from the standpoint of development 
of control over new areas and the subjugation of lower 
peoples. T h e growth of our country has been, in one 
sense, the record of imperialistic efforts and successes. 
T h e history of the Uni ted States from 1607 to 1890 is the 
record of a continually expanding frontier, during w h i c h 
process we brought the original Indian population under 
our control and conquered most of a great continent. 
This stage ended about 1890, at the very time when we 
had just passed through the most important stages of the 
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Industrial Revolution, had for the first time acquired a 
considerable volume of excess capital and had developed 
a greater necessity for markets overseas. I n other words, 
we needed to expand beyond our boundaries at the exact 
moment when we had the resources to do so and were 
under the temporary control of a political party that was 
to a peculiar degree under the domination of Amer ican 
industry and finance. A s Professor J . Fred R i p p y has 
correctly and courageously stated the facts:1 
It is in vain that we plead our innocence of imperial-
ism. Our whole history gives the lie to such a plea, unless 
one wishes to quibble over the meaning of the term "im-
perialism." The fact is that our boundaries are vastly 
more extensive than they were in 1783 and that most of 
our territory has been acquired at the expense of Spanish 
America. . . . A policy which has brought under our 
virtual domination some nine to twelve republics in a 
generation may differ from European imperialism in 
form but it is very near that imperialism in substance. 
I n the following summary paragraph Professor Parker 
Thomas Moon gives a graphic statement of the actual ex-
tent of the "American Empire ," which wi l l doubtless 
astonish those readers who have not given special atten-
correctly and courageously stated the facts:* 
But if Canada is part of the British Empire, and if 
Egypt and Iraq are under British control, then by the 
same standards Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, 
Panama, and Nicaragua are to be reckoned as falling in 
some degree under the control of the United States, for 
they are subject to military intervention, which Canada 
is not; their foreign affairs are to some extent submitted 
to American guidance, or at least to an American veto; 
1 J . Fred Rippy, Latin America in World Politics, p. 26S. 
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their economic life is in considerable measure under 
American supervision; and they are protected against 
non-American encroachment quite as genuinely as any 
French or British protectorate. Liberia may perhaps be 
added to the list without serious dispute. Some readers 
would wish to add other Central American Republics, or 
Mexico, or Colombia and Venezuela; but these are ex-
cluded for the reason that American intervention in their 
affairs is less formal, less continuous, less analogous to the 
"protectorates" of European imperialism. Taking then, 
this fairly conservative list of quasi-dependencies—Cuba, 
Haiti, Santo Domingo, Panama, Nicaragua, and Liberia 
—and adding it to the list of territories and possessions, 
we obtain a grand total that will put the United States 
colonial empire in sixth place for area, and for popula-
tion, and in second place for commercial value. For a 
non-aggressive nation, the United States has done re-
markably well, as compared with rivals candidly intent 
on imperial expansion. Only Great Britian has done 
better. 
I t was natural that we should first turn to Lat in 
America, justifying our action in official rhetoric on the 
ground of advancing the cause of human justice, but not 
failing in the process to increase the facilities for invest-
ment and to acquire under favorable conditions the v a l u -
able natural resources of the lands occupied. O u r inter-
vention in C u b a was not in any sense a novel or cata-
clysmic affair. W e had aided the movement for C u b a n 
independence from Spain and considered intervention at 
various times for more than half a century before 1898. 
A t the close of the century things shaped up in such a w a y 
that we took the final step. F r o m C u b a we extended our 
economic penetration and political pressure into other 
parts of L a t i n America: Mexico, Ha i t i , Santo Domingo, 
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Nicaragua, Honduras , Salvador, Panama, and the Virg in 
Islands. D u r i n g the same period we turned to the Pacific 
and entered the Hawai ian Islands and the Phillipines. 
T h e Un i t ed States also joined wi th alacrity i * the com-
mercial penetration of China . W i t h the outbreak of the 
W o r l d W a r came our remarkable investments in All ied 
bonds and the subsequent European loans which have 
made us a very powerful factor in European finance. 
W i t h the discovery of rich petroleum resources in Asia 
Minor and Mesopotamia we have recently interested our-
selves in the Near East . 
There is no discernible limit to the nature or extent of 
our future investments in overseas areas. The most strik-
ing aspects of our recent financial penetration beyond 
national boundaries are those connected with the expan-
sion of our interests in Canada and L a t i n Amer ica , and 
our increasing importance in European international fi-
nance. W e have now become the chief outside investor 
in Canada; our trade and interests in South Amer ica have 
increased a thousandfold in a little more than a decade; 
and Europe looks to our aid and direction in settling her 
outstanding financial problems, as the formulation of the 
Dawes and Y o u n g Plans bear eloquent witness. The 
following table, taken from Margaret A . Marsh's The 
Bankers in Bolivia, gives a good statistical picture of the 
results of our expansion policy and of the extent of the 
"American Empire": 
T H E COLONIAL EMPIRE OF T H E U N I T E D STATES, 1924 
Area Population Commerce 
(square miles) (dollars) 
OUTLYING TERRITORIES: 
Alaska 590,884 60,000 $ 88,905,000 
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Hawaii 6,449 307,000 188,541,000 
DEPENDENCIES: 
Plülippme Island n f , 0 2 á 11,076,000 243,356,000 
Porto Rico 3,43 5 1,347,000 172,478,000 
Virgin Islands 132 26,000 2,559,000 
Samoa 5 8 8,000 294,000 
Guam 210 13,000 967,000 
Wake and Midway Is 29 
LEASED TERRITORY: 
Panama Canal Zone, Gaun-
tanámo, Fonseca Bay, 
Corn Island 527 27,000 
Total Possessions 716,750 12,864,000 $697,100,000 
NOMINALLY INDEPENDENT 
DEPENDENCIES; 
Cuba 44,164 3,369,000 $724,595,000 
Haiti 11,072 2,045,000 28,872,000 
Dominican Republic 19,325 897,000 51,843,000 
Panama 33,667 443,000 16,250,000 
Nicaragua 49,200 638,000 21,797,000 
Liberia 36,834 1,500,000 2,528,000 
Total nominally independent 
dependencies 194,262 8,892,000 $845,88 5,000 
Grand Total 911,012 21,756,000 $1,542,985,000 
The dynamics of our imperialistic ventures are well 
revealed by the following statistics of the remarkable 
growth of our commercial investments overseas: 
AMERICAN COMMERCIAL INVESTMENTS BY AREA 
1900 1920 1931 
Mexico $185,000,000 $ 800,000,000 $1,325,000,000 
Canada 150,000,000 1,450,000,000 4,436,011,000 
Cuba 50,000,000 525,000,000 1,530,000,000 
Other Latin-American 
Countries 5 5,000,000 650,000,000 5,722,000,000 
Europe 10,000,000 470,000,000 5,607,332,000 
Asia and Oceania 7,500,000 1,485,831,000 
In Lat in America the United States has been primarily 
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concerned with Mexico and the Caribbean area, par-
tially due to the Panama Canal and in part as a result 
of our large investments in these areas. T h e Panama 
C a n a l is of vital significance to the commerce and na-
tional protection of the United States. W e have about 
$1,325,000,000 invested in Mexico. O u r greatest invest-
ments in the Caribbean area are in C u b a , some $1,500,-
000,000. T h i s shows that outside C u b a and Mexico our 
policy is dictated pr imari ly by the larger strategy of 
security and protection. 
T h i s protective a im has led the Un i t ed States to as-
sert general supervision over the Caribbean area. W e 
have heavily fortified the Panama C a n a l . W e have taken 
steps to prevent the nine Caribbean republics f r o m fa l l -
ing into the hands of foreign powers. W e have assumed 
the obligation of encouraging order to protect A m e r i -
cans and foreigners and to forestall any excuse for 
intervention other than American . W e have followed 
such pol icy as to insure that any economic dependency 
of a Caribbean state shall be economic dependency on 
the U n i t e d States. W e have secured naval bases in the 
C a n a l Zone, C u b a and the V i r g i n Islands, and have 
purchased the right to a naval base i n Nicaragua. W e 
have encouraged Santo Domingo, Nicaragua, H a i t i and 
Salvador to pay off debts to foreign countries through 
A m e r i c a n loans, and have then established customs re-
ceiverships in these countries to insure payment o f these 
loans. T o protect foreigners, maintain order and give 
our investors security we have established mi l i tary gov-
ernments i n C u b a , H a i t i , Santo D o m i n g o and Nicaragua . 
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W e have temporarily intervened in H o n d u r a s twice , i n 
Nicaragua twice and in Guatemala once. 
I t is usually assumed that our State Department has 
invariably moved under pressure f r o m investment 
bankers, but the opposite has sometimes been the case. 
T h e Secretary of State has at times believed it desirable 
for the U n i t e d States to assert its supervision in some 
area and has wished to have the support of A m e r i c a n 
finance in such a policy. T h e n the State Department 
has brought pressure on the bankers to buy the bonds 
of the particular L a t i n A m e r i c a n country involved. S u c h 
was the case in the loans to Nicaragua and Honduras in 
1911-1913 and to C u b a in 1922. 
T h e fol lowing table, published in Current History for 
A p r i l , 1929, indicates both the nature of Amer ican p r i -
vate investments in L a t i n - A m e r i c a n countries at the 
present t ime and the changes in these investments be-
tween 1912 and 1928: 
1912 1928 
Argentina $40,000,000 $488,000,000 
Bolivia 10,000,000 90,000,000 
Brazil 50,000,000 400,000,000 
Central America and Panama 40,000,000 22 5,000,000 
Chile 15,000,000 500,000,000 
Colombia 2,000,000 212,000,000 
Cuba 220,000,000 1,325,000,000 
Ecuador 10,000,000 25,000,000 
The Guianas 5,000,000 7,500,000 
Haiti and Dominican Republic... 7,500,000 5 5,000,000 
Mexico 800,000,000 1,195,000,000 
Paraguay t 17,500,000 
Peru 35,000,000 170,000,000 
Uruguay 5,000,000 80,000,000 
Venezuela 3,000,000 125,000,000 
Total $1,242,500,000 $4,915,000,000 
xxviii I N T R O D U C T I O N 
" S T U D I E S I N A M E R I C A N I N V E S T M E N T ABROAD5' 
T h e Am e r ican F u n d for Publ ic Service is engaged in 
the process of employing a considerable sum of money 
for the purpose of advancing in diverse ways the cause of 
human enlightenment and social justice. I t was con-
ceived, and probably just ly , that one way in w h i c h this 
goal could be attained would be the appropriation of an 
adequate fund to al low the prosecution of studies into 
Amer ican expansion and investment. T h e A m e r i c a n 
F u n d rendered substantial aid in the process of compil ing 
and publishing the notable books by D r . Near ing and 
Mr. Freeman on Dollar Diplomacy and by M r . D u n n on 
American Foreign Investments. I t was further de-
cided to carry out three initial investigations of typica l 
examples of Amer ican imperialism in L a t i n A m e r i c a 
under the general direction of the present writer. C u b a , 
Santo Domingo and Bolivia were selected for this p u r -
pose. C u b a provides the example of a theoretically i n -
dependent state w h i c h has become i n fact an economic 
protectorate and also occupies a peculiar political status 
owing to the Piatt Amendment and the consequent 
ability of the United States to protect economic invest-
ments by periodic political interventions. Santo D o -
mingo is a representative case of forceful intervention 
primari ly to protect A m e r i c a n investors through restor-
ing order and stability. Bolivia presents an instance 
where the penetration has thus far been purely economic, 
and in w h i c h the engagements of the government of the 
state occupied have been made pr imar i ly to the private 
foreign bankers who have floated the requested loans. 
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For the execution of these three initial studies in 
American Investments Abroad three highly competent 
investigators were engaged. D r . Melvin M . Knight , a 
trained historian and economist, a professional student 
of contemporary economic history, and a specialist in 
the subject of imperialism, was selected to study Santo 
Domingo. D r . Leland H . Jenks, likewise trained equally 
in history and economics, and a specialist who has 
demonstrated his competence in this field by producing 
the foremost work on the migration of British capital 
overseas, was entrusted wi th the task of dealing w i th 
the Cuban situation. Margaret Alexander Marsh, long 
well known for her interest in international affairs, for 
a considerable period Executive Secretary of the A m e r i -
can Association for International Conciliation, and a 
specialist for the Federal Counc i l of Churches on A m e r i -
can investments in Mexico, was chosen to investigate 
the situation in Bolivia. 
The high quality of these original monographs and 
the interest they provoked both in this country and 
Lat in America (where they have since appeared in 
Spanish translation) has encouraged the American F u n d 
to sponsor another and more extensive group of studies. 
Books are in active preparation dealing with our finan-
cial and political relations with Colombia, Nicaragua, 
the Frui t Republics, H a i t i and Porto Rico . W e have 
been fortunate in finding scholars of the same high 
repute and impartiality as the original trio to undertake 
the second series of monographs. 
D r . Bailey W . Diffie, who has executed this study of 
contemporary conditions in Porto R ico , has been wel l 
trained for the investigation of L a t i n American prob-
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lems. A n American by birth and in collegiate training, 
he took his doctorate from the Univers i ty of Madrid in 
modern history and international relations. H e has thus 
been placed in a position to handle these issues from a 
broad and balanced point of view. 
T h i s monograph on Porto R i c a n conditions is given 
more than usual timeliness and interest through the 
recent visit of President Hoover to the Island. The 
President expressed himself as "well satisfied" wi th con-
ditions. A careful perusal of D r . Diffie's substantial and 
unprejudiced book w i l l furnish an excellent basis for 
judging M r . Hoover's knowledge of conditions in Porto 
Rico and his criteria of "satisfactory" conditions in our 
colonial domains. 
Political conditions are more tolerable than other as-
pects of Porto R i c a n life today, though even here 
Utopia has hardly been reached. Doubtless, M r . Hoover 
had in mind chiefly political life in Porto R i c o . Y e t 
political freedom, even if complete, is of no avail i f eco-
nomic conditions produce general misery, poverty and 
hopelessness. 
D r . Diffie presents a reliable and penetrating analysis 
of the economic life of Porto R i c o today. H e thus goes 
to the heart of the problem, though he does not ignore 
political life and institutions. H e shows that the three 
decades of American occupation have not notably bet-
tered the economic life or general l iv ing conditions of 
the mass of the Porto Ricans. Absentee ownership has 
impeded economic prosperity and social progress for the 
majority. The absentee owners have also been able to 
evade equitable taxation, thus failing to contribute their 
just quota to the public finances of the country. A l a r m -
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ingly rapid population growth has still further depressed 
living conditions. T h i s further demonstrates the i m -
possibility of separating economic and social conditions. 
I t seems to the editor that the fair-minded reader is 
likely to come from a perusal of D r . Diffie's work wi th 
the impression that Porto R i c o presents a pressing de-
mand for immediate economic and sociological stateman-
ship of a high order. There appears to be little ground 
for Mr. Hoover's satisfaction with the general state of 
affairs. Moreover, further delay in recognizing the real 
condition of the Island and in tackling the problems in 
resolute and realistic fashion wil l only pile up greater 
burdens and responsibilities which this country cannot 
continue indefinitely to deny or to dodge. 
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PORTO RICO: 
A BROKEN PLEDGE 
C H A P T E R I 
I N T R O D U C I N G P O R T O R I C O 
"The people of the United States in the cause of liberty, jus-
tice and humanity . . . come bearing the banner of freedom, 
inspired by a noble purpose . . . (to) bring you the fostering 
arm of a nation of free people, whose greatest power is in jus-
tice and humanity to all those living within its fold . . . not to 
make war upon the people of a country that for centuries has 
been oppressed but, on the contrary, to bring you protection, 
not only to yourselves, but to your property, to promote your 
prosperity, and to bestow upon you the immunities and bless-
ings of the liberal institutions of our government... to give to 
all within the control of its military and naval forces the ad-
vantages and blessings of enlightened civilization."—MAJOR-
GENERAL NELSON A. MILES TO THE PEOPLE OF PORTO RICO 
(1898) 
"The Congress of a country which never has enacted laws to 
oppress or abridge the rights of residents within its domain, 
and whose laws permit the largest liberty consistent with the 
preservation of order and the protection of property, may 
safely be trusted not to depart from its well-settled practice 
in dealing with the inhabitants of this island."—THE AMER-
ICAN PEACE COMMISSIONERS (1898) 
"The United States has made no promise to the people of 
Porto Rico that has not been more than fulfilled, nor has any 
representative or spokesman for the United States made such 
a promise."—CALVIN COOLIDGE (1928) 
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GOVERNOR ROOSEVELT SPEAKS 
T H E Stars and Stripes had flown over Porto R i c o for 
thirty-two years when young Governor Theodore 
Roosevelt wrote: 
"Rid ing through the hills, I have stopped at farm after 
farm where lean, underfed women and sickly men re-
peated again and again the same story—little food and 
no opportunity to get more. 
" F r o m these hills the people have streamed into the 
coastal towns, increasing the already severe unemploy-
ment situation there. Housing facilities, of course, are 
woefully inadequate. Six or seven people sometimes live 
in one small room. I n some of the poorer quarters I have 
seen as many as ten housed in a makeshift board room 
not more than 12 feet square. O f course, disease has 
spread, for living conditions of this sort always beget 
disease. Besides, the lack of funds and the increased 
work have rendered it impossible for our Hea l th De-
partment to cope satisfactorily wi th our increasing 
problems. 
" I n the last six weeks I have travelled all over the 
Island, I have been through school after school, I have 
seen hundreds of thousands of children and I write now 
not what I have heard or read, but what I have seen with 
m y own eyes. I have seen mothers carrying babies who 
were little skeletons. I have watched in a class-room 
thin, pallid, little boys and girls trying to spur their 
brains to action when their little bodies were underfed. 
I have seen them try ing to study on only one scanty meal 
a day, a meal of a few beans and rice. I have looked into 
the kitchens of houses where a handful of beans and a 
few plantains were the fare of the entire family ." 1 
I N T R O D U C I N G P O R T O R I C O Í 
Even the casual visitor finds it difficult to escape the 
continual piteous spectacle of poverty throughout the 
Island. T h e inland districts, from the outskirts of the 
cane-ridden valleys to the tops of the mountains, seethe 
with human misery, and it is impossible to pass into or 
out of any city or town without traversing the fringe of 
unsightly, malodorous, filthy habitations which surround 
the more prosperous areas. Every spot of arid or swampy 
land unfit for decent l iving has been seized by the gaunt, 
penniless population which stoically accepts its fate and 
lodges where it can. Generations of filth and poverty 
have robbed it of expectation of betterment, so that it 
pushes even into area occupied during a part of the day 
by the tide, and builds makeshift huts on stilts to the 
very borders of the sea. D u r i n g high tide one may see 
hundreds of houses on the outskirts of coastal cities, 
which give the appearance of floating on top of the 
water, as their floors are propped just high enough 
above the ascending water to avoid the entrance of the 
tide at its average height, but low enough to be i n u n -
dated at such times as i t may rise higher than its average 
level. T w i c e daily the inhabitants of these miserable 
huts are shut in or out of their dwellings unless they are 
willing to wade through water up to their waists, and 
year in and year out they are hemmed in by the moldy, 
mosquito-infested dampness which never dries. 
"We were and are a prey to disease of many kincis," 
Governor Roosevelt writes. " I n the fiscal year ending 
June 30,1929,4,442 of our people died from tuberculosis. 
O u r death rate from this disease was higher than that of 
any other place in the western hemisphere, and 4 1/2 times 
the death rate in the continental United States. O u r 
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death rate from malaria was 2 1 / 2 times the rate in the con-
tinental United States. Phrasing it differently, some 
35,000 people in our Island are now suifering from 
tuberculosis, some 200,000 from malaria and some 600,-
000 from hookworm. Besides hookworm there are a 
number of other intestinal parasites that cause great 
damage. . . . 
"This condition is all the more deplorable because the 
climate here is exceptionally healthy. "We have a mode-
rate temperature vary ing very little during the year. 
W e have an abundance of sunshine. T h e trade winds 
blow through the majority of the year. W e should be 
nearly free from such plagues as tuberculosis." 2 
H o w such conditions persist during th ir ty- two years 
under American rule and in the face of the promise of 
Major-General Miles to the people of Porto R i c o at the 
time of American occupation that "the people of the 
United States in the cause of liberty, justice and humanity 
. . . come bearing the banner of freedom, inspired by a 
noble purpose . . . " to "bring you the fostering a r m of a 
nation of free people, whose greatest power is in justice 
and humanity to all those living wi th in its fold . . . not to 
make war upon the people of a country that for centuries 
has been oppressed, but, on the contrary, to br ing you 
protection, not only to yourselves, but to your property, 
to promote your prosperity, and to bestow upon you the 
immunities and blessings of the liberal institutions of 
our g o v e r n m e n t . . . to give to all w i th in the control of its 
mil itary and naval forces the advantages and blessings 
of enlightened civil ization"?3 T o answer that question, 
it is necessary to review briefly the Island's racial , political 
and social history. 
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R A C I A L H I S T O R Y O F P O R T O R I C O 
When, in 1493, Columbus first set foot on the Island 
which later came to be k n o w n as Porto Rico , two Indian 
tribes were fighting for supremacy.4 T h e Borinquens, 
immigrants from northern South America, had been in 
possession of the Island sufficiently long to have become 
a peaceful, sedentary and partially civilized people. T h e y 
were apparently a branch of the Arawaks , inhabitants 
of Venezuela, and neighboring territories. The second 
tribe, also immigrants from South America, were a 
branch of the Caribs, and being of a warlike disposition 
were rapidly encroaching upon the older inhabitants. 
The Spaniard soon incurred the enmity of both tribes, 
and defending himself from the Carifc enslaved the 
Borinquen, wi th the result that from 1511, a date which 
marks the first resistance of the Borinquen, to the end of 
the century, almost constant warfare existed. The result 
was the migration of both Indian races to other islands, 
or to the mountains of the interior of the Island. T h e 
once large Indian population which has been estimated 
at 60,000, had almost disappeared by 1600, but as late 
as 1797 there still existed more than 2,000 unmixed I n -
dians together with an extensive mixture of Spaniards 
and Indians. A s early Spanish explorers came without 
wives it was only natural that they should have taken 
wives from among the conquered people. 
Still another racial element was soon introduced when 
the laws against the enslavement of Indians brought 
about the introduction of Negroes, and a further mixture 
of Indian and Negro was added to the cross between 
Indian and Spaniard. A n interbreeding between Span-
8 P O R T O R I C O : A B R O K E N P L E D G E 
iard and Negro resulted later when Negro women were 
introduced into the Island. A s a result of this commin-
gling of blood there lives in Porto R i c o today a large sec-
tion of the population which is not Spanish, Ind ian nor 
Negro, but so complete a fusion of all three that it is im-
possible to say in just what proportion these various 
bloods are represented. 
Despite this racial melange, however, there are two 
classes in whose composition there is scarcely any foreign 
blood. T h e jibaros, or peasants, are of pure Spanish 
extraction, and inhabit the interior of the Island. 
T h e pure blooded Spaniards of the higher class have re-
mained the leaders socially and politically, and largely 
retain the characteristics of their ancestors. I t is with 
these characteristics that the Amer ican has had to deal 
in governing the Island. T h e always preponderant ele-
ment of Spanish blood in the upper classes was strength-
ened steadily throughout every century of Spanish oc-
cupation by newcomers, as Porto R i c o was a military 
garrison and there was a constant addition to the original 
Spanish settlers of the best blood of Spain. Furthermore, 
during the time of Phil ip I I , who was king of both Por-
tugal and Spain, Porto Rico was garrisoned by a regiment 
of Portuguese, many of whom remained and whose de-
scendents may be known today from the numerous 
Portuguese names among the population. 
D u r i n g and after the wars of independence in South 
America , Porto R i c o saw the immigration of the group 
which was to determine so largely the composition of her 
upper classes. Spaniards from the mainland whose loyalty 
to Spain had made their lives unsafe, fled to the Island 
where they assumed positions of prominence in the social 
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and political life. Af ter 1815, when the "Cédu la de 
Gracias" increased commercial possibilities in the Island, 
other Spaniards came direct from Spain and settled. T h i s 
constant renewal of upper class Spanish blood explains 
w h y Porto R i c o was never a fertile soil for the seeds of 
revolution, and w h y she remained faithful even when 
C u b a was in revolt. 
ECONOMIC LIFE 
I n addition to its many other troubles, Porto Rico has 
had a rather sad economic history.5 I t lacked the one 
essential necessary to hold its settlers—gold. Despite 
every effort to discover profitable supplies the yield of 
this metal remained insignificant as compared with that 
from Mexico and Peru. T h e one source of wealth of 
the Island was confined then as now to its agricultural 
produce. 
Sugar cultivation was introduced into Porto Rico in 
1514. Its production grew rapidly, and by 1533 more 
than 10,000 pounds were exported to Seville, and b y 
1586, 11 mills wi th an annual production of about 165,-
000 pounds were in operation. T h e nineteenth century 
saw the greatest expansion of the sugar industry, which 
then had 267 mills of steam power, 211 "trapiches" of 
oxen, and five water mills. I n 1850 the total sugar pro-
duction was worth 4,000,000 Spanish pesos. 
Parallel w i th sugar, other crops were produced wi th 
success. Tobacco cultivation was introduced but the 
law made its exportation contraband. This provision 
did not retard its growth, however, for in the nineteenth 
century it was one of the largest crops. I n 1647, 10,000 
hides were shipped to Seville, and the number smuggled 
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out of the country considerably increased this number. 
Ginger was a principal crop and the contraband trade 
carried on with the D u t c h furnished a steady source of 
revenue through the seventeenth century. 
T h e extensive list of products of the Island dur ing the 
eighteenth century shows its fabulous agricultural pos-
sibilities. Sugar cane, tobacco and coffee were the money 
crops, while bananas, hay, rice, maize, kidney beans, 
sweet potatoes, pumpkins , cotton and ginger were also 
produced for export. 
T h e policy followed by Spain in conformity w i t h the 
mercantilist ideas of the time was the chief obstacle to 
the growth of commerce and industry before the nine-
teenth century. I f , in accordance w i t h the contemporary 
theory, a colony existed solely for the advantage of the 
mother country, that country could expect to reap the 
ful l harvest only by the enjoyment of monopolistic trade 
relations. Under this policy, Porto Rico could trade 
with a foreign power only by illegal means and smuggling 
was carried on continually. I t w i l l later be seen that this 
monopolistic system has varied but little under Porto 
Rico's present form of government. 
T h e organization in 17 5 5 of a company to trade with 
Porto Rico and the establishment of a maritime mai l line 
in 1765 gave an outlet for the colony's products. The 
monopoly exercised by Madrid had been removed in 
1715, and that of C a d i z , in 1778, but San Juan still re-
mained as the only port of the country. F r o m the time 
of Charles I I I , the commercial restrictions that had been 
laid on the Island were gradually removed and i n 1778 
the Porto Ricans first received the right to own land. To 
this privilege was attached the duty of paying a fee to 
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cover the expense of clothing the mil i tary establishment 
maintained in the Island. 
Inasmuch as the colony was not self-sustaining, gold 
from Mexico was brought to cover deficits in the local 
budget. Thi s subsidy ceased when, in 1810, Mexico 
revolted from Spain and won her independence. A new 
period of prosperity for Porto Rico was, however, at hand, 
and 1815 proved a great year for the Island, the " C é d u l a 
de Gracias" bringing about reforms which stimulated 
business. T h e most important reforms made possible 
by this new ruling were permission to trade with the non-
Spanish islands of the West Indies; the creation of a de-
pository for Spanish goods, making the Island a jobbing 
and distributing center; absolute independence in the 
slave trade; the right to buy and register foreign boats 
as Spanish; and sanctioning of the settlement of Catholic 
foreigners. T h e direct result of this last provision was 
the immigration of French families from Louisiana in 
1816, an element which added a very important com-
mercially minded class. These reforms and the new 
fusion of blood from other Spanish colonies then in re-
volt, made the nineteenth century one of marked impor-
tance in Porto R i c a n history, and the most startling 
progress was shown after 1850. 
T h e production of sugar, which up to this time had 
been but an. uncertain source of revenue, reflects the ad-
vancement then in ful l swing. I n 1850, the sugar crop 
was 112,000,000 pounds. I t was 116,000,000 pounds 
in 1860, a small though rather constant increase having 
been maintained for the preceding ten years. T h e 1870 
production reached 191,000,000 pounds, the highest u p 
to that time, while 1871 records 206,000,000 pounds of 
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sugar produced. T h i s figure was not maintained, but in 
1879, the highest production before American occupa-
tion, the sugar crop reached 154,000,000 kilos, or about 
340,000,000 pounds. T h e prosperity of the Island began 
to decline, however, about 1890 and by 1897 the sugar 
crop had fallen to but 125,000,000 pounds. 
T h e coffee crop of the same period shows fluctuations 
proportionate to those of sugar. I n 1850, 11,000,000 
pounds of coffee were grown; by 1860 the crop had in-
creased to 15,000,000 pounds, and by 1870 to 17,000,000. 
A s in the case of sugar, 1879 produced the largest coffee 
crop up to that time, reaching about 30,000,000 kilos 
or 66,000,000 pounds. W i t h more or less steady de-
cline it had dropped in 1897 to only 50,000,000 pounds. 
Tobacco over this period does not hold to so constant 
a figure as sugar and coffee. T h e crop of 1850 reached 
almost 3,000,000 pounds, doubled itself in 1851, and 
finally decreased wi th some variations to 2,500,000 
pounds in 1860. T h e next two years saw crops of 8,000,-
000 and 9,000,000 pounds respectively, the highest 
figure prior to 1880, when tobacco reached its peak of 
more than 12,000,000 pounds. T h e decline of the crop 
was sudden and during the six years preceding American 
occupation, it remained at a figure near 4,000,000 
pounds, until in 1897 the crop was something over 
6,000,000 pounds. 
THE POLITICAL PAST 
T o view Porto Rico's past as the past of a responsible 
people would be an injustice. T h e history of Porto 
Rico is the history of a subject people—a colony, tied 
for four hundred years to the apron strings of Spain, 
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and, in its dependent maturity, abruptly shifted to the 
foster aprong strings of the United States.6 Self-gov-
ernment was never a part of its upbringing. Its pros-
perity or its poverty, its government good or bad, must 
be laid at the door of an indifferent parent—never at 
that of an unhampered Porto Rico . 
A s Spain majestically pursued her way through the 
centuries, Porto R i c o dangled along as best she could, 
accepting what crumbs of culture and progress came her 
way, more or less reconciled to her lot as one of the least 
favored of all Spain's children. T h e return that Porto 
Rico could make to Spain was small—gold she had none, 
and the gold-giving colony was the darling of Spain's 
eyes. T h e smallest and least prepossessing of all Spain's 
possessions in the N e w World , Porto Rico could mean 
little in the life of her immense Empire . 
I t has been said that "Glory, Gold and God" were the 
three motives which prompted Castile to its rapid con-
quest of what at that time was the world's most extensive 
empire. T h e cupidity of the entire human race, and not 
of the Spanish race alone, brought colonization most 
promptly to those places where gold was most abundant 
and where deeds of heroism in the defense of the "Fai th" 
were most productive of honor and great fame. 
W i t h i n eighty years after the discovery of America , 
Spain had pushed her way through most of the territory 
from Cali fornia to Patagonia. England and France had 
done little during this time. A m o n g other reasons one 
is outstanding: no gold had been found along the N o r t h 
Atlantic coast. T h e close-fisted H e n r y V I I found no 
reason to be liberal w i th Cabot, who brought back 
promises in place of profits, so while Spain was conquer-
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ing the N e w W o r l d , England conservatively stuck to the 
old trade routes, wh ich brought in a less bril l iant, but 
more certain yield. 
W h a t Labrador was to Eng land , Porto R i c o was to 
Spain. I t lacked the necessary elements of quick returns; 
according to the colonial creed, it committed the unfor-
givable sin: it did not pay. A colony which required 
subsidies for its defense failed in the sole reason for its 
existence: to fatten the mother country. Both England 
and Spain viewed their colonies in the light of sources 
for raw materials and precious metals—as a market for 
their manufactured products. A s Porto R i c o , a scant 
thousandth part of Spain's empire, offered few of these 
advantages, the notice which she received f r o m Spain 
was proportionately slight. 
Poor Porto Rico , on the other hand, suffered all the 
vary ing fortunes of Mother Spain. W h e n Spain was at 
war, Porto Rico was subject to attack. This was her one 
excuse for being; although of small advantage to Spain 
herself, Porto Rico's advantages to England or Holland 
as a base for attacks on Spain's great treasure fleets, were 
incalculable. Periodically ships came out from Spain to 
the gold-supplying colonies of L a t i n America , returning 
laden wi th untold riches—and in deadly fear of English 
and D u t c h pirates. 
A f t e r its discovery, Porto R i c o was neglected unti l in 
1505 it was granted to V i ñ c e n t e Y a n e z P i n z ó n , one of 
the companions of Columbus on his first voyage. Pin-
z ó n either lacked the means to fulfil l his obligations, or 
lost interest in the Island, for he forfeited his rights. 
Ferdinand was merciless in his demands for gold and 
would not tolerate a lazy explorer. D u r i n g the three 
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years following this incident, the Island received no fur-
ther attention. 
Its next possessor is better known to history for his 
search for the Fountain of Eternal Y o u t h than for his 
activities in Porto R ico , but his contribution in Florida 
to the settlement of the N e w W o r l d was insignificant as 
compared with his part in the settlement of Porto Rico . 
Ponce de L e ó n landed in the Island in August, 1508 w i th 
fifty companions and was well received by the Indians. 
He settled near what is now San Juan, and the site was 
given the name of V i l l a de Caparra by Obando, governor 
of Española . T h e king , however, decreed that the set-
tlement should be called "Cibdad de Puertorrico" and by 
some chance this name of "Puerto R i c o " changed places 
with the name San J u a n Bautista, which Columbus had 
applied to the entire Is land, so that today San Juan is the 
city and Porto Rico the Island. I n 1509, Ponce received 
the title of "Governor" and the next year he was named 
Captain of Sea and L a n d . His tenure of office was soon 
interrupted by the appointment of Diego Columbus, who 
named Juan Ceron as his lieutenant in Porto Rico. 
Several years of difficulties followed wherein Ponce de 
Leon's varying fortunes plunged h im in and out of the 
governorship. A little later the Island was divided into 
two sections, San G e r m a n and Porto Rico. F r o m this 
time on it was ruled by a succession of Spanish governors, 
the majority more interested in their own private in -
terests than in those of the Island. These conditions were 
hardly helpful to Porto Ricans in learning self-govern-
ment. 
W i t h Ceron began the system of "Encomiendas" and 
"Repartimientos," which has received so much unfavor-
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able criticism from historians of the colonial period. This 
system, somewhat akin to our present day ward-boss 
politics, gave to certain favorites who had supposedly 
rendered special service to the government, the posses-
sion of designated lands and of a certain number of the 
Indians. The Cathol ic Kings had introduced this plan 
in the new world in the hope of giving just treatment 
and religious teaching to the natives. Greedy for gain, 
however, the men thus favored often placed unbearable 
burdens on the Indians, and numbers of them died from 
hard labor and bad conditions. I t was not difficult to 
overwork men who had lived for generations on the 
abundant growth of the Island without need of exerting 
themselves. T h e revolt in 1511 terminated in the en-
slavement of large numbers of Indians and from this 
time on the colonization progressed slowly but surely. 
I f the gold and silver of Mexico and Peru had not been 
uncovered, Porto R i c o would probably have been of more 
importance to the Empire , but this condition made the 
colonization of Porto Rico from 1521 to a period near 
the end of the century exceedingly slow, new settlers 
preferring the lands of greater remuneration. Further-
more, Spain was seldom at peace during the century fol-
lowing the discovery of Porto R i c o . W h e n Charles V 
came to the Spanish Throne he found himself the posses-
sor of a vast ultramarine empire in addition to an already 
extensive empire in Europe. T h e great wealth which 
Spain brought from her colonies was spent in maintaining 
an almost constant warfare w i th Francis I and a little 
later wi th the Protestants, while enormous sums were 
necessary for the construction of a great navy and the 
maintenance of a great mil itary establishment, first to 
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conquer the N e w W o r l d , then to protect the merchant-
men which brought home her wealth to Spain. A very i m -
portant part of this mil itary establishment was in the 
West Indies, and Porto Rico, being the nearest of all 
Spain's American possessions to the motherland, served 
as an indispensable l ink in the system. 
I n 1 5 53, erection of the Fort of Santa Catalina was 
begun and in 1584, when Philip I I had inherited his 
father's vast dominions, the construction of San Felipe 
el Morro was undertaken. These two forts played an 
active part in the Island's defense when England, unsuc-
cessful in her quest for gold, countenanced the privateer-
ing of H a w k i n s and D r a k e , who were a constant menace 
to Spain's treasure galleons. I n 1 595, San Juan repulsed 
an attack of these famous English buccaneers, by a 
bloody fight in which Hawkins was killed. Three years 
later, the Count of Cumberland captured and held the 
city for a period of a few months, practically the only 
time before 1898 that Porto Rico was under foreign 
domination. T h e D u t c h captured, sacked and burned 
San Juan in 1625, but were immediately driven away 
by the heroic fighting of Juan de A m é s q u i t a , who has 
taken his place in history as one of the early heroes of 
Porto R i c o . Porto R i c o suffered many other attacks 
during the next two centuries because of the almost 
constant warfare which the House of Austria and later 
the Spanish Bourbons carried on with their neighbors. 
D u r i n g the wars which followed the French Revolution, 
the Island suffered an attack by the English forces who 
were driven back wi th a loss of 300 men. From 1808 to 
1826, while Spain was endeavoring to suppress revolution 
from Mexico to Argentina, Porto Rico remained loyal 
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and m a n y Spanish loyalists as previously explained, took 
refuge in the Is land, strengthening the fidelity of a people 
who had never attempted revolution. 
A movement for autonomy arose about the middle of 
the nineteenth century . Revolutionists from the south-
ern continent in a desire to liberate the remaining Spanish 
colonies carried their intervention to C u b a and Porto 
Rico , but the composition of the Porto R i c a n population 
condemned their efforts to failure. T h e rul ing class was 
Spanish, entirely loyal and not in the least l ike ly to re-
volt, while the mass was jibaro (peasant) and entirely 
too ignorant to comprehend any such movement. I n 
1869, the right to elect a body of deputies was created, 
and served to appease for the time being all but the 
most violent nationalists. Some, however, could not be 
satisfied by such a minor concession, and the autonomists 
kept up an active campaign, although no revolutionary 
movement reached a stage equal to that in C u b a . The 
movement for autonomy bore frui t in 1897, w h e n Spain, 
hard pressed in C u b a , and under control of the Liberal 
Par ty , heeded the petition of L u i s M u ñ o z R i v e r a and 
granted the A u t o n o m y Charter . 
A s a result of the w a r between Spain and the Uni ted 
States, this form of government was in actual force for 
only a few months. 
C H A P T E R I I 
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"The Governor-General had the right of vetoing the statutes 
voted by the Chambers which required his approbation to ac-
quire executive character. The opportunity of exercising this 
right of veto never arrived, because the first legislature was dis-
solved immediately on being called, owing to the war."— 
MUÑOZ RIVERA (1898) * 
"As to the peons, however, they have nothing. They have 
no medicines, nor doctors, nor proper food; they don't live in 
houses, they don't live in villages, but live like savages. They 
have no education, nothing is done for them, and it appears in-
credible, and it is a mystery to me how they live on 50 cen-
tavos a day or less with the large families they have."—José 
RAMON RIVERA (1898) f 
OUR PROMISE RECALLED 
IN 1928 when Colonel Lindbergh visited Porto R i c o 
the Legislature of Porto R i c o intrusted to h im a "Message 
from the People of Porto R i c o to the People of the U n i t e d 
States" w h i c h in part besought: " G r a n t us the freedom 
that you enjoy, for w h i c h you struggled, which you w o r -
ship, w h i c h we deserve, and you have promised us." 1 
* Leader of the Autonomy Movement during the Spanish rule and of 
the Unionist Party after American occupation until his death in 1916. 
t Porto Rican physician at the time of American occupation, 1898. 
19 
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Concurrent with this message, a cablegram was ad-
dressed by the President of the Porto Rican Senate and 
the Speaker of the House to President Coolidge, on the 
occasion of the Sixth Pan-Amer ican Conference at 
Habana. This cablegram, in the same vein as the mes-
sage sent by Colonel Lindbergh, stated: 
"Porto Rico feels humiliated because of the inferior 
condition she is subjected to in spite of the hopes the treaty 
of Paris woke in us; in spite of the unfulfilled promises 
made to our people, and in spite of the repeated legitimate 
demands in favor of a regime that may enable our Island 
to exercise her own sovereignty over her own internal 
affairs and to freely solve the grave economical situation 
she is undergoing. 
" O u r s is the only Spanish-American country whose 
voice has not been heard at Habana during the Pan-
American Conference, for it was not represented there, 
and we are now cabling to Habana asking our sister na-
tions of America, now meeting there, to join us i n making 
this petition to your excellency." 2 
T o these two messages, President Coolidge replied via 
the Governor of Porto Rico, that "the cablegram and 
resolution seem to be based largely on a complete misun-
derstanding of concrete facts. . . . T h e United States has 
made no promise to the people of Porto Rico that has not 
been more than fulfilled, nor has any representative or 
spokesman for the Uni ted States made such a promise"! 3 
I n view of such a statement enquiry may well be made as 
to what General Miles promised the people of Porto Rico 
when he said: "We have come to bring you protection, 
not only to yourselves, but to your property, to pro-
mote your prosperity, and to bestow upon you the im-
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munities and blessings of the liberal institutions of our 
government." W h a t then were the conditions which 
called for a declaration which promised to protect the 
person and property and promote the prosperity of the 
people of Porto Rico? "What were the institutions which 
were to be suplanted in order to bestow "the immunities 
and blessings of the liberal institutions of our G o v e r n -
ment"? W h a t were the economic, educational and po-
litical conditions of the Island when the United States 
began its occupation? 
A G R I C U L T U R A L CONDITIONS 
T h e total area of Porto Rico is 3,43 5 square miles, or 
some 2,198,400 acres, which is about two-thirds the size 
of Connecticut. I n 1899, 1,754,774 acres were in farms, 
and 477,987 in cultivation.4 The census shows that the 
main crops cultivated were coffee, 41 per cent of the total, 
sugar cane, 15 per cent, and food crops, 32 per cent. O n e 
per cent was in tobacco and about 10 per cent was not 
accounted for.5 Sugar and coffee were foods to the ex-
tent that they were consumed on the Island. I n spite of 
this, half the total imports were food stuffs. There were 
39,021 farms. Commenting on farm ownership, the 
census says: 
"While in C u b a the proportion of farm owners to the 
whole number of farms is but 28 per cent, in Porto Rico 
it is 93 per cent. O n the other hand, the proportion of 
the cultivated area owned by occupants is but 43.5 per 
cent in C u b a , while in Porto Rico it is 91 per cent. I n 
other words, a large proportion of the cultivated area of 
Cuba is in the hands of comparatively few landlords, 
some of whom reside outside of the Island, while in Porto 
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Rico large numbers of the rural population own their 
homes and are permanent residents." 8 
T h e following table is compiled from information from 
the Census of 1899 and shows the maximum amount of 
land in farms of less than 100 acres. 
Acres Farms Maximum Extent 
0-4 22,327 89,308 
5-9 7,417 66,7 J 3 
10-19 4,503 85,557 
20-49 2,929 143,521 
50-99 994 98,456 
Total 38,170 483,595 
These38,170 farms contained 483,595 acres, but the re-
maining farms, only 8 51 in number, had 1,271,179 
acres. T h e y made up only 2.18 per cent of the total num-
ber of farms, but they represented more than 72 per 
cent of the total land devoted to agriculture. A high 
percentage of farmers were owners, but the bulk of the 
land belonged to a chosen few. 
T h i s large scale farming was having its effect on the 
food producing crops. O n l y a little more than 153,000 
acres were given to produce consumed mainly at home; 
and the coffee and sugar crops received more attention 
from farmers. H o w really inadequate the food supply 
was may be seen by looking at the amount of food im-
ported, which in 1897 was valued at more than 8,000,000 
pesos, and was 50 per cent of the imports for that year.7 
T A X B U R D E N S A N D B E N E F I T S 
T h e tax burden borne by the Porto Rican was by no 
means small. T h e combined expenses of the Insular 
Government, the Provincial Deputation and the Munic -
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ipal Governments was more than 7,500,000 pesos, a 
sum equal to about 1/5 of the total trade and 1/14 of 
the entire wealth of the country. T h e expenses of the 
Insular Government alone were nearly 4,000,000 pesos.8 
About 500,000 pesos of this went for the budget of the 
Ministerio de Ul tramar (the Colonial Ministry) and a l -
most 1,500,000 pesos went for the support of the A r m y 
and N a v y of Spain. I n other words, about half the I n -
sular budget was being used for the support of the home 
government, and benefited Porto R i c o only indirectly. 
For public health and sanitation, the Provincial D e p u -
tation spent 38,748 pesos, while for all kinds of hospital 
expense and sanitation for both army and navy the I n -
sular Government spent 87,983 pesos, making a total of 
126,731 pesos. T h e Provincial Deputation spent an ad-
ditional sum of 50,116 pesos for "Beneficencia," or pub-
lic charity. This totalled 176,847 pesos. I t is difficult 
to determine just how much of the municipal budget 
went for health and sanitation. San Juan spent 28,972 
pesos in 1897-98, out of an estimated expense of 598,484 
pesos, for public charity.8 This is a little less than 5 per 
cent. Ponce spent 33,758 pesos, out of a budget of 287,-
759 pesos, or a little less than 12 per cent. San G e r m á n 
spent 2,800 pesos of a budget of 51,960 pesos,10 or just 
over 5 per cent. Guayama had a total budget of 59,500 
pesos and an expenditure of 6,950 pesos was made for 
public charity,11 amounting to more than 11 per cent. 
These figures would seem to show that sanitation and 
health may have used up to 10 per cent of the entire 
municipal budget, but probably not more. T e n per cent 
of the municipal budget of 2,799,848 is 279,984 pesos, 
which when added to the 176,847 pesos spent b y the 
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A r m y , N a v y and Provincial Deputation, gives a total 
for all expenditures for sanitation and health of 456,795 
pesos out of the total combined budget, or about 6 per 
cent. 
T H E T A R I F F S Y S T E M 
T h e sources from which these taxes were collected 
were such as to make them fall mainly on the classes 
least able to pay them. O n 17,858,063 pesos of im-
ported goods, 2,841,962 pesos tariff was assessed. This 
represents an increase of 15.9 per cent in the cost of the 
goods. O n food products worth 8,984,808 pesos, the 
duty collected was 1,750,856 pesos, or about 19.5 per 
cent. T h e tariff on many food products was extremely 
high. F lour paid about 4 pesos on every 200 pounds, and 
there was an additional 2.50 pesos consumption tax mak-
ing the total tax on flour around 3 pesos a hundredweight. 
Wheat paid 3.15 pesos on 200 pounds, while rice paid 
1.95 in the husk and 2.70 pesos cleaned. A n additional 
consumption tax of one peso made the rice tax amount 
to 3.70 pesos. Fresh beef paid 5 pesos for 220 pounds in 
addition to a head tax for slaughtering. Fortunately the 
country then produced meat in sufficient quantities to 
supply its needs and export a portion. Sugar paid a tax 
of 2 centavos per pound. 
I n addition to customs duties, m a n y other tariffs bore 
heavily on local manufacturing. T h e tariff on 100 boxes 
of soap of 100 pounds each was 15 pesos, but the tariff on 
the supplies necessary to make this soap was 32.82 pesos. 
The oppressive tariffs of which C u b a complained so bit-
terly were, on some commodities, even higher i n Porto 
Rico . A four seated carriage paid 350 pesos in Porto 
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Rico, and 100 pesos less in Cuba . Ra i lway carriages paid 
only 4.80 pesos per hundredweight in C u b a , but 8 pesos 
in Porto Rico. Carts and handcarts paid but 3.80 pesos 
in C u b a , while in Porto Rico they paid 6 pesos.12 These 
examples show how heavy was the tariff levied on the 
Porto R i c a n people and how much Porto Rico was com-
pelled to pay out in taxes. 
E D U C A T I O N 
T h e educational system was wholly inadequate for the 
country's needs. T h e total number of buildings used for 
school purposes was not more than Í60,13 and the total 
number of students has nowhere been quoted at more 
than 28,000.14 O n l y one person in every 3 5 was in school 
and of children of school-age probably not more than one 
in 12 received any instruction. O f the 560 buildings 
used for school purposes (given in the Census of 1899 as 
only 473) only one had been erected for use as a school.15 
T h e amount of money spent on education was piti-
fully small. Almost everything so spent came from the 
municipal budgets and although the Insular Government 
was using more than half of the tax money collected, it 
spent almost nothing for education. T h e report of the 
C i v i l Secretary in 1897 mentions all of the major expenses 
of the government without including anything for 
schools, and says: " T h e support of Public Instruction 
figured in the Insular budget in a secondary place, the 
greater part of the expense falling on the municipali-
ties." 16 T h e Carrol l Report shows that the "Presupuesto 
General de Gastos e Ingresos" for 1897-98 included only 
300 pesos for educational purposes. T h e Provincial D e p -
utation spent 120,195 pesos; the total amount spent by 
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the three branches of the government amounted to 331,-
367 pesos.17 Less than four and one half per cent of the 
budget was spent on education! H o w ineffectual the 
system was is illustrated by the fact that more than 80 
per cent of the entire population was illiterate. 
T h e scarcity in quantity of education was in no way 
compensated by the quality which , according to the 
testimony of Porto Ricans themselves, was far f rom sat-
isfactory. D r . Carbonel l , Secretary of Interior (Fo-
mento) under whose direction the educational system 
came, gave as his opinion that "the previous system of 
instruction in this island could not have been worse." 18 
H e also said that the system was antiquated, the teachers 
poorly paid or sometimes not paid at all , the municipalities 
lax in keeping the schools open and frequently suspend-
ing them when short of funds. There were "very few 
buildings" and, though required by law to furnish books 
and supplies, the municipalities seldom did so. T h e curric-
u lum consisted of "reading, writ ing, arithmetic, very 
much religious teaching and history." The highest in-
struction possible was the "bachelor's degree, which is 
the degree that entitles a person to enter the universities." 
H e further stated that there was no university. 
ROADS AND R A I L R O A D S 
T h e transportation system was as faulty as the schools. 
T h e C i v i l Secretary says: " W i t h respect to the construc-
tion of roads and public highways, almost all were in a 
state of embryo or study, except the central road from 
the Capi ta l to Ponce." 19 There were some 275 kilo-
meters of hard surface road, most of it between these two 
towns.20 T h e quality of this road was very excellent, but 
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it was not one twentieth part of what Porto Rico needed. 
The need of more roads was recognized, and Señor José 
Amadeo testified that "except for the central road, which 
was built splendidly w i th strategic views, as were also 
those of Guayama and Adjuntos, the roads of the coun-
try are for the most part mule tracks and cart paths, i m -
passable in rainy weather." H e also stated that "a jour-
ney from Maunabo to Mayaguez (about one hundred 
miles) in the months of June to October costs more than 
a trip to N e w Y o r k " and "after four centuries of exist-
ence we are almost cut off from intercommunication. 
O f our internal roads, it is best to say nothing; no one 
dares journey by them: even in traveling on foot one's 
ribs are not safe. There are towns where no mail is de-
livered for five or six days when the rivers rise, and 
neither the public works department nor private enter-
prise has thought of spanning the rivers even by foot-
bridges." 21 
D r . Santiago Veve of Fajardo testified that the cost of 
sending a cart from San Juan to Fajardo was $20 to $25. 
"The reason for this," he said, "is the condition of the 
roads, w h i c h wear the oxen out. T h e y are really not 
roads. Y o u go over them and get stuck in mud up to 
the middle of the wheels. I n order to come here to attend 
the Congress yesterday I had to pass over a river on a 
raft." 22 T h e inevitable conclusion from this testimony 
is that, in spite of the excellent military highways, the 
Island needed more roads badly and the growth of com-
merce and agriculture was stifled because of bad means 
of communication. 
The railroad situation in 1898 was no better than that 
of the highways. There were only 194 kilometers of 
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railroads in operation, according to the testimony of M r . 
C . Dominguez of G u a y a m a , and this 194 kilometers was 
cut up into four unconnected parts. Theoretically there 
was a road completely encircling the Island, but much 
of it had not gone beyond a survey, according to M r . 
Tui lo Larr inga , an engineer who had constructed a large 
part of the railroad lines then in existence. 
H E A L T H A N D S A N I T A T I O N 
T h e health conditions were certainly not such as to have 
given the Island a reputation as a health resort. D r . José 
C . Barbosa, graduate of the Universi ty of Michigan Med-
ical School in the class of 1880, says the most prevalent 
diseases were malaria and tuberculosis. Concerning the 
death rate among children he said: " T h e poor here have 
too many children to sustain; they have not the means 
to provide their children proper nourishment. Mi lk 
costs here a great deal, because of the consumption tax, 
and is usually stale. T h e n the crowded way in w h i c h the 
poor live and the damp places where they have to live are 
conducive to diseases among the children and adults as 
well. T h e principal diseases among the children are 
bowel diseases, which reduce them to a condition of weak-
ness from which they are unable to build up their strength 
again, owing to lack of proper nourishment and suitable 
conditions. There is also a great deal of tetanus among 
the children owing to the careless w a y in which the cord 
is cut at birth—seldom by a physician in the case of poor 
children; usually an old neighbor is called in and she wi l l 
cut the cord with a pair of scissors. T h i s carelessness, to-
gether wi th the climate, which is favorable to the de-
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velopment of tetanus, produces the disease in many 
cases." 23 
Mr. Gonzales Cordova (physician) testified as fol-
lows: " I wi l l take advantage of this opportunity to say 
a few words in behalf of m y country with regard to ques-
tions concerning m y profession. I consider Porto R i c o 
the most anaemic country in the world. W e are almost 
without charitable institutions; so much so, that among 
a people of 1,000,000 inhabitants we have only one hos-
pital worthy of the name. That is at Ponce. W e are con-
tinually seeing people in the country die for want of 
medical assistance." 24 
Concerning sanitary conditions in the Island, D r . A z e l 
Ames, Major and Brigade Surgeon, United States V o l u n -
teers, says: "The sanitary or rather unsanitary conditions 
of Porto R i c o have been too well known, especially by 
army and other visitors of the island in the last few 
months, to need any extended comment. That every dis-
ease of a zymotic character—that is, diseases originating 
in filth—was widely prevalent—in fact, omnipresent— 
goes almost without saying. Perhaps no more general 
filth conditions among a people l iving so nearly an out-
door life, and yet so densely packed in a small area, was 
ever k n o w n , and these conditions, both an ever-increasing 
menace to themselves and recently to the lives and health 
of new possessors and their representatives, have assumed 
the utmost importance." 25 
T h e death rate for the years between 1898 and 1901 
was exceptionally high due to the condition produced by 
the w a r and by the hurricane of 1899. D u r i n g 1888-
1898, the death rate ranged from 24.6 per thousand to 
35.7 per thousand. T h e years 1897 and 1898 show the 
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highest rates, 34.4 and 3 5.7 respectively.26 T h e census 
takers estimated that these figures did not approach the 
real figures, due to poor recording of deaths, and that the 
number of deaths certainly was very much higher. 
T h e death rate first cited was due largely to laboring 
and l iv ing conditions, which were so bad as to defy de-
scription. Many families had but one meal a day and that 
consisted of rice, beans and bananas. Wages were only 
2 S to SO centavos a day, with sometimes one, sometimes 
two meals given by the employer, but families of five and 
ten had to live on the stipend w h i c h was paid in cash or 
even in script. L i t t l e children wore no clothes, and 
adults wore few, while only 200,000 of the more than 
900,000 inhabitants ever wore shoes, and not more than 
100,000 had shoes the year around. 
Houses were entirely inadequate. T h e rural dwellings 
were made of poles and miscellaneous boards, and had a 
thatched roof. T h e interior had no furniture except 
boxes, cans and logs, and when dining the family sat on 
the floor. Few had beds; the majority slept in hammocks 
or on the floor. D r i n k i n g water came from insanitary 
sources, more than 8 5,000, or 53 per cent of the houses 
using river water, and some 5 5,000,.or 34 per cent, draw-
ing the water supply from cisterns. O n l y 11 per cent of 
the people used water from such sources as springs and 
aqueducts which could be considered sanitary.27 Such 
large numbers were unemployed that the number of 
workers without occupation reached in 1899, 17 per cent 
of the male population ten years old and older. 
A N E W F O R M O F G O V E R N M E N T 
T h e position of Porto Rico was certainly not enviable; 
P O R T O R I C O I N 1898 31 
bad government, high tariffs and taxes, a poor and inade-
quate school system, low wages, insanitary l iving condi-
tions, bad roads, and unequal distribution of wealth had 
made the Island anything but the plentiful land which 
its soil and climate entitled it to be. Porto Rico's hope 
now lay in the autonomous government recently granted 
her. 
I t is customary for North Americans to pooh-pooh 
this form of government because of its short duration 
but under its provisions Porto Rico had many privileges 
for which the people had waited 400 years and for which 
they still wait. T h e head of the government was a G o v -
ernor-General appointed by the K i n g of Spain. T h e 
legislative powers were vested in a council of Adminis -
tration and the Chamber of Representatives. T h e first 
was composed of 15 members, eight to be elected by the 
people and seven to be named by the Governor-General. 
The lower house was elected as a body by the people, and 
only Spanish subjects born in Porto Rico or those who 
had resided on the Island continuously for four years 
were eligible. T h e powers of the legislature extended to 
all local legislation not reserved to the Cortes. T w o rights 
of spcial significance were the right of naming delegates 
to cooperate in the making of all commercial treaties af-
fecting the Island,28 and the provision that "the Insular 
Parliament shall have power to frame the tariff and fix 
the duties to be paid on merchandise as well for its impor-
tation into the territory of the Island as for the exporta-
tion thereof." 29 
T h e powers of the Governor-General included the su-
preme authority in the Island, the right to appoint seven 
of the C o u n c i l of Administration and the secretaries of his 
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cabinet. H i s veto powers were restricted to the right to 
forward any measure to the C o u n c i l of Ministers of the 
K i n g d o m , who must return or approve the bil l within 
two months. I f the Ministers failed to act w i t h i n two 
months the Governor-General had authority to sanction 
and proclaim the bil l . 
A m o n g the chief provisions of the organic law one of 
the most important provided that "when the present 
constitution shall be approved by the Cortes of the King-
dom, for the Islands of Cuba and Porto Rico, i t shall not 
be amended except by virtue of a special law and upon the 
petition of the Insular Parliament." 30 
T h e chief disadvantage which Porto Rico suffered un-
der the Autonomy Charter was the lack of complete 
sovereignty. T h e Governor-General was expressly made 
"the supreme authority of the Colony ." 31 T h e commer-
cial rights which she gained, however, were of such im-
portance as to offset any such disadvantages, for w i t h the 
power to collaborate in the making of treaties and to fix 
her own duties, Porto Rico acquired valuable rights which 
showed every promise of alleviating the oppressive tariff 
system which had been strangling her. But Porto Rico 
was not to enjoy for long the rewards of her 400-year 
struggle. 
T h e Legislature met on J u l y 17, 1898, and on July 
25, in the midst of a celebration in honor of Santiago, 
patron saint of Spain, came the news that the American 
fleet was off G u á n i c a preparing to land.32 " T h e Legis-
lature adjourned, never to meet again under the Spanish 
flag, and the work of 400 years was blown away in the 
breeze that raised our flag over the island." 33 
C H A P T E R I I I 
G O V E R N M E N T U N D E R T H E A M E R I C A N F L A G 
"The American flag found Porto Rico penniless and content. 
It now flies over a prosperous factory worked by slaves who 
have lost their lands and may soon lose their guitars and their 
songs."—Luis MUÑOZ MARIN * 
"At the time of the American occupation, a very liberal régime 
of government had already been granted by the Crown of 
Spain. There are many able lawyers and statesmen who opine 
that the organic law in force in Porto Rico and approved by 
Congress in 1917, 19 years after the American occupation, 
can not be favorably compared with the autonomy granted us 
by the Crown of Spain in 1897."—CORDOVA DÁVILA t 
THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT 
GENERAL NELSON A . MILES, upon landing in Porto Rico , 
issued the proclamation which has already been quoted. 
The mil i tary occupation of the Island was accomplished 
within a few weeks and without serious resistance from 
the Spanish troops. W h e n on August 12 the truce end-
ing the w a r put a stop to all fighting, General Miles estab-
lished a military Government, which was continued unti l 
1900.1 
U n d e r the treaty w h i c h the Uni ted States signed with 
* Son of Muñzo Rivera and authority on Porto Rican affairs, 
t Resident Commissioner from Porto Rico to the United States Congress. 
33 
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Spain, provision was made that "the people of Porto Rico 
shall be deemed to be citizens of Porto Rico unless they 
make declaration before a court of their allegiance to 
Spain." 2 T h e fact that very few of the people made such 
a declaration demonstrates the spirit in which they re-
ceived the American occupation. Addit ional evidence of 
the good faith of the Porto Ricans and their hope of 
benefits to come from the American rule lies in the fact 
that by February, 1901, the Uni ted States could recruit 
and t u r n the Island over to a Porto R i c a n regiment wi th-
out fear of revolution. 
T h e military government under General John R. 
Brooke and later under General G u y V . H e n r y instituted 
changes which the Porto Ricans appreciated at the time, 
and w h i c h they still appreciate. A postal system was 
established, the government lottery abolished, freedom 
of speech and press instituted, the use of stamped paper 
and certificates abolished, and a national police force es-
tablished. Sanitary measures were taken, which i f they 
had been carried to a conclusion, would have cut the mor-
tality and disease rate much below its 1930 level. The 
right of jury trial and Habeas Corpus was established. 
Free public schools were opened. 
However , United States currency was exchanged for 
Porto R i c a n at 60 cents Amer ican money for one peso 
Porto R i c a n money. This change placed incalculable 
hardships on the people of all classes and especially the 
very poor who found their wages cut to suit the change 
in currency, and their food priced at the same number of 
dollars as it had been pesos. A laborer who had received 
50 centavos Porto R i c a n coin now received 30 American 
cents, but whereas rice had only cost h i m only 4 centavos 
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(2 2/5 American cents ) , it now cost him 4 Amer ican 
cents. 
T h e war , the change in money, and the temporary loss 
of commerce all served to visit great suffering on the al-
ready greatly oppressed population. This lamentable 
condition was made worse on August 8, 1899, by one of 
the most terrible hurricanes of the many which the I s -
land had gone through. Thousands of people were left 
homeless and starving, and to meet a disaster of such enor-
mous proportions, Congress appropriated $200,000. 
This sum was expected to feed 950,000 stricken people 
until a new crop of bananas and other native foods could 
be grown. T w e n t y cents to feed a human being for six 
months! T h e attitude of the American people toward 
Porto R i c a n interests was clearly defined. • 
T H E F O R A K E R A C T 
I n January, 1900, a resolution was introduced into 
Congress, looking to military rule for a period of five 
years, this being deemed necessary because of the general 
unpreparedness of the people for self-administration. 
The resolution was not adopted and on Apr i l 12, 1900, 
the Foraker A c t , providing a form of civil government 
was passed.3 Under this A c t a government on the A m e r -
ican model, which aimed at balancing the power between 
American and Porto R i c a n officials, was set up. T h e 
executive authority was vested in a Governor appointed 
by the President, and supported by two legislative houses: 
the Executive Counc i l and the House of Delegates. T h e 
Executive Counci l was to be appointed by the President 
and five of its members were to be natives, while the House 
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of Delegates had 3 Í members and was elected by the peo-
ple. 
O n M a y 1, 1900, the new regime was inaugurated, and 
M r . Charles H . A l l e n was appointed governor. F u r t h e r -
more, six Americans were named to serve as heads of de-
partments and at the same time as members of the E x e c u -
tive C o u n c i l , which had a total of eleven members. I t 
may be seen from this that Americans were in clear con-
trol of the government, having the Upper House of the 
Legislature and the Governor. T h i s A c t was a distinct 
blow to the pride of the Porto R i c a n people, excluding 
them, as it did, from citizenship in the country under 
whose flag they were destined to live. I t has been cr i t i -
cised harshly by its opponents and favorably by those 
who consider that it worked well. E x - G o v e r n o r Regis 
H . Post says that he considers it the best form of govern-
ment which could have been devised for Porto R i c o at 
that time. H e continues, however, that "coming so 
shortly after the realization of their hopes for autonomy 
granted by Spain, and excluding the Porto R i c a n from 
our citizenship, it bore seeds of disappointment and 
wounded self-respect, which were to grow a crop of dis-
satisfaction and complaint." * 
T h e period immediately preceeding and following the 
inauguration of this A c t was one of political uncertainty. 
T h e party which had been the Autonomy Party under 
the Spanish regime was divided as to what course it should 
follow, and later split on this issue, while the mal l group 
of Amer ican sympathizers expected to wield a major por-
tion of political influence. T h e parties w h i c h were 
formed out of the old Autonomy P a r t y were the R e p u b -
lican, which became k n o w n as the Pro-Amer ican Party , 
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and the Federal, which was known as the A n t i - A m e r i c a n 
Party. Neither of these parties advocated independence 
at this time, the Republicans favoring statehood and the 
Federalists, organization as a territory. 
W h e n the new form of government was inaugurated 
it was necessary to divide the Island into seven legislative 
districts for the purpose of electing representatives to the 
Lower House, and for this purpose a committee of five 
was named. T h e committee was composed of two R e -
publicans, two Federalists, and one neutral, who was so 
Anti-Federal as to be Republican, and the districts fa-
vored the Republicans. T h e minority vigorously opposed 
this arrangement and when the Executive Counci l ap-
proved the plan the Federalists withdrew and two R e -
publicans were appointed. I n the following election, the 
Federals declined to present candidates and all the Legis-
lators were Republicans, leaving the Federals without a 
voice in the Government. 
The first Legislature met on December 3, 1900, and 
remained in session unti l January 31, 1901, by which time 
they had approved 36 laws providing civi l government 
and a system of taxation. One of the most important 
features of the Foraker A c t was that it established free 
trade between Porto R i c o and the United States. T h e 
effect of this wi l l be discussed in the chapter on Tariff . 
Governor Al len served unti l September 14,1901, when 
he was succeeded by Governor Wi l l iam H . H u n t , who 
had been serving as Secretary. I n his message to the 
Legislature, Governor H u n t outlined the enormous prob-
lem facing the people: there must be schools; agriculture 
must be encouraged; roads constructed; asylums for the 
crippled, blind and insane, erected. T h e Commissioner 
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of Educat ion, D r . Samuel M c C u n e Lindsay, pointed out 
that there were only 41,000 children out of 3 50,000 of 
school-age then in school; and that $3,000,000 a year 
was required to take care of educational needs, while the 
entire income of the Island was not that much. Clearly 
the people of Porto R i c o were confronting a problem 
that was too much for them alone. T h e y had manifested 
a great desire for education by doubling in three years the 
amount given to schools, but they needed help in the bat-
tle to combat the neglect they had suffered for centuries. 
Uncle Sam, they confidently believed, was going to re-
generate them. I n this expectation they worked hard to 
be worthy of a r ich uncle who had advertised his great 
liberality when he entered the Island. T h e magnanimity 
of this uncle wil l be seen in the following pages. 
F r o m the first organization of the government, the 
chief political preoccupation of the people has been a de-
finition of the future status of Porto Rico . T h e positions 
of the two leading parties have been pointed out. I n 
1902, the House of Delegates unanimously adopted a reso-
lution asking for organization as a territory looking for-
ward to statehood, and when the Executive C o u n c i l de-
feated this measure, the Porto Ricans were bitterly disap-
pointed and critical. 
T h e Foraker A c t had made the people a body politic 
known as the "People of Porto R i c o " and when territorial 
status was denied there was an immediate demand for col-
lective citizenship. President Roosevelt recommended 
this to Congress in 1905, 1906, 1907 and 1908, but the 
people of Porto R i c o had to wait unt i l the eve of our en-
trance into the W o r l d W a r in 1917 to become citizens. 
T h e Federalist Par ty was the one most outspoken in 
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its demands. Governor H u n t had been succeeded in 1904 
by Governor Beekman Winthrop, who was faced w i t h the 
immediate problem of securing fair elections. I n the 
previous elections the Republicans had won, although it 
seemed they were actually a minority of the voters. G o v -
ernor Winthrop issued a proclamation to the effect that 
he would prosecute vigorously any fraud in the election. 
The result was a complete victory for the Unionist Party , 
a reorganization of the old Federalist group. 
W h e n the Unionist Party had been the minority party, 
holding no offices, it had been extremely critical of the 
American governors, and had at times even tried to cause 
their removal. Following the election of 1904, the R e -
publicans became the "outs" and used much the same 
tactics against the governors. T h e Unionists were still 
determined to continue the fight for autonomy and had 
included in their platform a declaration for independence. 
Declaring for independence did not mean that they con-
templated revolution, for as Ex-Governor Post points 
out "the Porto R i c a n was a fighter by constitutional 
methods. H e had been trained for centuries as a politi-
cian, he was astute, courageous, and quick to see and 
grasp any opportunity that the law or the political situ-
ation might offer. H e knew exactly what he wanted 
and how to influence the public opinion of his people, and 
he was entrenched in the elected House of Delegates." 5 
F r o m the beginning there had been more or less con-
stant friction between the House of Delegates and the 
Executive Counci l . I n 1909, the House of Delegates 
refused to make appropriations unti l the Executive C o u n -
cil approved a law changing the manner of selecting 
judges. T h i s matter was carried to Congress wi th the 
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result that that body passed a law providing that when-
ever an appropriation was not made the budget of the 
preceding year should hold over. T h e House of Delegates 
had lost in the first serious fight for greater power. The 
dissatisfaction of the people wi th the Foraker A c t was 
brought to the attention of Congress, and from 1910 to 
1917, agitation for a new Organic A c t was carried on. 
THE JONES BILL 
T h e desire for a new form of government was realized 
on March 2, 1917,6 just on the eve of American entrance 
into the W o r l d W a r , when it savored strongly of a bid 
for Porto R i c a n loyalty during the coming conflict. The 
Jones B i l l extended greatly the powers of the Porto R i -
cans. Collective citizenship was granted in opposition to 
the wishes of the majority party, the Unionists, who had 
taken the stand that it was not consistent with their de-
mand for independence. T h e Execuive C o u n c i l was 
supplemented by an elected Senate and appointments to 
cabinet positions were, with two exceptions, no longer 
made by the President of the Uni ted States, but by the 
Governor of Porto R ico , subject to confirmation by the 
Porto R i c a n Senate. T h e Governor retaining the right of 
veto. 
T h e economic and social condition of the Is land had 
long been pointed out as deplorable and the great growth 
of the Socialist Party from the time of Governor Colton's 
administration (1909-1913) was due principally to the 
low wages and wretched conditions of practically the en-
tire laboring class. Señor Santiago Iglesias had pointed 
this out to Congress during the Col ton administration 
and had asked for a Department of Agriculture and labor 
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to be created by Congress and presided over by an A m e r -
ican. T o show that this condition was realized not only 
by leaders of the labor movement, but by the responsible 
authorities, the following is quoted from the report of 
General Mclntyre , C h i e f of the Bureau of Insular A f -
fairs, for the year 1924: 
"The labor situation in Porto Rico is not a happy one. 
The island is almost exclusively agricultural. T h e popu-
lation is so great that it could only live under reasonable 
conditions i f half of the people were engaged in industrial 
occupations. I t is quite as important that there should 
be produced in Porto Rico the clothing, the shoes, the 
material of which houses are built, etc. as it is that food 
should be produced there. Yet all these things are i m -
ported into Porto Rico in the manufactured state. 
"Labor being plentiful, industries would be attracted 
to the island were it not for the existence of continuous 
labor agitation. T h e labor agitation, on the other hand, 
would cease were it not continually fed by justifying 
grievances. W e thus have in full effect a vicious circle. 
The effect of the labor agitation, as well as the cause, is 
well shown in the annual report of the Governor for the 
current year. 
"Notwithstanding this increase, the profit of sugar 
growers in Porto R i c o was, measured by any rule, exces-
sive, and a reasonable increase of wages should not have 
been the product of a strike but of a little enlightened sel-
fishness on the part of the cane growers." 
Perhaps no political aspect of the Island's life is more 
important than the growth of the Socialist Party since 
1914. I n that year, it cast only 4,000 votes; in 1920, 60,-
000 votes were cast, and at the last election in 1928, w h i c h 
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the report of the Governor describes as "the most hotly 
contested and close election ever held in the history of 
the Is land," the Socialist Party won 8 of the 19 senatorial 
posts and 18 of the 39 places in the Lower House. This 
party, unlike the others, offers no political solution for 
the status of the Is land, i f we except its advocacy of an 
elective governor. I t bases its campaigns on "justice for 
the worker" and seeks to get more aid from the Federal 
Government. O n e of the propositions which it has fre-
quently made is that of borrowing $100,000,000 to be 
paid back in small amounts over a long period. 
Since September, 1928, the principal struggle of the 
Island has been to recover from the effects of what was 
probably the nearest to a complete disaster that any nation 
has ever suffered. O n the 13 th of September of that 
year, a hurricane, w h i c h reached a speed of more than 
150 miles an hour, did damage estimated at almost $100,-
000,000. T h e loss of life was negligible considering the 
enormity of the disaster, but thousands of people were 
left homeless and starving. While this hurricane tended 
to make bad conditions very much worse, it did not create 
new problems, but served only to render visible those 
perennial ones which the people of Porto Rico have been 
facing for more than four centuries. 
T h i s discussion of the types of government has done 
little to show what effect a generation of Amer ican occu-
pation has had on conditions in the Island. H a v e we fu l -
filled all of the promises made by General Miles i n 1898? 
Perhaps there is no w a y to answer this question i n full , 
but the following chapters attempt to examine some of 
the principal problems, economic and social, wi th a view 
to weighing, in a measure, the results of American occu-
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pation. Whatever the conditions of the Island are to-
day, there is one indisputable fact: the responsibility must 
be shared by Continentals and Porto Ricans alike. T h e 
United States obviously cannot be blamed for conditions 
which prevailed before our ownership of the Island, but 
for the period since 1898 we have a very definite respon-
sibility. O n the other hand, the people of the Island can-
not place the entire burden at the door of the Uni ted 
States government. T h e y have, through the medium of 
their elective officers, the means of helping themselves 
and where they have neglected to do so they must accept 
the blame. Exist ing conditions, as the succeeding pages 
wil l demonstrate, are far from flattering either to the 
government of the United States or that of Porto Rico . 
Thousands are undernourished or actually starving, while 
the products of the Island bring more than $100,000,000 
a year. W h o is to blame for this faulty distribution of 
the resources? Disease is present everywhere, and there 
is neither adequate sanitation nor medical care for the v i c -
tims. Must Porto R i c o or the United States accept the 
challenge to effect a remedy? 
Wages are so low that the majority of the people are 
compelled to live like paupers. Just how much of this 
is due to Amer ican neglect? Thousands of children can-
not attend school because there are no schools for them. 
Should the Porto R i c a n government be held solely c u l -
pable for this lack? T h e answers to these questions must 
be sought in a study of the salient features of Porto Rico's 
life since her transfer to American rule. For some of the 
difficulties of the Island, the natives wi l l be found to be 
at least partially to blame, while a great deal of the pov-
erty, ill health and general bad conditions may be traced 
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directly to what the Uni ted States has done or not done 
with respect to the chief problems. I t must also be borne 
in mind that, regardless of the natives and their efforts 
pro and con, the ultimate responsibility lies w i t h the 
Ame r ic an people and government. Porto R i c o is in 
everything subject to any action the President and C o n -
gress m a y take. H e r statute laws may be reversed by the 
President or Congress and her Organic A c t can be changed 
by the American legislative authority alone. T h e life of 
Porto R i c o , economic and political, is ordered by a will 
outside Porto R i c o and this wi l l must in the end accept 
the responsibility. 
I n the succeeding pages the chief industries and busi-
ness assets of Porto R i c o , sugar, tobacco, fruit growing, 
utilities, etc. are discussed with a v iew to deciding what 
share Americans as individuals, as distinguished from the 
Government of the Un i t ed States, have had in promoting 
progress and poverty. T h e political institutions are not 
illiberal, but have they really served Porto Rico? Amer-
icans, both here and i n Porto R ico , are prone to con-
sider American rule as solely political, but this is far from 
true. T h e real A m e r i c a n Rule is the economic penetra-
tion which has taken place. T h i s , more than the new 
form of government, has changed the life of the people. 
I t is w i t h this aspect of our rule in Porto Rico that we have 
chiefly to deal. 
C H A P T E R I V 
T H E S U G A R I N D U S T R Y 
"Four large Centrals practically own the south, west, and east 
of the island, and they are so strongly constituted, have such 
a strength together, that I believe their strength is greater than 
that of the Government of Porto Rico."—ANTONIO BARCELO* 
" . . . the development of large absentee-owned estates, the 
rapid curtailment in the planting of coffee—the natural crop 
of the independent farmer—and the concentration of cigar 
manufacture into the hands of the American trust have com-
bined to make Porto Rico a land of beggars and millionaires, 
of flattering statistics and distressing realities. More and more 
it becomes a factory worked by peons, fought over by lawyers, 
bossed by absent industrialists, and clerked by politicians. It 
is now Uncle Sam's second largest sweat-shop." 
—Luis MUÑOZ MARIN f 
GROWTH OF THE INDUSTRY 
THE growth of the sugar industry in Porto Rico has 
been phenomenal. I n 1899, the crop absorbed only about 
15 per cent of the cultivated area of the Island, whereas 
today it claims 44 per cent.1 The total sugar crop in 
1897 amounted to some 72,000 tons, while the 1930 
crop reached 856,109 tons.2 The yield per acre rose from 
* President of the Unionist Party of Porto Rico and for many years 
President of the Porto Rican Senate, 
t See note at beginning of Chapter HI. 
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less than one ton of sugar for the 72,146 acres in cane to 
more than 3 1/2 tons of sugar for the lands assessed as cane 
land in 1930.3 
T h e methods of manufacturing have not been slower 
in developing than the science of cultivating. T h e 1897 
crop was manufactured by almost S00 small mil ls; in 
1930, 42 Centrals ground the entire crop. A greater 
sucrose content is obtained today, both because of better 
varities and of better machinery. T h e growth of the sugar 
industry has been due to the aid given the sugar growers 
by the government in experimentation and development 
of new kinds of cane, and to the efforts of the growers 
themselves in this direction. Further impetus to sugar 
production has come from the irrigation projects built 
by the government and by the sugar companies. 
Accompanying this great growth of the sugar industry 
has come a striking concentration. T h e average produc-
tion per mi l l in 1897 would not have reached more than 
125 tons, while in 1930 it was more than 20,000 tons. 
E v e n more startling is the concentration of the sugar in-
dustry in the hands of a small group of companies, the 
most important of w h i c h are absentee owned. 
T H E A B S E N T E E SUGAR C O M P A N I E S 
T h e South Porto R i c o Sugar C o m p a n y 4 was incorpo-
rated under the laws of N e w Jersey, November 16, 1900, 
to manufacture raw and refined sugar, molasses and other 
products of sugar cane, and similar commodities; to en-
gage in agriculture and plant, cultivate and grow sugar 
cane and other products, and to purchase and acquire 
obligations and shares of the stock of other corporations. 
T h e South Porto R i c o Sugar C o m p a n y owns all the 
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stock of the South Porto Rico Sugar Company of Porto 
Rico, operating the G u á n i c a Central sugar factory, hav-
ing an annual capacity of 700,000 bags and owning 432 
acres of land, a railroad and other equipment. 
Since 1917, the agricultural business formerly con-
ducted by the company has been owned by Russell and 
Company, S. en C , a limited partnership whose profits are 
distributed to the common share holders of the South 
Porto R i c o Sugar Company. Russell and Company owns 
and controls about 50,000 acres in the southern and west-
ern parts of the Island. T h e production of Guánica C e n -
tral in 1930 was more than 118,000 short tons of sugar. 
The Fajardo Sugar Company of Porto Rico 5 was i n -
corporated in Porto R i c o in February, 1919, as successor 
to the Fajardo Sugar Company, incorporated in N e w 
Y o r k in 1905 to manufacture sugar and molasses. T h e 
company has under cultivation about 27,000 acres of 
sugar land situated in the northeastern part of Porto Rico , 
at Fajardo, 15,000 acres are owned outright and 12,000 
acres are controlled under lease or contract for long terms. 
The Fajardo mil l has a daily grinding capacity of about 
4,000 tons of cane and an annual production capacity ex-
ceeding 5 5,000 tons of raw sugar. O n October 6, 1925, 
the company purchased the 22,500 outstanding capital 
shares of the Loiza Sugar Company for $90 a share. T h i s 
purchase included Centra l Canóvanas and cane lands 
adjacent to those of the Fajardo Sugar Company, pro-
ducing more than 24,000 tons of sugar a year and making 
a combined capacity of more than 80,000 tons for the 
two mills. T h e company also controls the Fajardo Sugar 
Growers Association, owning real estate, etc., and the 
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Fajardo Development Company, which owns 80 miles 
of railroads, a telephone system, and other property. 
T h e L o i z a Sugar Company,6 w h i c h is owned by the 
Fajardo Sugar Company , produced more than 28,000 tons 
of sugar in 1928, and almost 28,000 tons in 1930. This 
company owns 10,613 acres7 in the eastern part of Porto 
Rico. 
T h e total holdings of the Fajardo Sugar Company , the 
Fajardo Sugar Growers Association and the Lo iza Sugar 
Company are about 2 5,741 acres,8 owned, and about 
12,000 acres held on long-time contracts.0 
T h e Centra l Agu irre Associates 10 was organized in 
Massachusetts in 1928 as a holding company for the C e n -
tral Agu irre Sugar Company. Before the end of that 
year it had acquired approximately 99 per cent of the 
outstanding shares of the Central Aguirre Sugar Company 
on the basis of four shares of Centra l Aguirre Associates 
for one share of Centra l Aguirre Sugar Company. 
T h e Centra l Aguirre Sugar Company 11 was incorpo-
rated in Porto Rico in 1918 as a reincorporation of the 
Centra l Aguirre Sugar Companies which was a voluntary 
trust organized in 1905 under the laws of Massachusetts. 
I n 1920, this company acquired 72 per cent of the stock 
of Centra l Machete Company. I t also owns the entire 
16,200 outstanding shares of the Santa Isabel Sugar C o m -
pany. Its properties are located on the south side of the 
island and near the port of Jobos. Centra l Aguirre Sugar 
Company grinds the cane produced by Luce and C o m -
pany, S. en C . T h e entire capital stock of the Ponce and 
Guayama Railroad C o m p a n y which owns and operates 
45 miles of railroad on the southeastern coast of Porto 
Rico, connecting the plantations w i t h the sugar Centrals, 
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is owned by the Central Aguirre Sugar Company. T h e 
Porto R i c a n Government has constructed an irrigation 
system which protects the crops of this company f rom 
drought. T h e production of the Centra l Aguirre mi l l 
was more than 78,000 tons in 1930. 
Luce and Company, S. en C.,12 is a limited partnership 
with a paid capital of $1,203,000, whose partners are d i -
rectors in the Central Aguirre Sugar Company. I t owns 
21,788 acres of land assessed at $4,065,675.13 
The Centra l Machete Company,14 is controlled by 
Luce and Company. T h e controlling interest ($580,-
000 of the $800,000 capital stock outstanding) was p u r -
chased in 1920 by this company. Centra l Machete owns 
a sugar mi l l but no land except that on which the mi l l is 
situated. T h e 1930 production was 25,465 tons of sugar. 
The Santa Isabel Sugar Company 15 is also controlled 
by Centra l Aguirre, which purchased 62 per cent of the 
outstanding 16,200 shares in 1924, and subsequently ac-
quired the entire stock. T h i s company owns the Centra l 
Cortada at Santa Isabel, which produced 20,265 tons of 
sugar in 1930. 
The total lands held by the Central Aguirre Sugar 
Company, L u c e and Company, S. en C , Central Machete 
Company, and the Santa Isabel Sugar Company are some 
22,269 acres owned, and 17,000 acres leased.18 
The Uni ted Porto R i c a n Sugar Company 17 was i n -
corporated in Maryland in 1926 to manufacture and deal 
in sugar cane, and to own companies doing a similar busi-
ness. T h e properties controlled by this company c o m -
prise a complete producing and operating unit wi th mills 
which have a total capacity of 1,000,000 bags of sugar 
a year. I n addition, the company owns railroads and 
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warehouse and harbor facilities. T h e land holdings of 
this company include more than 28,843 acres owned18 
and 15,187 acres leased.19 T h e company owns 100 per 
cent of the United Porto R i c a n Sugar Company (of 
Porto R i c o ) , which is the owner of Centrals Santa Juana, 
Defensa, Cayey, Juncos, and Pasto Viejo. 
A l l of these sugar companies are held principal ly by 
continental Americans l iving in the United States. C e r -
tain others are owned partly by Porto Ricans, who live 
in Porto Rico , and part ly by absentees, Porto R i c a n or 
foreign, who live abroad. 
Centra l Victoria, Incorporated20 is a Spanish and Porto 
R i c a n company, operating a mil l at Carol ina, Porto Rico. 
This company was incorporated in 1921, and in 1930 had 
about 3,649 acres owned,21 and about 6,000 acres in cane 
lands controlled and leased.22 T h e 1928 production was 
in excess of 11,000 tons and the 1930 production in ex-
cess of 14,000 tons of raw sugar. 
T h e c o m p a ñ í a Azucarera del Toa,2S which operates 
Constancia Central , is a Spanish company, both resident 
and absentee owned. I t owns about 5,739 acres of land, 
and produced more than 16,000 tons of sugar in 1928 and 
22,502 tons in 1930. 
T h e Centra l V a n n i n a , Incorporated,24 is also a Spanish 
central, owned by residents and absentees. I t owns 2,672 
acres and produced in 1928 more than 10,000 tons of 
sugar, and in 1930 more than 14,000 tons. 
Centra l Coloso, Incorporated,25 is a Spanish company, 
owned by residents and absentees. Its properties consist 
of about 8,000 acres owned and additional acres controlled 
by colono contracts. T h e production in 192 8 was 23,363 
tons of sugar, and in 1930 more than 29,000 tons. 
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V A L U E S A N D ASSESSMENTS O F SUGAR C O M P A N I E S 
A recent study of Porto Rico placed the value of ab-
sentee sugar properties at $40,000,000.2S As has been 
noted, the American sugar companies are the South 
Porto R i c o Sugar Company, the United Porto Rican Sugar 
Company, the Centra l Aguirre Sugar Company and the 
Fajardo Sugar Company. The total assets of these com-
panies in 1928 amounted to some $86,791,288.27 
The total common and preferred stock in 1928 
amounted to $47,159,595.28 The Uni ted Porto R i c a n 
Sugar Company owns from 87 to 100 per cent of the 
stock of its five centrals, which means that it controls 
not less than $7,200,000 of the complete stock which was 
$8,081,985, in 192 8.29 T h e South Porto R i c o Sugar C o m -
pany has large holdings in Santo Domingo in addition to 
its Porto R i c o property. T h e total capacity of its mills 
in both Porto Rico and Santo Domingo is in excess of 
1,550,000 bags of sugar of which 700,000 bags are attrib-
uted to the G u á n i c a Centra l in Porto Rico . This is 45 
per cent of the total capacity and it would seem that no 
less than 45 per cent of the assets of this company must be 
located in Porto Rico. O n this basis about $11,200,000 
of the $24,906,810 30 complete capital tock can be 
ascribed to Porto Rico and of the $42,096,136 total assets 
approximately $18,943,261 also apparently pertains to 
Porto R i c o . T h e combined assets of these companies 
would be about $63,638,410 distributed as follows: 
South Porto Rico $18,943,261 
United Porto Rican 16,63 5,713 
Aguirre 14,438,157 
Fajardo 13,621,279 
52 P O R T O R I C O : A B R O K E N P L E D G E 
These four sugar companies have, then, assets amount-
ing to almost $24,000,000 above the $40,000,000 estimate 
quoted above. This is about 10 per cent of the estimated 
total wealth of the island,31 and nearly 20 per cent of the 
assessed value.32 D o the capital stock and assets of these 
companies represent the true value of their holdings? 
A n examination of what properties they hold wi l l throw 
light on this subject. 
T h e sugar lands are conceded to be the best in the I s -
land. T h e y lie in the fertile valleys, leaving the less de-
sirable mountainous country to other crops. T h e entire 
cultivated area of the island in 1929 was something over 
568,000 acres, of w h i c h 251,000 acres were i n sugar 
cane.33 T h e continental American companies owned 
and controlled by lease or contract the following acreage: 
Company Owned34 Leased or Controlled 
United Potto Rican .... 28,843 15,187 3R 
Fajardo 25,741 12,000 36 
Aguirre 22,269 17,000 37 
South Porto Rico 17,635 32,000 38 
Total 94,488 76,187 
T h e total acreage owned, leased and controlled by these 
four companies was 170,675. 
T h e acreage of foreign companies was as follows: 39 
Company Owned Leased or Controlled 
Central Coloso 8,000 Exact amount unknown 
(extensive) 
Central Constancia .. 5,739 Exact amount unknown 
Central Victoria 3,649 6,000 40 
Central Vannina 2,672 Exact amount unknown 
Total 20,060 6,000 Minimum 
This acreage combined with Amer ican holdings gives 
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a total of 114,548 acres owned and a minimum of 82,187 
acres leased, making a total of not less than 196,73 5 acres 
owned and controlled by absentee companies. 
T h e significance of the value and extent of the hold-
ings of the absentee companies may be more readily seen 
when the amount of sugar they produced on these lands 
in 1928 is considered. T h e y milled 436,260 tons of sugar, 
or more than 5 8 percent of the entire sugar crop. F i f t y 
per cent of the entire crop of 748,677 tons was produced 
by the American sugar companies alone. I n 1930 the 
American companies again produced 50 per cent and the 
production of all absentee companies was 59 per cent of 
the total. 
It has already been shown that the holdings of the 
American sugar companies are one-fifth of the assessed 
wealth of the Island. W h e n it is considered further that 
sugar represents about 67 per cent of the agricultural 
wealth 41 and that the absentee companies produced 59 
per cent of the sugar, it is at once evident that they con-
trol in sugar alone 40 per cent of the agricultural wealth. 
A n inquiry into the amount at which lands owned and 
controlled by these companies are assessed reveals the fact 
that cane lands are assessed at from $50 to $293 an acre, 
with an average assessment in 1929 of $180 an acre.42 
H o w does this assessed value compare with the actual 
value of these lands? I t is cutomary to value cane lands 
at $ 10 for each ton of cane produced per acre. The C e n -
tral Aguirre averaged more than 55 tons of cane to the 
acre on 13,000 acres of land in 1928.43 O n this basis 
the lands of the Centra l Aguirre were worth an average 
of $550 an acre, or about $7,000,000. Lands in the re-
gion of the Centra l Aguirre have an average assessment 
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of not more than $272 an acre.44 T h e assessed value does 
not reach even half the value of the Aguirre lands, and 
the discrepancy is still greater when a comparison is made 
between the maximum assessment of cane lands and their 
value. T h e highest assessment is in the municipality of 
Manat í where it is worth $293.52. M a n a t í is on the north 
coast, west of San J u a n , but the highest yield comes from 
plantations on the southern coast, and here there is no m u -
nicipality with a higher average assessment than $272.45 
While these lands are assessed as i f they yielded only 27 
tons of cane to the acre, the report of the Commissioner 
of Agricul ture and Labor for 1927-28 says: "The planta-
tions on the southern coast obtained enormous quanti-
ties of cane and sugar per acre. Reports were received 
from various plantations which obtained 90 to 100 tons 
of cane to the acre, and one piece of land yielded 103.5 
tons of cane per acre." 46 
I t is readily evident that lands assessed at $272 per acre 
yielded a crop which made their values from $900 to 
$1,03 5 per acre. A p p l y i n g the same standard to all the 
same lands in Porto R i c o in 1928 when the average yield 
was 24.5 tons per acre,47 the value would have been more 
than $62,000,000, and i n 1930 when the yield had in -
creased to an average of thirty tons to the acre, their values 
would have been more than $75,000,000; whereas the 
assessed value was some $45,000,000. 
Central Aguirre Assessments 
A still further comparison between the actual values 
of the three largest sugar companies and their assessments 
is enlightening. I t has been shown that the 13,000 acres 
of land of the Central Aguirre Sugar Company is worth 
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about $7,000,000. T h e entire holdings of this company 
exceed 22,000 acres, and while all this is not sugar land 
and is not worth so m u c h as sugar land, it is fair to place 
a valuation equal to the average assessed value of all lands 
in 1929. T h i s would be $60 an acre on 9,000 acres of 
non-sugar land, or more than half a million dollars to 
make the land alone worth $7,500,000. This does not 
include the value of the central and other physical assets 
of the company, which brought the total to more than 
$14,000,000, in 1928. Some of these assets, such as grow-
ing crops, are tax exempt, but granting all exemptions, 
the assessments are far below actual value. Using market 
value of the stock as a measurement M r . Rafael de J . 
Cordero, of the Department of Economics of the U n i -
versity of Porto Rico, says: 
" I have examined in detail the valuations for assessment 
of three sugar corporations, Central Aguirre , South Porto 
Rico, and Fajardo, for every year from 1919 to 1928, and 
I have not found traces of any attempt to take market 
value of the capital stock as a basis for assessment. H a d 
this been done in the case of Central Aguirre , for say 1928, 
the valuation for that year would have been brought up to 
$19,512,374, instead of $3,421,540, which was the actual 
assessment made. T h i s represents a difference of $16,-
090,834, granting deductions for all tax-exempt intan-
gibles covered by court decision. 
" E v e n i f deductions from the capital valuations of the 
Central Aguirre were granted for the assessed value of 
the property of its two unincorporated subsidiaries, L u c e 
and Company , and Charles L . Creore, amounting to $4,-
374,705 for 1928, the difference in total value and valua-
tions for assessment would have been $11,725,129." 48 
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Market value of stock, however, is a very uncertain 
basis for taxation, due to rapid fluctuations, and has not 
been used. Capital value and physical value have been 
the usual procedure in Porto Rico . T h e procedure be-
fore 1926 was to compare physical value wi th capital 
value, and use the one which gave the higher valuation. 
This practice was not always followed, as M r . Cordero 
shows, when he says: 
" O f the ten years for which assessments have been ex-
amined, valuations were fixed on the basis of physical 
assets in five and on the basis of capital value in five. No 
consistent policy was followed in making assessments. 
T h e assessments for the years 1920 and 1922 made on the 
basis of physical assets would have been much higher had 
capital value been used instead." 4ii 
I n 1920, the actual assessment based on physical assets 
was slightly more than $3,000,000, while the possible 
assessment, had it been based on capital value w i th the 
stock placed at par, was in excess of $6,250,000. The 
difference in actual and possible assessment was more than 
$3,250,000. 
" I n the year 1921," M r . Cordero continues, "when the 
assessment was based on capital value there is a marked 
increase as compared with the previous year's assessment 
in spite of the fact that the Board of Review reduced the 
assessor's valuation by $775,223." T h i s increase amounted 
to some 40 per cent, while the increase for the year 1923, 
as compared with the year 1922, is m u c h more significant, 
amounting to almost 100 per cent.00 
T h i s company has not paid its taxes on its fu l l value, 
then, on any basis used to test valuation: ( 1 ) market 
value of stock, (2 ) capital value and ( 3 ) physical assets. 
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I t may be objected that perhaps its earnings did not jus-
tify placing a high valuation on its property. T h e fol -
lowing table shows actual assessments since 1922, as com-
pared wi th what the value of the company's properties 
would be i f its earnings were capitalized at 10 per cent: 
Net 
Income Capital-
Year Assessment'''1 Net Income02 ized at 10 per cent 
1922 $2,991,050 $751,837 $7,518,370 
1923 5,878,710 2,398,284 23,982,840 
1924 3,986,110 1,048,104 10,481,040 
1925 3,000,000 1,458,964 14,589,640 
1926 3,600,000 1,062,731 10,627,310 
1927 3,832,250 2,492,177 24,921,770 
1928 3,421,540 2,755,773 27,557,730 
F r o m this table it may be seen that assessments have 
been from $4,000,000 to $24,000,000 below actual value 
of the company's net income from 1922 to 1928. O n the 
other hand, it is said that the sugar business is risky and 
uncertain. T h e changes are so great that the investor is 
entitled to a high rate of profit. Suppose that this is ad-
mitted, and the previous rate doubled. T h e net earnings 
are then to be capitalized at 20 per cent. Surely 20 per 
cent is high enough! W h a t is the result? I n 1922, the 
company was under-assessed by almost $1,000,000; in 
1923, by $7,000,000; in 1924, by more than $1,000,000; 
in 192S, by $4,000,000; in 1926, by nearly $2,000,000; in 
1927, by $8,000,000; and in 1928 by $10,000,000! E v e n 
with the net income capitalized at 50 per cent the assess-
ment would not have been equal to the value in 1927 
and 1928. I n those years the net income was 65 per cent 
and 80 per cent, respectively, of the assessment! 
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Fajardo Sugar Company Assessments 
T h e Fajardo Sugar Company has been scarcely less fa-
vored.53 Concerning the assessment of this company, the 
following statement is of interest: 54 " I n 1919, the assess-
ment was based on realty and personal tangibles subject 
to taxation. I n 1920, a new item is introduced and as-
sessed as 'OTHER PERSONALITY—SECTION 317 OF THE 
LAW' presumably to cover intangibles and fixed at $207,-
681. T h i s raises assessment above physical valuation by 
that amount, making it $2,563,377. I f capital value had 
been used the valuation would have been $5,546,816. 
H o w the figure for the valuation of intangibles was ar-
rived at and why ful l capital value was not used as the 
basis for assessment could not be determined. 
" I n 1921, the assessor used capital value as the basis for 
his assessment, which he fixed at $9,575,170, as compared 
with $2,563,377 for the preceding year. T h e Board re-
vised the valuation down to $3,129,910 which was $989,-
780 above the physical valuation. 
" I n 1922 no attempt is made to tax intangibles and 
assessment shrinks to $2,263,860 which represents a re-
duction of $866,050. T h e reason may have been that the 
company had a deficit. F r o m 1923 to 1927, capital value 
is consistently used as the basis for assessment, increas-
ing valuation for these years by over 300 per cent as com-
pared wi th valuation for 1922. Valuations for the years 
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The assessment for 1928 is shown in the following table 
in comparison with those of 1926 and 1927. T h e great 
change in valuation is due to a Supreme Court Decision,55 
which held that Federal Government Bonds, stocks of 
other corporations, mortgages, notes receivable and other 





I f the capital value has been used in 1928, the assessment 
would have been more than $4,500,000 instead of the 
$2,500,000 shown above.57 
A s a final comparison of assessments and values, the 
following table shows assessments, net income and net 
income capitalized at 10 per cent, as was shown in the 
case of Centra l Aguirre: 
Net Income 
Year Assessment53 Net Income59 Capitalized at 10% 
1922 $2,263,860 $272,488 $2,724,880 
1923 6,871,800 1,120,149 11,201,490 
1924 7,051,420 1,344,511 13,445,110 
1925 7,207,710 1,303,398 13,033,980 
1926 6,798,850 582,111 5,821,110 
1927 7,123,430 901,863 9,018,630 
1928 2,484,890 501,782 5,017,820 
W i t h a five year average earning of $926,733 from 
1924 to 1928, which would have given an average assess-
ment of $9,267,330, i f assessments had been equal to net 
income capitalized at ten per cent, this company was as-
sessed at an average of only slightly more than $5,500,000. 
South Porto Rico Sugar Company Assessments 
The third of the large sugar companies to be considered 
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is the South Porto R i c o Sugar Company . T h e assessments, 
made on physical assets, have been rather consistent since 
1919, ranging from $3,500,000 to IS.OOO.OOO.60 
T h i s corporation has appealed its assessment consist-
ently to the Board, and since 1924 has initiated law suits 
against assessments. T h e main contentions of the corpo-
ration are: 
(1 ) Assessment of factory on the basis of daily capacity 
of the mi l l in tons of cane times 5 50 is unfair. T h e value 
of the mi l l is $1,018,100 by the company's own calcula-
tions, and according to the above formula it would be 
$2,767,800. 
( 2 ) Factory supplies and merchandise for the factory 
should be included in the assessment of the factory and 
should not be assessed separately. 
(3 ) Sugar and molasses on hand should not be taxed, as 
they come under tax-exempt "products of the soil in 
possession of the producer," according to Art ic le 291 of 
the Political Code of Porto Rico . 
(4 ) Valuation should be fixed at $1,542,045 instead of 
$4,014,830 as recommended by the assessor. 
T h e value of this company's property in Porto R i c o is 
somewhat difficult to determine due to the fact that it 
has extensive holdings in Santo Domingo. Its total assets 
as of September 30, 1928, were $42,096,136, and the pre-
ferred and common stock was set at $24,906,810. A c -
cording to its own statement, the real and personal value 
of the company's properties in Porto Rico in 1928 was 
$10,455,920, and the par value of the stock was $4,000,-
000. Its net earnings were $1,638,202. Judging from 
the total capacity of the mil l in Porto Rico and Santo 
Domingo, this valuation is not adequate, since as has been 
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stated above, the total capacity of the three mills operated 
is 1,550,000 bags of sugar of which the G u á n i c a Centra l 
in Porto R i c o can produce in excess of 700,000 bags, or 
45 per cent of the total. W i t h this as a basis the va lua-
tion should be about $18,943,261. E v e n using the com-
pany's own figures for net income in 1928, and capitaliz-
ing them at ten per cent, as was done in the cases of C e n -
tral Aguirre and the Fajardo Sugar Company, the result-
ing evaluation is $16,382,020, to compare with the evalu-
ation of a little more than $4,000,000 which the company 
considered too high. 
Assessment of Local Sugar Lands 
The under-assessment has not been confined to these 
sugar companies alone.61 T h e Central Lafayette, owned 
by Sucesores de C . y J . Fantauzzi , who are French and 
spend most of their time in France, has 8,664 acres of 
land. T h e assessed value of this land is $926,270, whereas 
if it were worth no more than the average "assessed" value 
of the cane lands it would be valued at something like 
$1,500,000. T h e total assessment for the mill and prop-
erties is less than $2,000,000 and the owners have con-
sistently refused to sell for three times that amount. 
There are numerous other examples of such under-
assessment. Hacienda Teresa, belonging to Mr. Manuel 
Gonzá lez , probably the wealthiest Porto Rican, has 734 
acres and is forth at least $600,000, while the assessment 
is only $140,000. Hacienda Carlota, belonging to M r . 
Jenaro C a u t i ñ o Insua, has 816 acres worth more than 
$500,000 but is assessed at $165,000. Hacienda B a r r a n -
cas, comprising 287 acres, was sold in 1918 for $125,000. 
I t was leased in 1929 to L u c e and Company, a subsidiary 
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of C e n t r a l Aguirre , for $12,000 annually, the taxes to be 
paid by the lessee. T h e assessed value is only $65,000. 
Estancia Felicia, belonging to M r . Jenaro C a u t i ñ o Insua, 
was sold in 1927 for $150,000 and is assessed at $78,000. 
M a n y more such cases could be cited but one more will 
suf&ce to illustrate the general under-assessment. H a -
cienda Melania, w i t h 790 acres, is leased to L u c e and 
C o m p a n y for $26,000 a year, and the taxes. T h i s farm, 
•worth not less than $500,000, is assessed at $122,000! 
P R O F I T S I N SUGAR 
F r o m the point of view of the stockholder, the sugar 
business in Porto R i c o is a veritable Drake's treasure. 
There have been, natural ly, difficult times, but one of the 
numerous good years was quite enough to wipe out even 
the memory of the losses. 
South Porto Rico Dividends 
T h e South Porto R i c o Sugar Company,62 operating 
Centra l Guán ica , was organized in 1900, and has paid on 
its $5,000,000 worth of preferred stock at $100 per share 
a regular dividend of 8 per cent since its organization. 
C o m m o n stock paid dividends amounting to 6 per cent 
in 1910,4 per cent in 1911, 6 per cent in 1912, 6 per cent 
in 1913, 4 per cent in 1914 and 10 per cent in 1915. 
This regular dividend with the extras brought divi-
dends to $40 in cash and 18 per cent in stock i n 1916; 
some $32.50 cash in 1917; $20 in 1918 and 1919 respec-
tively; and $15 cash plus 100 per cent stock i n 1920. 
Dividends have been somewhat more modest since 1920. 
I n 1921 only $4.50 was paid and in 1922 the company 
suffered a loss. T h e earnings for 1923 were sufficient to 
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cover this loss, amounting to some $3 5.34 per share of 
preferred stock and $12.20 per share of common. D u r i n g 
1924, the dividends were $4.50 a share and for 1925 and 
1926 they were $6 per annum. I n 1927, dividends of 
$4.50 a share on the old $100 par value stock were paid 
and after the exchange of the old for new stock at the 
rate of one share of the old for four of the new, there was 
an initial dividend of 50 cents. T h e total dividends in 
1927 amounted to some $6.50 cash and 10 per cent in 
stock. I n 1928 and 1929, dividends on the new stock 
were $2.50, or something like 10 per cent. 
From the above it may be seen that this company has 
paid over a period of 3 0 years a steady dividend of eight 
per cent on preferred stock, and dividends on common 
stock from 4 to 115 per cent! 
Fajardo Sugar Company Dividends 
The Fajardo Sugar Company of Porto Rico has not 
been far behind the South Porto Rico in its race for ample 
profits.63 Beginning in 1908 the company paid dividends 
of 10 per cent; in 1909, 8 1/2 per cent; in 1910, 10 per 
cent; in 1911, 5 1/4 per cent; in 1912, 7 per cent, and 
in 1913, 1 1/4 per cent. 
D u r i n g the bad years of 1914 and 1915, this company 
paid no dividends. I n 1916, however, the stockholders 
had ample reason to forgive the management, the U n d e r -
wood Tari f f and all other drawbacks to the cause of high 
profits. Beginning wi th February 1, a regular quarterly 
dividend of 2 1/2 per cent was paid up to and including 
May 2, 1921. I n addition to this, 5 per cent extra was 
paid on August 1 and September 1 to bring the year's 
profit to 20 per cent. I n 1920, an extra cash dividend of 
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30 per cent, and a stock dividend of 70 per cent brought 
the profits to 110 per cent for the year. 
From August 1, 1921, to February 1, 1923, inclusive, 
dividends paid came to only 11/4 per cent. Extra divi-
dends, however, brought the profits to $16.50 in 1923; 
$16.25 in 1924; $11.50 in 1925, and $10 from 1926 to 
1928, inclusive. 1929 dividends were 2 1/2 per cent 
and in 1930 dividends were passed. 
Central Aguirre Dividends 
The Central Aguirre Associates, owner of the Central 
Aguirre Sugar Company has been the most profitable, 
probably, of all the sugar companies.64 From 1909 to 
1920, with the exception of 1913-14, the company paid 
from 5 to 60 per cent profit. In December 1919, the old 
$100 par value stock was changed to $20 stock, by an 
exchange of five shares of new for one of old. The profits 
in 1920 were $14 on the new $20 per share stock! In 
1921, the dividends descended to $7.50 a share, a mere 
37 1/2 per cent, as compared with the 70 per cent re-
ceived in 1920. From 1923 to October 1928, inclusive, 
a regular dividend of $1.50 a quarter was paid. This is 
equivalent to 30 per cent per annum, and the extra divi-
dends paid in cash and stock brought this to 5 5 per cent 
in 1923; 50 percent in 1925; 35 per cent in 1927; and 40 
per cent in 1928. In 1928 the old stock was exchanged 
at the rate of four shares of Central Aguirre Associates 
for one of Central Aguirre Sugar Company. Dividends 
in 1929 on the new stock were $ 1.75, or about 3 5 per cent. 
I n 193 0 the company earned $2.42 per share. A n original 
stockholder of the Aguirre told the authors that the 
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average yearly return had been 69 per cent on the orig-
inal investment.65 
T H E C O L O N O C O N T R A C T 
T h e Centrals supplement the cane they grow them-
selves wi th cane from farmers, known as colonos, who live 
within reach of the mill.06 T h e colono may have any 
amount of land from one acre to several thousands, and 
either sells his cane outright to the Central for a definite 
amount of sugar for each hundred pounds of cane, or re-
ceives a proportion of the sucrose content. T h e first 
system encourages the cultivation of varieties which yield 
heavy weight rather than rich sucrose content. F o r this 
reason the second type of contract is now preferred by the 
Central . 
T h e contract with the colono is usually drawn up on a 
basis of 6 1/2 or 7 pounds of sugar for each 100 pounds 
of cane. T h e Centra l sells the sugar for the colono at 
N e w Y o r k prices, minus transpdrtation, commission, 
and subtracts from the sum paid to the colono for his 
sugar the expenses incurred in marketing. 
A s the colono is usually unable to finance himself 
throughout the long period of a year or more unti l the 
cane is ready for cutt ing, he is forced to borrow money 
for this purpose from the Central . T h e interest paid, as 
well as the basis of his contract, is determined by the ex-
tent of competition between Centrals in his district. 
O n l y a few districts remain where competition works to 
the benefit of the colono, most colonos being compelled 
today to sell at what the Central desires to pay, and bor-
row at the rate set by the Central or the bank. 
I n districts where competition is keen, as was formerly 
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the case between Centra l Santa Juana (belonging to the 
United Porto Rican Sugar C o m p a n y ) and Centra l D e -
fensa (then belonging to another company, but since 
bought by the United Porto R i c a n ) , the colono was able 
to borrow money at 6 per cent, and received m u c h more 
than seven pounds of sugar, the usual top contract. W h e n , 
however, the United Porto R i c a n bought out the Centra l 
Defensa conditions changed. T h e colono today pays the 
maximum rate of 12 per cent allowed by the law, and 
advance discounts make his interest even more. 
A s an example of how this contract functions from the 
point of view of the colono, the liquidation sheet of C a n -
dido R a m í r e z , a colono of the Uni ted Porto R i c a n sugar 
Company, grinding at the Central Santa Juana, showed 
for 1930 the following figures: 
H e carried to the mi l l 14 different deliveries of cane, 
on a contract calling for seven pounds of sugar for each 
100 pounds of cane delivered. O n ticket No. 269, truck 
3027, he delivered 20,680 pounds of cane, which showed 
a content of 11.49 pounds of sugar. I n this case the 
colono got seven pounds and the mi l l 4.49. However , 
when on ticket 253, t ruck No . 1062, the test showed 
only 9.72, in place of the seven pounds the colono received 
only 5.72, the Central having first deducted its 4 pounds. 
I t can be easily seen, therefore, that regardless of how 
high the rendition may be, the colono gets no more than 
his 7 per cent, while the mil l often gets much more than 
the colono. The total rendition of sugar is as a rule be-
tween 11 and 13 per cent, but in some cases it runs higher 
than 13 ,OT as in the case of the Centra l Mercedita, which 
gave in May 1930, 13.33 5 per cent. 
T h e owner of the land has incurred all the expense of 
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cultivation, paid interest at an exorbitant rate on bor-
rowed money, paid taxes on the land, and taken the risk 
of too much or too little rain, or even hurricane, which , 
as in 1928, may seriously damage his crop. H e then must 
deliver his crop to the Central for grinding and testing, 
and trust that he wi l l get the full amount due h im. T h e 
Central has its own chemist, who makes the test and sets 
the figure of sucrose content and puri ty of the cane juice. 
The colono has long complained of this system as unjust, 
ironically referring to it as the "funnel system" in which 
his is the little end. 
T h a t his complaints are justified was fully established 
in a test made by Fernando A . Vi l lami l , Assistant C h e m -
ist of the Insular Experimental Station, on May 5, 6 
and 7, 1930.08 I n 21 cases at Central Defensa and in 9 
cases at Central Santa Juana, the test made showed a 
sucrose content ranging from 15.94 to 22.26, whereas 
the highest sucrose content showed by any mi l l in 
the report for May, was 16.81, the average content shown 
being between 14 and 16. T w o mills showed the very 
low mark of 12.25 and 12.30. 
I n the same series the Brix test showed a range of 19.2 
to 24, while the mil l reports ranged from 14.72 to 19.89. 
The usual figure given in the mil l reports was just over 
18, while the chemist usually reported 20 to 22. These 
differences are extremely important when we come to 
examine the method of computing the probable rendition 
of sugar, as we shall do later. 
Regarding the deficiency of the method of taking a 
sample of cane juice to test, the chemist says: "The system 
of taking a sample used in Central Defensa is completely 
deficient: first, because the cane of different colonos and 
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of the mi l l itself is mixed on putting it into the hammock, 
thus causing the analysis of the cane of each colono to 
be inaccurate; second, because the chemist takes a sample 
from a load of sixteen tons the same as from a load of two 
tons. T h i s is done by placing a flag in the middle of each 
pile of cane, and catching a quart of cane juice in a can 
as soon as the flag comes through. T h e sample should be 
taken continually, or i f not continually, at least intermit-
tently, while the cane is being ground. T h e Central Santa 
Juana takes the sample in this manner, which, though 
not perfect, is superior to the system used in the Centra l 
Defensa." 69 
Is there any remedy for this situation? One was pro-
posed in the last session of the Porto R i c a n Legislature, 
when Representatives F e r n á n d e z Garc ia , V é l e z Gotay and 
García D u c ó s presented a " L a w to regulate cane-grinding 
contracts and for other purposes." T h e remedy proposed 
was that all analyses should be made by the Horne or some 
other method of similar scientific value and that the prob-
able rendition of sugar should be on the basis of the fol-
lowing formula: 
R = (S 0 .3 x B ) F 
R . is the probable rendition of sugar of 9 6 degrees. 
S. is the sucrose content of juice. 
B . is B r i x in the juice. 
F . is a factor to be calculated from the average of the 
juices and sugar produced during the three previous years 
at the factory. 
T h e question as to whether this would really aid the 
colono may be tested by substituting the sucrose reported 
by the Centrals and comparing it wi th the test made by 
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the government chemist. T o do this it wil l be necessary 
to use a supposed factor, but we shall use the same factor 
in each case, thus giving a fair comparison. T h e highest 
factory report was: Br ix 19.89 and sucrose 16.81. This 
would make the formula read: 
R = (16.81 x 0.3 x 19.89).10 
This gives a probable rendition of 10.03, when an i m -
aginary factor of 0.10 is used. 
Using the highest results given by the government 
chemist, the formula would read as follows: 
R = (22.26 x 0.3 x 24.) .10 
This yields a probable rendition of 16.02, when the 
same imaginary factor of 0.10 is used. 
The benefits which would accrue to the cane grower 
if this law became effective are not difficult to see. T h e 
Legislature, however, failed to make an appropriation to 
carry the law into effect, so the colono wil l continue to 
have his cane tested by the Central in the old way, and 
receive whatever the Central sees fit to give him. 
T h e colono's rights to full participation in the crop 
he has grown are further curbed in the division of the 
molasses which remains after the ful l amount of sugar 
is extracted. E v e r y ton of cane renders about five gal-
lons of molasses, which has a selling price of about four 
and in 1928 rendered the Centrals about $830,891. 
Another by-product, the bagasse, which is used for 
the manufacture of fabric products in Hawai i and other 
sugar-producing area, is burned by the Porto Rico mills. 
This means that the colono furnishes free fuel to the 
Central , which effects a saving of thousands of dollars 
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yearly in this manner—a further increase of profits for 
the Centra l at the colono's expense. 
S 0 0 - A C R E C L A U S E 
T h e Foraker A c t , the first organic act of Porto Rico 
after the Island passed into the hands of the Un i t ed 
States, made the following provision: 
"No corporation shall be authorized to conduct the 
business of buying and selling real estate or be permitted 
to hold or own real estate except such as may be reason-
ably necessary to enable it to carry out the purposes for 
which it was created, and every corporation hereafter 
authorized to engage in agriculture shall by its charter 
be restricted to the ownership and control of not to ex-
ceed S00 acres of land. This provision shall be held to 
prevent any member of a corporation engaged i n agri-
culture from being in any wise interested in any other 
corporation engaged in agriculture." 70 
Why I t Cannot Be Enforced 
I n the new organic act of 1917, k n o w n as the Jones 
Bi l l , this provision was repeated.71 W h y then do corpora-
tions own many times the 500 acres named in the organic 
acts of Porto Rico? Congress evidently manifested its 
intention of keeping the property of the Island out of the 
hands of the few, but this provision has certainly never 
been enforced. 
T h e tendency of the Porto R i c a n is to lay the blame 
on the American Congress, which in reply can point out 
that no Porto Rican Legislature has ever enacted a law 
making punishable a breach of this provision. B u t such 
legislation is unlikely w i th the sugar companies in control 
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of the Legislature. So long as there is no penalty it is to 
be expected that the sugar companies wi l l continue to own 
large tracts of land, in violation of the law. 
T h e arguments for such large holdings on the part of 
corporations are forcefully set forth in forto Rico and 
Us 'Problem72 on the basis that the production of sugar 
is a business that can be carried on only by large com-
panies w i th ample capital to buy the enormous machinery 
for the successful manufacture of sugar in competition 
with such countries as Cuba , Java and Hawai i . C o n -
cerning this A c t , D r . Victor C l a r k says: 
"Its application to Porto Rico has never been fruit ful 
of results, nor can it be made effective under any con-
struction of the constitution of which we have judicial 
precedent. Vir tua l ly all the big sugar corporations, 
whether controlled by Islanders, Mainlanders, or E u r o -
peans, hold extensive areas, the title of which is vested in 
private individuals or partnerships, acting as their trus-
tees. A s long as the right of an individual to own land is 
recognized as sacred [the italics are the authors'] this 
circumvention of the law wil l be an easy matter." 73 
D r . C l a r k further says: "Under the circumstances the 
desirability of retaining this futile A c t on the statute 
books may be questioned." 74 
T h e concluding argument presented for the repeal of 
this provision is that by so doing the government could 
place these corporations under the jurisdiction of corpora-
tion law. 
T h e belief that sugar is the best crop for Porto R i c o 
and that large holdings are necessary is at the bottom of 
the fact that this law has never been enforced by the 
Porto R i c a n Legislature. For this reason a part of the 
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blame must be laid first at the door of the Porto Ricans 
themselves, who have watched the giant grow without 
making any effort to curb him. T h e underlying reason 
why no effort has been made by the Legislature to en-
force the SOO-Acre Provision is easily discovered: T h e 
leaders of the body have always been too closely and too 
profitably tied up wi th the sugar industry to be free to 
do so. 
T h e power of the sugar corporations in Porto R i c a n 
politics is clearly illustrated in the following instances: 75 
A recent Governor of Porto R i c o was desirous of ap-
pointing to the position of Treasurer of Porto R i c o a 
man who was opposed by the Unionist , the majority, 
party of Porto Rico. T h e reply of the Governor to the 
Party's objections was that he must appoint this par-
ticular man because he had the support of the sugar cor-
porations. 
Another incident illustrating the dictatorship of the 
corporations occurred in the appointment of an A t -
torney General of Porto Rico. T h e Governor favored 
a certain candidate against the nominee of the Unionists, 
still the majority party. T h e president of this party, 
Señor Barcelo, was in Washington and spoke to the Chie f 
of the Bureau of Insular Affairs concerning the appoint-
ment. H e was informed that it was now too late to dis-
cuss the appointment as the name of the opposing candi-
date had already been sent to the President of the Uni ted 
States. 
Mr. Enr ique Bird, then acting as interpreter for Señor 
Barcelo, went from Washington to N e w Y o r k , where he 
visited the office of one of a group of prominent lawyers 
and financiers who control an important sugar company. 
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Upon the lawyer's inquiry, Mr. B i r d told him who had 
been appointed. T h e lawyer declared that the appoint-
ment was not satisfactory to his company, and immedi-
ately called the Bureau of Insular Affairs by long distance 
telephone. W i t h i n five minutes he had obtained the ap-
pointment of his candidate, a thing which the majority 
party of Porto Rico had been unable to do. 
Further relations between the Porto Rican Legislature 
and the sugar industry are not difficult to point out. T h e 
Honorable Antonio R . Barcelo, since 1917 leader of the 
Unionist Party, the majority party in the Island, and 
until 1930 President of the Senate, is the brother-in-law 
of Jorge Bird Arias, Vice-President and General Manager 
of the Fajardo Sugar Company. T h e Honorable José 
Tous Soto, for many years Speaker of the House, is also 
attorney for the South Porto Rico Sugar Company. U n -
der such leadership, it is not probable that the 500-Acre 
Provision wi l l ever be enforced by the Porto Rican Legis-
lature. 
T h e position of the Congress of the United States in 
this matter may well raise a question in the mind of an u n -
biased observer. W h y did Congress insert a clause in the 
Foraker A c t forbidding ownership of more than 500 acres 
of land in Porto Rico , and later insert the same clause in 
the Jones Bi l l of 1917, i f it was not to be enforced? T h e 
thirty years which have passed since this provision was 
made seem to indicate that Congress had no intention of 
enforcing it. The people of Porto Rico are justified in 
saying that the hands of their own Legislators are tied so 
that they cannot fulfill its purpose, and in asking as they 
do ask: 
" I f Congress considers us incompetent of governing 
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ourselves, w h y does it not enforce the provisions of the 
Organic A c t which it gave us?" 
T h e same reasons w h i c h explain w h y the insular Legis-
lature has never acted explain the indifference of the C o n -
gress of the Uni ted States. Reverence for the sacredness 
of property precludes a n y action w h i c h would effectually 
end the violation of the 500-Acre Provision. 
Extent of Violation of 500-Acre Clause 
H o w extensive are the infractions of the 5 0 0 - A c r e 
clause? T h e table on pages 76 and 77 70 shows the extent 
of absentee ownership in 1917 when the number of hold-
ings in excess of 500 acres was some 477, and the agri-
cultural land so held was 537,193 acres, valued at more 
than $36,500,000. L a n d s leased b y the same absentees 
were more than 229,000 acres w i t h a property value of 
more than $21,000,000. T h e total land so held reached 
approximately 766,000 acres wi th a total value of $57,-
000,000. T h e land, buildings and machinery of the ab-
sentee companies were w o r t h in excess of $84,000,000. 
Since this survey was made the increase has gone on 
steadily, unt i l today the total absentee property so held is 
not less than twice what it was in 1917, as wi l l be shown 
in summariz ing the total absentee holdings of the Is land. 
S U G A R A N D F O O D C R O P S 
T h e statement is often made that sugar cane has dr iven 
out the food crops, causing the present enormous short-
age of native foods and the necessity of import ing large 
quantities of such foods as rice, beans, corn, potatoes, 
etc., w h i c h might we l l be raised w i t h profit b y local 
growers. 
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Opposed to this is the statement of a competent i n -
vestigator that the "cane growing extended, i n fact, 
chiefly at the expense of grazing, w h i c h then ( 1 8 9 7 ) 
occupied a large part of the coastal region." 77 T h e same 
authority asserts that f rom 1897 to 1907 the cane area 
increased f rom 61,558 acres to 177,196 acres, while pas-
ture lands decreased f r o m 1,143,364 acres to 856,764 
acres.78 
A number of difficulties make impossible an accurate 
comparison of agricultural conditions in 1897 and 1930. 
First , a discrepancy in the area of the Island as estimated 
in 1897 and today. Accord ing to the Spanish Census of 
1897, the A m e r i c a n Census of 1899, and various other 
statistics covering the area in square miles, figures v a r y -
ing f r o m 3,435 to 3,670 are given, while area in acres 
varies f r o m slightly over 2,000,000 to 2,349,000.79 O b -
viously such inequality of records can lead to very er-
roneous conclusions. 
Second, the classification of land in 1897 and 1930 is 
entirely different. Accord ing to the census of 1897, the 
land was classified as cane, tobacco, coffee, minor crops, 
other crops, pasture and woods, and swamps. I n 1929, 
the T r e a s u r y Department divided the land into the same 
food divisions, but altered the other classifications to 
read: pasture, timber and brush, marshlands and other 
lands. These slight alterations make it impossible to say 
what lands are classified today exactly as they were i n 
1897 or 1899. 
A l t h o u g h these factors make any absolute comparison 
impossible, it is still possible to determine to a certain ex-
tent the source of the increase in cane lands. T h e area 
of the entire island i n 1897 was 2,090,181 acres,80 and 
76 P O R T O R I C O : A B R O K E N P L E D G E 
REPORT ON R E A L P R O P E R T Y DEVOTED TO A G R I C U L T U R E 
CORPORATIONS, PARTNERSHIPS OR INDIVIDUALS, 





U. S. of America 271 
Spain 109 
France 21 
Other nationalities . . . . 5 
Americans in partner-
ship with Spaniards.. 21 
Americans in partner-
ship with citizens of 


































Total 432 445,360 $26,373,805 123,090 $9,591,817 
Corporations 
U. S. of America, incor-
porated in the U. S. 13 33,653 
In Porto Rico 31 58,038 
Foreign (incorporated) 1 142 
3,477,618 46,123 5,471,508 
6,703,402 59,549 6,150,297 
28,390 441 35,600 
Total 45 91,833 $10,209,410 106,113 $11,657,405 
Grand total 477 537,193 $36,583,215 229,203 $21,249,222 
T H E S U G A R I N D U S T R Y 77 
AND D I R E C T L Y OR I N D I R E C T L Y H E L D IN PORTO RICO BY 
IN HOLDING E X C E E D I N G F I V E HUNDRED ACRES 
BY NATIONALITY" 
description and value -
- Total • 
Buildings, machinery, 
— and other structures -
Number 
of acres Value Owned Leased Total 
Grand 
total value 



















37,363 2,784,565 113,225 18,690 131,915 2,916,480 
12,565 1,328,517 865,641 6,470 872,111 2,200,628 







437,732 7,865,742 $16,814,868 
87,228 11,722,970 24,576,669 
810 763,542 827,532 
197,946 $21,866,815 $19,826,484 $525,770 $20,352,254 $42,219,069 
766,396 $57,832,437 $25,661,780 $1,046,343 $26,708,123 $84,540,560 
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in 1899 was given in the census as 2,060,990.81 T h e 
Governor's report of 1929 shows a total of 2,085,902 
acres.82 T h e Census of 1899 is considered the most 
thorough survey existing, and as far as it contains the 
statistics necessary it w i l l be used in preference to the Co l l 
y Toste report of 1897. 
Cane lands in Porto R i c o have increased from 72,146 
acres in 1899 to 251,018 acres in 1929. This is a net in-
crease of 178,872 acres, which came either from pasture, 
woodlands or from land previously cultivated in other 
crops. Almost certainly it came from all these sources, 
but to determine just how much came from each source 
it is necessary to examine the past and present condition 
of each of these classes of land. 
F r o m 477,987 acres in cultivation in 1899, cultivated 
land in Porto R i c o has increased to 568,573 in 1929, a 
net gain of 90,586 acres of cultivated area. There are, 
then, only 90,586 acres now in cultivation which were 
not already cultivated in 1899, as against an increase in 
land given over to cane growing of 178,872. A s all other 
crops except tobacco decreased, it seems certain that this 
land went to cane growing. 
Coffee lands decreased from 197,031 acres in 1899 to 
169,491 acres in 1929, a net dcrease of 27,5440 acres. 
Formerly coffee and cane were not grown in the same dis-
tricts, but cane has ascended the hills and mountain sides, 
and is now grown where it was considered impossible to 
cultivate it previously. Tobacco increased from 5,963 
acres to 29,403 acres, an increase of 23,440 acres to be 
added to the net increase of cane. Minor crops decreased 
from 153,050 to 118,661 acres. 
Does this tell us anything about the source of the 
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202,312 acres net increase in sugar and tobacco? L e t us 
consider the net losses and add to them the increase in 
cultivation: 
Coffee land decrease 27,540 acres 
Minor Crops decrease 34,3 89 
Net increase in cultivation 90,586 
]0% of land in 1899 in cultivation 
in crops not specified 48,794 
201,309 
According to this calculation, the net increase of land in 
cultivation plus the amount of decrease in coffee and 
minor crops, and the land in cultivation in 1899 in crops 
not stated, yields a sum that is only 1,003 acres off an 
absolute balance. T h e source of increase has been cal -
culated without special reference to pasture, woodlands, 
swamps, etc. Comparing the totals of the remaining 
lands in 1899 and 1929, it will be found that there were 
1,579,903 acres in pasture, timber, etc., in 1899, while 
in 1929 the total acreage of pasture, timber and brush, 
marshlands and other lands (aside from lands in cult iva-
tion) equalled 1,517,329 acres, a decrease in all the classes 
listed of 62,574. Whi le this does not account for the 
entire 90,586 acres net increase, it is quite probable that 
the difference in estimates since 1899 makes up the de-
ficiency. I t does not, however, indicate that the cane 
and tobacco increase has not been due as much to pasture 
decrease as to decrease in other crops. There is still the 
possibility that change in classification could account for 
the foregoing conclusion. T h e ideal plan, of course, 
would be to know definitely to what use every acre of land 
was devoted in 1897 and compare it wi th the use made of 
every acre in 1929. A s this is impossible, the best sub-
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stitute, a comparison of the crops in the various munic i -
palities, must be made. 
T h e Census of 1899 shows a total of 153,OJO acres in 
minor crops while the report of the C i v i l Secretary, 
Cayetano Col l y Toste, in 1897 shows only 110,684.83 
T h e discrepancy may be accounted for by the incom-
pleteness of the 1897 figures. C o l l y Toste gives, how-
ever, a detailed account of the crops of each municipality, 
and as the Census of 1899 omits this, the 1897 figures 
wi l l be used. The acreage ascribed to minor crops in this 
report is certainly the minimum. 
Us ing C o l l y Teste's report, an examination of the chief 
cane growing districts today as compared with 1897, the 
year before the Amer ican occupation, wi l l be made. T o -
day these are Arecibo, Vieques, Ponce, Juana D i a z , H u -
macao, Yabucoa, Guayama, Cabo Rojo , Santa Isabel, and 
San G e r m á n . O f these only Arecibo, Humacao and Cabo 
Rojo show an increase of food stuffs while all others show 
an increase of cane from about two to five times. This 
seems to offer strong support to the contention that cane 
has been the direct cause of the decrease in food crops. 
Considering that C o l l y Teste's total is 30 per cent 
lower than that of the Census of 1899, and making due 
allowance for this in comparing the districts given above, 
it is found that only one of the ten districts has main-
tained its food production, and this one by only a small 
margin. T a k i n g into account that such crops as pine-
apples, oranges, grapefruit and coconuts are mainly ex-
port crops, the actual food producing crops are found to 
be even lower than the above figures would indicate, and 
not one of the districts given has as much food acreage 
as it had in 1897.8* 
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DOES SUGAR P A Y PORTO R I C O ? V 
) 
I n concluding his study of the sugar industry in Porto 
Rico, one economic expert decided that "so far as cane 
planting goes, the existing agricultural economy of the 
Island is rational and serves the needs of its people as well 
as any other of which we have present knowledge." 85 
Intentionally, or unintentionally, the writer left the 
subject open to debate by the use of the concluding words 
"of which we have present knowledge." The cane i n -
dustry might do that and still fail to serve the needs of the 
people. 
There may be many factors which might be considered 
in coming to a conclusion as to the relative profits and 
losses in the sugar business to the Porto Rican people as 
a whole, but a justifiable conclusion may be reached by 
considering whether or not under the existing economic 
system it pays the investor, whether it is profitable to the 
grower, whether it can be produced at a low enough price 
to compete in world markets, whether it pays decent 
wages and gives steady employment, whether it permits 
an economic and scientific crop distribution and finally 
whether it is paying its proportion of the taxes. 
Sugar Pays the Investor 
T o the first of these questions, does it pay the investor, 
the answer has been given under the subhead "Profits in 
Sugar," wherein it was shown that the three largest sugar 
corporations have paid dividends ranging from 4 to 115 
per cent over a period of twenty years. Such an enor-
mous profit can be justified only on the basis of great risk 
taken and ample return paid to the country furnishing 
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this fabulous treasure. Great risk there was never—the 
stars and stripes have always furnished ample protection 
to American property and have assured the Porto R i c a n 
investor that no revolution would menace his holdings, 
no laws would be made unduly oppressive and no exces-
sive taxes collected. Surely then, in the face of such 
favorable conditions and such unreasonable profits, the 
sugar corporations could have given back an ample return 
in liberal contracts to colonos, generous wages for work-
men, and full payment of their due share of the tax 
burden. But this has not been the case. 
The Colono Loses 
T h e condition of the colono has been shown. H e as-
sumes all the risk of the season, cost of production, pays 12 
per cent interest on money borrowed to produce his crop 
— a n d finally receives less for his cane than it cost him 
to produce it. Whi le the colono never gets more than 65 
per cent of the sucrose .content of his cane, and in most 
cases today he appears to get less than half ,8<i the major 
portion of the cost of production falls on his shoulders. 
T h e average cost of producing a ton of cane i n 1928 was 
$6P.42, and of this only $7.22 was manufacturing cost.87 
Many mills do not even pay $7.22 for manufacture. Boca 
Chica , for instance, though rated as an exception due to 
the ski l l of the engineer, is able to manufacture for the 
sum of 43 cents a sack, or $3.44 a ton. T h e colono pays 
89 per cent or more of the cost of production, and re-
ceives at most 65 per cent of the returns. Obvious ly the 
landowner cannot long survive under such a system. 
N o r is he surviving. The more than 100,000 acres of 
choice cane land now held by the absentee-owned sugar 
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companies show the extent to which the land has passed 
and is passing out of the hands of native owners. T h e 
sale of property to corporations, most of them absentee 
corporations, is steady. Dur ing the fiscal year ending 
June 30, 1930, more than 1,470 acres of land were ac-
quired by such corporations as Centra l Coloso, Fajardo 
Sugar Company, Uni ted Porto R i c a n Sugar Company, 
Central Cambalache, and other companies.88 T h e n u m -
ber of mortgages registered shows an even more startling 
condition of both rural and urban property. Prior to 
January, 1929, no statistics exist showing the amount of 
mortgages, but statistics compiled since that time are an 
ominous indication of the inevitable destination of lands 
now belonging to Porto Rican owners. 
O v e r a period of eighteen months, mortgages on urban 
property amounted to $1 1,3 51,533,80 and on rural prop-
erty, to $23,262,419, making a total of $34,613,952 in 
new mortgages registered within a year and a half. I n the 
same period, the cancellation of mortgages amounted to 
only $15,153,415, leaving a total of $19,460,537 new 
mortgages, net, on Porto Rican property. This is five 
per cent of the total assessed value of the property of the 
Island. N e w mortgages on rural property represented 
18 per cent of the entire rural wealth of Porto Rico . M r . 
José L . Pesquera, president of the Asoc iac ión de A g r i -
cultores de Puerto R i c o , estimates the mortgages to be 
$120,000,000—just short of the entire rural assessment! 
N o , sugar cane has not brought prosperity to the col-
ono. H e has lost, or is losing, his land under the system. 
A s to whether sugar cane can be produced at a price 
sufficiently low to enable it to compete in world markets, 
the answer is that it is competing and the manufacturers 
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show a profit. Thi s does not, however, answer the ques-
tion in ful l . Soil conditions, fertilization, harvesting, 
manufacture, financing, irrigation, wages, and taxation 
must be considered. 
T h e soil of Porto R i c o which is suitable for the pro-
duction of cane is limited. T h e limit of profitable pro-
duction has been reached, and today cane can be seen 
growing on hill tops and even on mountain sides where 
the yield is necessarily extremely low. T o stimulate soil 
which has been cultivated continuously for more than 
four centuries requires heavy fertilization, adding greatly 
to the cost of production in comparison with that of 
Santo Domingo and C u b a where large tracts of virgin 
soil still remain.90 
I t has been shown that the principal cost of the pro-
duction of sugar falls on the grower, and that he is not 
receiving his share of the returns. Harvest ing and grow-
ing costs have advanced 5 5 and 64 per cent respectively 
since 1914,01 while the total cost of production has risen 
only 40 per cent. F inancing the grower at a 12 per cent 
interest rate adds heavily to production cost. T h i s , as a 
rule, is done by the manufacturer, who thereby gets an 
unduly high profit on his money in this transaction alone. 
Manufacturing costs are more than in Hawai i and less 
than in C u b a . Irrigation in Porto R i c o in the dry sec-
tions of the Island costs from $ 11 to $ 15 an acre.92 
Sugar Taxes 
A s to taxation, it has already been shown that the sugar 
companies do not pay taxes in proportion to the value of 
the properties they hold. One additional item of taxa-
tion which has not been discussed, but which has a direct 
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bearing on the topic, is the Sugar T a x passed in 1923. 
This tax levies 4 cents a hundredweight on sugar. A s 
sugar is mainly an export crop, this is theoretically a tax 
on the exporter, usually an absentee. T h e tax, then, was 
originally intended to be a small check on the unreason-
ably large profits of the sugar manufacturers. I n an ef-
fort to find out who was paying this tax, the A s o c i a c i ó n 
de Agricultores de Puerto Rico addressed letters to their 
members in sufficient number to check every Centra l 
grinding cane. T h e y found that the Centrals, wi th very 
few exceptions, began to insert in the colono contracts 
a clause requiring the colono to pay this tax.93 T h e mil l , 
therefore, merely shifted this tax to the colono, and, as 
usual, evaded taxation. As this tax in 1928 amounted to 
$2.52 per acre,34 it places no insignificant burden on the 
already overburdened colono. 
Wages in the Sugar Industry 
O n e item remains to be examined in determining the 
factors in cost production: wages. F r o m 1914 to 1928 
the majority of workers in cane Centrals and cane fields 
received daily wages ranging from less than 50 cents to 
$2 per day. I n 1920 and 1921, the years of big prices and 
profits exceeding 100 per cent, 27.3 per cent and 40 per 
cent of the total workers, respectively, received more 
than $2 a day, and 72.7 per cent and 60 per cent, respec-
tively, received less than that amount. The day of high 
wages passed quickly, however, and from the latter part 
of 1921 to the present there has been a fairly steady wage 
scale during the grinding season, of 75 cents to $1.50 per 
day, about 40 per cent receiving less than one dollar and 
62 to 86 percent receiving less than $1.50.'J5 O n the 
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plantations the wages were lower and in 1928, 86.5 per 
cent of the workers on one plantation received less than 
one dollar.96 I n the off season, wages were even lower, 
with about half of the mi l l workers receiving below a 
dollar and more than 80 per cent less than $1.50. O n the 
plantation more than 90 per cent received less than one 
dollar. 
T h e wages of a laborer during a year's time average 
$169.00, as he works only about three days a week in dull 
times, and even with his house counted he earns only 
$207 a year.9T Furthermore, not even during the very 
busy season, from November to M a y , is there work 
enough for all. T o determine the relative position of 
Porto Rico , these wages must be compared wi th other 
cane-producing countries. 
I n 1917 the wage of sugar cane workers in Porto R i c o 
was 63 cents, as compared with 97 cents in H a w a i i and 
$1.26 in Cuba.98 I n 1928, as has been seen, wages were 
less than one dollar for the majority, while in Honduras 
they ran from $1.25 to $1 .50a day, and in the Bahamas 
they were from $1.46 to $1.95 a day.99 T h e wage in 
Porto R ico , then, is roughly a little more than one half 
that of other tropical countries producing the same prod-
ucts. 
Counting the Total Cost 
The total cost of sugar production and the cost of 
marketing are the final considerations in analyzing Porto 
Rico's competitive possibilities in the world market. I n 
1928, sugar costs in Porto Rico ranged from $64.06 to 
$92.54 per ton. Figures for C u b a and Hawai i are not 
available for the same year, but over a period from 1913-
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14 to 1922-23, the cost in Porto Rico was steadily one 
third higher to almost double the cost of sugar production 
in C u b a . I n Hawai i the cost was not quite so low as in 
Cuba.100 
Porto Rico, then, is at a disadvantage in sugar produc-
tion due to higher costs, which are due in turn to the 
necessity of fertilization, irrigation and high interest on 
money. 
T h e final disadvantage which Porto Rico suffers in 
putting her sugar on the market is a higher shipping cost, 
paying 15 cents a hundred to ship sugar to N e w Y o r k , as 
compared with 10 and 11 cents from Cuba. 
H o w then does Porto Rico compete? The answer has 
been partially given in the discussion of the colono con-
tract. T h e colono pays with his losses the gains of the 
sugar Central . Evasion of taxation, payment of starva-
tion wages, exorbitant rates of interest on money to fi-
nance the colono—these make sugar "good business" in 
Porto Rico . T h e Central , usually in the hands of the 
wealthy foreign corporation alone is prospering under 
the present system. 
T h e story is not, however, complete without a reminder 
as to the effect of sugar growing on food production. I t 
has already been seen that the invasion of sugar cane in the 
ten principal cane growing districts has driven out the 
food crops and that the effect on the entire nation has 
been to decrease food crops from one acre for every six 
people to one acre for every fifteen. T h e total effect on 
Porto R i c a n consumption has been that in 1928 the im-
portation of food amounted to approximately $30,000,-
000, making more than 32 per cent of the Island's imports 
food. I n a country where every type of tropical and sub-
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tropical foods grow, sugar has driven out such crops unt i l 
today Porto Rico must import the very food products it 
once produced in abundance: rice, beans, potatoes, and 
corn. 
Sugar Economy Has Been Bad Economy 
Nothing has been more disappointing or deceptive to 
Porto R i c o than the sugar business. T h e superficial glance 
at the pyramiding production in tons and dollars has 
made it seem a veritable cascade of riches. The millions 
made from sugar have given the false impression of a 
prosperous Porto Rico, when the truth is that the majority 
of the people of the Island are actually being forced f u r -
ther into debt day by day. This is now known. T h e in-
dustry does not belong to natives, but to outsiders. T h e 
profits are not enjoyed by those who make them possible, 
but by those who never see Porto Rico . T h e wages, wh ich 
in bulk are so large, are now known to be miserably i n -
adequate for the sustenance of life. Sugar has supplanted 
food crops by usurping the fertile valley lands. Sugar i n -
terests have taken charge of the legislature and of the 
Bureau of Insular Affairs, and rendered the people i m -
potent to help themselves. However glittering the sugar 
industry may appear to outsiders, the Porto Ricans k n o w 
that it has not paid. "Sugar economy" has proved to be 
"bad economy" for Porto Rico . 
C H A P T E R V 
T H E T O B A C C O A N D F R U I T I N D U S T R I E S 
"Millions upon millions of dollars have been invested in the 
island since 1900. The men who have invested this money in 
many cases looked for returns much higher than those usually 
obtainable at home. Is that not what a colony is for? Mer-
cantilism's answer has always been in the affirmative. Their 
chief interest has been in dividends, not in the people of Porto 
Rico. Hence there has arisen a conflict of interest, particu-
larly over tax legislation, between the continentals who direct 
the big business of the island and the Porto Ricans who make 
its laws."—HENRY KITTREDGE NORTON * 
GROWTH OF THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY 
THE development of the tobacco industry in Porto Rico 
has been proportionally as great as that of the sugar in-
dustry. I n 1899, the total land in tobacco was about 6,-
000 acres, while in 1929 it had reached some 30,000 acres,1 
about five times as much. 
A great deal of this increase in acreage has been due to 
the aid and encouragement which the government has 
given by distribution of seed, experimentation in the 
destruction and prevention of parasites and instruction 
in better methods of caring for the tobacco, such as ferti-
lization and care of the soil, irrigation, etc. T h e part 
which the tobacco companies have played in this growth 
* An American journalist and writer on Latin American affairs. 
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of the industry cannot be ignored. T h e y have offered to 
the Porto R i c a n farmer a readier market for this product 
than he formerly found, and have built up a large export 
trade where none, or little, existed before. The export 
of tobacco in 1S99 was very small, that of cigars reaching 
not m u c h more than 100,000 for the entire year. Just 
how much the cigar export has grown since that time may 
be seen f rom the following table which represents the 
amounts exported in selected years: 
1900 100,000 2 





T h e principal part of the cigar output was consumed 
at home in 1899, but the export crop is now far in excess 
of domestic consumption. One factor which encouraged 
home consumption of cigars in 1899 was the high tariff 
which practically forbade imports, even from C u b a . 
Free trade with the Uni ted States has, however, changed 
this situation and now great quantities of foreign tobacco, 
especially cigarettes, are consumed. T h e number of 
home grown and home consumed cigars probably reached 
100,000,000 in 1899, but by 1907 this had fallen to some 
74,000,000. From 1911 to 1921 there was a recovery 
which brought the consumption of Porto Rican cigars in 
the Island back to the former high level or 100,000,000 
a year on an average, but only once since the latter date 
has the 100,000,000 m a r k been reached. D u r i n g the 
three years, 1927 to 1929, the average has been about 
64,000,000 cigars a year. 
T h e total production of cigars grew steadily from the 
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number used for domestic consumption, about 100,000,-
000, to its high peak in 1920 when the total production 
for home sale and exportation was some 321,000,000. 
Since that time the demand for Porto Rican cigars has 
not been so great, and this, together with an increased 
export of tobacco to be manufactured into cigars after it 
reached the United States has served to curb production. 
M u c h of the decrease in home consumption of cigars 
can be ascribed to the great increase in the use of ciga-
rettes. Porto Rico was a cigar smoking country in 1899, 
but since that time it has been converted to the use of 
the cigarette. While the domestic demand for Porto 
Rican cigars was diminishing almost consistently through-
out a period of 3 0 years, the cigarette habit was growing. 
B y 1907, Porto Rico was using 347,722,000 cigarettes of 
domestic manufacture. I n 1920, the figure reached 576 , -
424,970, the highest in the history of the Island. T h e 
decrease since that time has been more or less constant and 
since 1926 has dropped below 300,000,000 a year. T h e 
export crop has never been very great. The high water 
mark was reached in 1919 when something over 20,000,-
000 cigarettes were shipped abroad. 
Along with the growth in the cigar and cigarette trade 
has come a corresponding increase in the amount of scrap 
and leaf tobacco exported. Before 1911 the exports 
rarely exceeded 4,000,000 pounds. From 1911 to 1918 
there was an increase from this amount to 9,000,000 
pounds and in 1918 the crop jumped to 17,000,000 
pounds. Since that time it has usually been in excess of 
20,000,000 pounds and during the years 1927 to 1929 
the average was about 29,000,000.* Concerning the 
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market possibilities of tobacco the Report of the G o v e r -
nor of Porto Rico for 1928 said: 
"The tobacco crop of the year under review was less 
than normal, but the prices received were much better 
than the preceding year. T h e crop of 1927-28 was only 
22,000,000 pounds and the amount exported amounted 
to $20,777,937. T h e crop of 1926-27 was 50,000,000, 
but the amount received was only $24,860,072. T h e 
average price of the 1926-27 crop was 22 cents per pound, 
and m u c h of the crop remained unsold. The average 
price received for the 1927-28 crop was 27 cents, and 
much was sold at prices ranging from 3 0 to 3 5 cents. T h e 
normal annual requirements of the market for our tobacco 
at the present time appears to be about 30,000,000 pounds. 
A larger production cannot be sold except at reduced 
and unprofitable prices." 5 
A B S E N T E E T O B A C C O C O M P A N I E S 
The essential difference in the development of tobacco 
and sugar is the failure of the tobacco industry to try to 
gain control of the land as did the sugar companies. T h e 
major tobacco companies have, nevertheless, exerted a 
monopolizing influence on the industry of the Island. 
O f these companies the most important is the Porto 
Rican-American Tobacco Company,6 established in 
Porto R i c o in 1899 as a subsidiary of the American T o -
bacco Company, but independent since 1912. D u e to 
war conditions, in 1898, a cigarette factory in San Juan 
and a cigar factory in Ponce were established by M r . L u i s 
Toro, president of the Porto Rico-Amer ican Tobacco 
Company. I n 1899 these factories were bought out by 
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the American company, and the Porto Rican-American 
Tobacco Company was organized. 
The Porto Rican-American Tobacco Company of 
Porto Rico , as it exists today, was incorporated M a r c h 1, 
1919, in Porto Rico and acquired ownership of all proper-
ties in Porto Rico formerly owned by the Porto R i c a n -
American Tobacco Company of N e w Jersey. T h e com-
pany owns in Porto Rico eight plants for the manufac-
ture of cigars and cigarettes, located at L a Marina, San 
Juan, B a y a m ó n , San Lorenzo, Manat í , Cayey, C i d r a and 
Ponce, together with a box factory and a warehouse at 
Miramar. These plants have a combined capacity of 
over 150,000,000 cigars and 400,000,000 cigarettes an-
nually. 
The Porto Rican-American Tobacco Company of N e w 
Jersey was incorporated in 1899 in N e w Jersey, and owns 
all the stock of the Porto Rican-American Tobacco 
Company of Porto Rico , and half of the capital stock of 
the Porto Rican Leaf Tobacco Company. I n 1927, the 
company acquired control of the Congress Cigar C o m -
pany, and with its subsidiaries owned unti l recently 1,195 
acres of farming lands in the Cayey district of Porto Rico 
for the cultivation of tobacco wrapper and 327 acres in 
the Cidra district, for the same purpose. It further holds 
five-year leases covering 70,441 acres in the Cayey dis-
tricts. 
T h e outstanding class A common stock of this com-
pany is valued at $10,187,550, while class B common, 
which has no par value, was set at $4,061,000 for the 
82,440 outstanding shares. The assets of the company in 
1929 were $24,404,142, and the dividends for 1927 
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amounted to $534,847, in 1928 to $178,282 and in 1929 
to $713,125, and in 1930 to $713,156. 
T h e Porto Rican-Amer ican Tobacco Company further 
controls Wai t t and Bond, Incorporated, a company own-
ing a factory in N e w a r k , N e w Jersey, and using Porto 
Rican tobacco. T h e assets of the latter in 1929 were $3,-
338,218, and its net income for the years 1927 to 1930, 
inclusive, was $696,673, $788,227, $542,064 and $472,-
710, respectively. 
T h e Congress Cigar Company, Incorporated, which 
is controlled by the Porto Rican-Amer ican Tobacco C o m -
pany, was incorporated in Delaware in 1926, as successor 
to the Congress Cigar Company of Pennsylvania. This 
Company owns a warehouse in Porto R i c o and uses Porto 
R i c a n tobacco for its factories. Since 1926, its dividends 





Since 1924 this company has earned from $3.36 to 
$8.53 per share on 3 50,000 no par shares. I n 1929, this 
dropped to $8.23 per share, and in 1930, to $4.73. The 
margin of profit rose from 10.24 per cent to 20.10 per 
cent in 1929. 
T h e N e w Y o r k - T a m p a Cigar C o m p a n y was incorpo-
rated M a y 13, 1921, in Delaware and acquired the busi-
ness and assets of M . A l v a r e z and C o m p a n y and the I n -
dustrial Company of Porto Rico, subsidiaries of the Porto 
Rican-American Tobacco Company, which have been 
dissolved since that time. Their plant is located at T a m p a , 
Florida. T h e Porto R i c a n - A m e r i c a n Tobacco C o m p a n y 
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owns the entire $500,000 preferred stock and the 15,000 
shares of no par common stock. 
About 80 to 8 5 per cent of the tobacco business of 
Porto R i c o is done by these large companies, the remainder 
being done by jobbers who make contracts for small lots 
of cigars, establish temporary factories, where the cigars 
are made by hand, or let out small contracts to individual 
workers. These jobbers close out as soon as they have ob-
tained the number of cigars needed to fill their contracts, 
thus representing the worst type of absentee ownership. 
Whi le the large tobacco companies are established in 
Porto R ico , and must pay property and corporation taxes, 
the temporary contractor carries on his business in a rented 
house, remains only a few weeks, and pays neither general 
property tax nor income returns. Small benefit to the 
people can result from this type of business. 
T O B A C C O E M P L O Y M E N T A N D WAGES 
T h e condition of the worker in the tobacco fields and 
in the factories varies little from that of other field and 
factory workers. Women workers in the tobacco fields 
draw smaller wages than men, about 72 per cent of them 
receiving less than 50 cents a day, whereas fewer than 5 
per cent of the men get less than this amount. Ninety-
eight and eighty-five hundredths per cent of all women 
workers draw less than 60 cents a day and the remaining 
1.15 per cent get only 60 to 69 cents. T h e wages of men 
workers show a better average, although the majority 
receive only 60 to 79 cents a day.8 
T h e wage of the tobacco factory worker was consider-
ably better, but by no means adequate. O f those employed 
by the day, only some 10 per cent made less than one 
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dollar a day, while 31 per cent made up to $1.24 and 3 5 
per cent made from $1.50 to $1.99. T h e workers who 
were paid by the week received from five to 20 dollars 
weekly, about 75 per cent falling in this class. "Women 
workers were not so wel l paid as the men, 47 per cent of 
them receiving less than one dollar a day and 92 per cent 
less than $1.25. Those who worked on a weekly basis 
almost all fell in the class earning less than $7.50, only 
about 6 per cent earning more. T h e yearly income of 
the tobacco worker has been calculated to be the same as 
that of the coffee worker, $183. T h i s includes his money 
wages, his house when that is furnished, and ground for 
growing food crops, which is sometimes allowed him.9 
A great deal of the work done in the factories is piece 
work, and this is rapidly being mechanized. W i t h i n the 
last ten years the factories have been supplied w i th ma-
chines for making cigars, and now about 75 per cent of 
the cigars are machine-made. Natura l ly , this has les-
sened the demand for factory workers and added to the 
already large number of permanently unemployed in the 
cities. T h e introduction of machines has also, as in the 
United States, tended to transfer the making of cigars 
from male to female workers. 
T H E T O B A C C O F A R M E R 
T h e position of the tobacco farmer is analagous to that 
of the sugar planter, in that he must depend upon the 
companies or some intermediary to finance his crop. Due 
to the fact that tobacco matures in a m u c h shorter period 
of time than sugar cane, this is not such a burden on him 
as it is on his sugar-growing neighbor. I t adds, never-
theless, to the cost of production. 
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T h e price of tobacco is usually about 30 to 32 cents a 
pound, and theoretically the tobacco farmer receives this 
amount for his crop. T h e way the system works is very 
different. T h e independent grower, who is sufficiently 
wealthy to finance himself, buy his own fertilizers, cure 
his own tobacco and deal directly with the manufacturer, 
does receive the market price of tobacco for his crop, but 
this class numbers but 20 per cent of the entire group of 
tobacco growers.10 T h e remaining 80 per cent of tobacco 
farmers are too small to deal directly with the factory 
and these depend upon a middleman to finance them, buy 
their fertilizers, seed their ground, pay their help, furnish 
them curing facilities and market their crop. 
T h e latter type of grower begins by paying a rate of 
interest which may be as high as 12 per cent, to the mid-
dleman, who in turn gets the money from the factory, and 
contracts with the factory to supply a certain amount of 
tobacco for factory use. The middleman must make a 
profit on his transaction, so that the farmer is certain not 
to receive the market price under this system. T h e far-
mer must also cure his tobacco in the warehouse of the 
middleman and he is, of course, charged for this. His 
fertilizer is bought at wholesale prices and sold to h im at 
retail. F inal ly , when his crop is mature, he must accept 
whatever grading his tobacco is given. 
U n d e r this system, only about 20 of the 30 cents mar-
ket price actually reaches the farmer's pocket. A recent 
study showed that the tobacco farmer with less than six 
acres of tobacco lost money; farmers with more than six 
acres, but less than 63, showed a profit, but in no case did 
this profit exceed $707. Farms wi th more than 63 acres 
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were therefore necessary in order for the farmer to make 
even the small profit of $ 1,239 for the year.11 
T H E F R U I T I N D U S T R Y 
Frui t growing, unlike sugar and tobacco, is rather new 
in Porto Rico . W h e n the Americans occupied the Island 
in 1898, the fruit acreage, if coconuts are excepted, was 
so insignificent that it was not recorded in the Census. 
This coconut acreage was only 5,447, or less than one per 
cent of the land in cultivation,12 and the total value of co-
conut exports in 1901 was only $8,334.13 This was a con-
siderable decrease from the normal crop, due to the cy -
clone of 1899 which practically destroyed the coconut 
producing palms but the growing of this fruit had re-
covered sufficiently by 1910 to permit an export of $ 218 ,-
870. T h e number of coconuts exported increased stead-
ily from that time and since 1921 it has averaged more 
than $600,000 yearly, reaching in 1928 $713,992. T h e 
acreage had naturally increased at the same time and in 
1929, 12,052 acres were given over to this crop. 
Far more important is the growth in importance of 
pineapples, grapefruit, and oranges. T h e pineapple crop 
of 1901 was so small that it was included in the export 
list as "other fruits," the total of w h i c h was a little less 
than $17,000, but it has increased unt i l in 1928 exports 
of fresh pineapple were $1,654,108, and canned pineapple 
exports were $1,159,175. The acreage in pineapples, so 
small that it was not recorded in the Census of 1899, was 
2,772 in 1929. 
The increase in grapefruit and orange cultivation is still 
more significant. There was no grapefruit industry in 
1899, but by 1929, 8,720 acres were planted in grapefruit 
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trees.14 T h e export value rose steadily from zero to an 
average value of over $2,000,000 a year since 1924, and 
reached in 1928, $2,704,310. There was some orange 
growing before the American invasion, but that this was 
very small is seen from the value of the exports in 1901, 
which were only $84,475. This had increased in 1928 
to $1,256,039. T h e orange acreage, like that of pine-
apple and grapefruit, too small to be mentioned in the 
Census of 1899, amounted to 4,93 0 acres in 1929. 
T H E F R U I T CORPORATIONS 
According to figures furnished by the Treasurer of 
Porto R i c o there are 10,183 acres of land in fruit, owned 
by corporations. T h i s does not represent the total amount 
of land dedicated to the growing of fruit, however, as a 
considerable portion is owned by individuals. There are 
in all 46 fruit corporations of which 28 are owned by 
Americans and 18 by Porto Ricans. O n the other hand, 
not all of the American corporations are absentee owned, 
as many Americans owning fruit orchards, have lived in 
Porto R i c o for twenty or thirty years and expect to re-
main there. Whatever capital they accumulate is rein-
vested in Porto R i c a n business and for this reason they 
cannot be considered absentee owners. There are, never-
theless, others who are either wholly or partially absen-
tees. Fifteen of these are rated as wholly absentee, and nine 
as partially absentee, making a total of 24 companies 
owned entirely or partly by people who do not reside 
in the Island. 
T h e 15 wholly absentee companies own 3,839 acres of 
land, and the partly-absentee companies, 2,660, making 
a total of 6,499 acres in fruit in the hands of absentee in -
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terests. Thi s is 64 per cent of all lands owned by fruit 
corporations, and the assessed value of the 10,183 acres 
is $ 1 , 0 9 3 , Í 8 0 . T h e absentee companies are assessed at 
$678,130, or approximately 62 per cent of the total. T h e 
total paid-in capital of all the fruit corporations is $2,-
098,993, the absentee companies having $1,391,539, or 
about 66 per cent, of the total. I t can be seen, then, that 
absentee and partly absentee corporations control about 
two-thirds of the fruit lands owned by companies. 
The following table shows the nationality, number of 
acres owned, paid-in capital, classification as residents or 
absentees, and assessed value of all absentee corpora-
tions: 15 
Acres 
Name Nationality Owned 
Barceloneta Fruit Co American 232 
Bayview Fruit Co American 440 
Colombo Tropical 
Fruit Co American 329 
Coto Plantations, Inc P. Rican 391 
Grand View Fruit Co American 372 
Del Rio Plantations American 674 
Hatillo Fruit Co American 436 
La Isabella Grove Co P. Rican 500 
Oneida Fruit Co American 129 
Palo Alto Orchard American 320 
Palo Blanco Fruit Co American 498 
Palo Seco Fruit Co American 470 
Plaza Fruit Co. of 111 P. Rican 78 
Pomelo Fruit Co American 51 
P. R. Grove & Garden Co. American 125 
Royal Fruit Co. of Utica American 90 
San Juan Fruit Co American 152 
Spanish-American 
Fruit Co P. Rican 385 
Sunny Land Fruit Co American 60 
Toa Alto Citrus Fruit Co. American 156 
Tropical Fruit 
































































254 161,290 Absentee 36,500 
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Tyee Frui t C o P. R i c a n 165 16,167 Both 15,980 
Utica Plantations, Inc American 110 43,700 Both 10,000 
Herkimer P. R . Land 
& Frui t Company .... American 82 7,500 Absentee 10,500 
6,499 $1,452,979 $678,130 
F R U I T L A N D V A L U E S A N D A S S E S S M E N T 
I t has already been said that the total assessment of the 
10,183 acres owned by fruit corporations is $1,093,580 
which gives an average assessment of about $107 per acre. A ? 
According to the Governor's Report for 1929, the aver- ® 
age assessment of pineapple lands was $169.40, and of "i ^ 
of orange lands $237.06. Grapefruit lands were not * 
listed separately, but were included in lands classified as 
minor fruits, which class had an average assessment of 
$44.25 per acre. I t would appear from this that corpo-
ration lands are not assessed as high as the average as-
sessment for all fruit lands. I t has been shown that sugar 
lands are greatly under-assessed. Let us see whether the 
same thing is true of fruit assessments. 
Us ing the highest average assessment for fruit lands, 
$237.06 an acre, should be fair in making a comparison 
of assessment evaluations and actual value. T o find the 
true value an examination of what fruit lands yield 
should serve as a good index. A s a rule, an acre of land 
has 70 to 90 trees, the average yield in an ordinary year 
being five boxes of fruit to the tree, or about 350 boxes 
per acre per year. Some lands give a higher yield than 
this, and in good years eight and ten boxes to a tree is not 
uncommon, while trees yielding 20 to 25 boxes a year, 
though extremely rare, have been known- A s w i l l be 
shown the cost of marketing a crate of grapefruit varies 
from $2.28 to $3.47, and the usual clear profit above all 
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growing, harvesting, financing and marketing expense 
is $.80 to $1.00 a box. Suppose that an average acre of 
land, yielding 3 50 boxes, brings the lower profit of $.80 a 
box. T h i s is $280 an acre profit each year, and at this 
rate a ten-acre farm would yield $2,800 a year. Natura l ly , 
on a small farm like this the owner would be his own 
manager. Al lowing h i m a salary of $2,000 a year would 
leave an absolute net profit of $800, which if capitalized 
at ten per cent would give a value of $8,000 for the entire 
farm, or $800 for each acre. T h e highest average assess-
ment of fruit lands of any municipality is $304.45, so 
clearly the fruit lands are assessed at much less than half 
their value. 
Still another test w i l l serve to indicate this under-as-
sessment. The authors talked wi th a member of fruit 
growers, practically all of whom, when asked what 
standard they employed for valuing their lands replied 
that lands prepared for planting were worth f rom $200 
to $350 an acre, and that the usual value placed on a tree 
between its sixth and fifteenth year was $ 10. T h i s shows 
clearly that an acre of land in bearing citrus fruit trees 
is worth from $950 to $1,100 an acre, or even more. De -
spite this prevailing under-assessment, fruit growers 
would follow the statement as to the worth of their lands 
with the information that the Government was seeking 
to put an assessment of $400 an acre and that they con-
sidered such a high assessment little short of confiscation! 
T h e total assessment of fruit lands is shown in the fol-
lowing table. T h e grapefruit assessment is an estimate, 
as the Treasurer's report does not list grapefruit lands 
separately- However there are 7,720 acres, w h i c h if 
assessed at $300 would not exceed the figure given. 




Total $4,3 3 8,28 5 
T h e total value of fruit lands is far in excess of this 
assessment, for taking $300 an acre, the estimated cost of 
bringing a citrus fruit grove into bearing,18 as an average, 
the entire investment for approximately 16,422 acres of 
fruit lands would be slightly less than $5,000,000. A 
great deal of this land is in fruit-bearing trees, certainly 
not less than half. Accepting the estimates of the fruit 
growers themselves as to their value would place the aver-
age at $1,000 an acre, which means that bearing trees and 
land are worth in excess of $8,000,000. The remaining 
half could not be valued at less than the average price at 
which the fruit growers themselves value their land be-
fore it reaches the productive stage. This would amount 
to $300 an acre for something more than 8,000 acres, or 
about $2,400,000. O n this basis the total value of fruit 
lands would then be in excess of $ 10,000,000. I t has been 
shown that the companies which are entirely absentee 
owned have 3,839 acres, or 23 per cent of the fruit lands 
(the total of which is 16,422 acres, as contrasted wi th 
the 10,183 acres owned by corporations), and that com-
panies which are partially absentee owned have 2,660 
acres, or 17 per cent. Assuming that the partly-absentee 
owned companies are 50 per cent controlled by absentees, 
it would be seen that another 8 per cent of the fruit lands 
must be added to the above 23 per cent, making a total 
of 31 per cent of the fruit lands in the hands of absentees. 
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COST O F P R O D U C T I O N 
T h e fruit industry from the viewpoint of labor is 
probably the best of the three major crops produced. 
Throughout the year an average of one laborer per acre is 
employed," and comparatively speaking there is no dull 
season such as we find in tobacco and cane growing. While 
there is increased activity during the harvest period, the 
fact that Porto R i c a n citrus fruit has three blooms in each 
year makes this season three times as frequent as the sugar 
and tobacco harvests and between harvesting seasons the 
fruit f a r m furnishes almost steady work in spraying, 
pruning, fertilizing and keeping the ground free of weeds. 
Wages on the fruit farms likewise tend to average more 
than those in other types of agriculture. Professor José 
C . Rosario, of the Universi ty of Porto Rico, shows that 
the annual wage of the fruit-worker is about $217, as 
compared with $183 a year for the coffee and tobacco 
laborer and $207 for the sugar laborer.18 This small dif-
ference, though it may seem insignificant, is really of 
considerable importance in a region where wages are 
generally excessively low. One distinct advantage that 
the fruit-worker has is a small plot on which to grow 
garden produce. V e r y rarely, i f ever, does the worker 
on the sugar plantation have such a plot of ground fur-
nished h im, the tendency being to herd the workers' cot-
tages together on the poorest sections of land, w i th prac-
tically no space between them. 
T h e Porto Rican frui t industry is dependent for com-
petitive purposes upon the tariff. Captain E d w a r d B. 
Lesesne, of the Porto R i c o F r u i t Exchange, shows that 
the cost of placing a crate of pineapples on the dock in 
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San Juan is $1.87, and that the invoice value delivered 
is over $2.00, as compared with $1.45 delivered from 
Cuban markets.10 T h e old tariff on pineapple was $.225 
for a crate of 1.96 cubic feet, or three-fourths of one cent 
each in bulk. T h e new tariff was raised to $.50 for a 
crate of 2.45 cubic feet, and to 1 1/6 cents each in bulk. 
It can readily be seen that without protection Porto 
Rican pineapples could not compete with those from 
Cuba. 
T h e cost of producing and marketing a crate of grape-
fruit is f rom $2.28 to $3.47, whereas the cost in British 
Honduras of producing and marketing a crate of this 
fruit is, i f sold in London, $3.12, and if offered for sale 
in N e w Y o r k about $2.18. When this is compared wi th 
the min imum cost of producing and marketing Porto 
Rican grapefruit, it can be seen that the fruit of British 
Honduras has an advantage of 10 cents a crate over the 
minimum cost and $1.29 over the maximum and that 
this disadvantage can only be equalized through the 
tariff of 1 1/2 cents a pound. Oranges are protected by a 
tariff of one cent a pound. 
T h e future of the fruit industry seems bright. F r u i t 
can be grown in the mountains, where other crops are 
not profitable, and therefore can extend, despite the 
monopoly of sugar and tobacco in the low lands. A s no 
excessively high capital is needed to begin business, this 
wil l enable native Porto Ricans to develop their industry 
and use their own capital in Porto Rico . Furthermore, 
no other crop furnishes such steady work or pays equal 
wages. A s the market in the United States and in Europe 
is good, it seems that fruit growing should be one of the 
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means of eventually taking Porto R i c o out of her di-
lemma of starvation wages and seasonal labor. 
But it must not be taken for granted that fruit is go-
ing to be the salvation of Porto R i c o . Competition is 
keen; shipping costs are higher, due to the Amer ican 
monopoly of this business, than those of competitors; 
foreign capital is tending to encroach on native owner-
ship and if this continues will put frui t in the same cate-
gory w i t h tobacco and sugar, an absentee-owned in -
dustry paying small return to the natives; the under-as-
sessment, so common now, wil l not be remedied by the 
Government without a fight; and, finally, wages wi l l 
continue to be inadequate unless the owners are com-
pelled to maintain a higher level than at present. F r u i t 
is a possibility, but only a possibility. 
C H A P T E R V I 
P U B L I C U T I L I T I E S , R A I L R O A D S A N D O T H E R 
I N V E S T M E N T S 
"Since the American occupation there have been heavy, and 
practically continuous, investments of American capital in 
Porto Rico."—VICTOR S. CLARK * 
P U B L I C U T I L I T Y S E R V I C E 
THE principal public service utility in Porto Rico are 
owned and operated by absentee companies. Few of the 
local companies have any financial strength or serve a 
very large population; the only real competitor that the 
absentee companies have is the Insular Government, 
which has entered strongly into the telephone, telegraph 
and power business. 
The Porto Rico Telephone Company 1 is controlled by 
the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation. 
This company was incorporated in Delaware in 1914, and 
took over the business of the Porto R i c o General Tele-
phone C o m p a n y and the South Porto R i c o Telephone, 
the former of which served the cities and towns in the 
northeastern and western parts of the Island, and the 
latter the cities and towns of the southern part. T h e 
principal cities served are: San Juan and its environs, wi th 
* Author of Porto Rico and its Problems, i recent investigation of the 
Island by the Brookings Institute. 
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a population of about 89,000; Ponce and its surround-
ings, w i t h a population of about 75,000; Mayaguez, with 
a population of about 43,000; Arecibo, with about 11,-
000; Aguadil la , wi th about 9,000; and other small munic -
ipalities. 
T h e franchise of this company signed by the President 
of the Un i t ed States extends to 1964, and the Government 
of Porto Rico is empowered to purchase the business of 
the company after the expiration of a twenty-year 
period, or on the expiration of ten-year periods there-
after. T h e assets of the company were, in 1929, $4,011,-
232. F r o m 1921 to 1927 inclusive, dividends were paid 
at the rate of 8 per cent; in 1928, 6 per cent; in 1929, none 
were paid on account of the hurricane; and in 1930, the 
entire preferred stock of some $250,000 was authorized 
to be retired as of October 1, at $107 per share. 
T h e Government operates a system of telephones which 
connect San Juan, Ponce and Humacao , three of the 
principal cities of the Island.2 I t also operates a telegraph 
system connecting all of the most important towns. 
There is no private telegraph line in operation, but the 
telephone lines run by the Insular Government compete 
with those of the Porto Rico Telephone Company men-
tioned above. 
T h e Ponce Electric Company,3 a constituent company 
of the Engineers Publ ic Service Company , was incor-
porated in 1919, under the laws of Porto Rico , wi th a 
charter of perpetual duration, and acquired the properties 
of the Ponce Rai lway and Light Company, a N e w Jer-
sey Corporation. T h i s company does the entire light and 
power business of Ponce and the Playa (the P o r t ) , and in-
terchanges electric power with the Irrigation Service of 
P U B L I C U T I L I T I E S , I N V E S T M E N T S 109 
Porto Rico . T h e estimated population served with light 
and power in 1929 was 51,000. T h e lighting franchise 
expires in 1963. T h e outstanding capital stock is $765,-
000 of common stock and $384,100 of preferred stock, 
with a par value of $100, while the assets in 1929 were 









T h e Porto Rico Gas and Coke Company 4 is controlled 
by the Southern Cities Utilities Company, under the di-
rection of the United Utilities and Service Corporation. 
I t was incorporated under the laws of Delaware in 1922, 
as a reorganization of the Porto Rico Gas Company. T h e 
company manufactures and supplies gas to San Juan, 
Porto R ico , and has a capital stock of $250,000 common, 
with a $25 par value, and $494,500 preferred, wi th a 
value of $100 at par. Its assets in 1929 reached $1,724,-
954, and its net income in 1928 was in excess of $18,000 
but in 1929, due to hurricane conditions, this fell to 
slightly over $14,000. 
T h e Porto Rico Power Company,5 formerly the Porto 
Rico Ra i lway Company, Limited, controlled by the I n -
ternational Power Company, Limited, was incorporated 
in 1906 in Canada, and controls and operates through 
the Porto Rico R a i l w a y Light and Power Company, a 
subsidiary, the electric lighting and power distribution 
systems in San Juan, and the principal municipalities in 
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the eastern section of the Island. T h e total population 
within the towns served is about 300,000. T h e sub-
sidiary also operated the only tramway system in San 
Juan and its suburbs, together with a steam railway con-
necting its tramway terminals at R io Piedras with Caguas, 
18 miles away. T h e total number of its light and power 
customers is approximately 32,200. 
T h e Porto Rico L i g h t and Power Company owns h y -
dro-electric plants wi th a combined capacity of 9,000 
horsepower, together w i th a steam plant of 4,000 horse-
power. A franchise has been granted the company to 
develop the water powers of the R i o Blanco, situated 
within the zone of its operations. T h e initial development, 
now under construction, wi l l consist of a plant of 7,000 
horse power installed capacity, and wi l l effect a saving in 
operating expenses by supplying the power at present 
furnished by the oil-burning plant in San Juan. 
I n 1911, a complete reorganization of the subsidiary 
companies was effected, so that instead of the three com-
panies hithertofore existing, one new company, the Porto 
Rico Rai lway , Light and Power Company , was incor-
porated under the laws of Porto R i c o taking over the 
assets of the old companies. T h e Insular Government 
desired that the operating company, as a public service 
corporation, should confine itself strictly to public serv-
ice and the Porto R i c o Construction Company was i n -
corporated to carry on the work of construction for the 
operating company, w i th power to do business as con-
tractors and engineers. T h e entire capital stock of the 
construction company is held by the Porto R i c o Power 
Company. 
T h e common stock is set at $3,000,000 and the pre-
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ferred at $1,000,000. T h e assets in 1929 were in excess 
of $8,900,000, and from 1925 to 1929 the five year 
average income on both common and preferred stock was 
$192,195. T h e total assets of the four companies in 1929 
was as follows: 
Ponce $1,441,471 
Porto Rico Railways (Porto Rico 
Power Company) 8,938,966 
Porto Rico Gas 1,724,954 
Porto Rico Telephone 4,011,232 
Total $16,116,623 
T H E G O V E R N M E N T I N BUSINESS 
Additional power is furnished the Island by Govern-
ment plants." A t the beginning, the Government of 
Porto R i c o did not wish to go into the public utility 
business and welcomed foreign capital, but for the last 
fifteen years there has been a reversal of this policy and at 
the present time about half the light and power business 
is done by the Government plants. T h e entrance of the 
Government into the power business came with the de-
velopment of the irrigation systems, plants constructed 
for this purpose being made to serve a double use, so 
that the Insular Government now sells its power to munic-
ipalities which have their own franchise. N o attempt 
has ever been made to encroach on the territory of the 
private companies, but the effect on private rates has been 
felt, nevertheless. Before the Government began selling 
power to municipalities, the current rate was 15 cents a 
kilowatt hour, as compared with an average rate of 6.18 
cents per kilowatt hour for domestic use in the United 
States.7 T h e Government had for a field of operation, of 
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course, only those small towns which the private com-
panies did not care to serve, but the effects of this enter-
prise have been seen in a rate of 12 cents instead of 15 cents 
in many of the towns near the line between the publ ic ly-
and privatly-supplied power. T h e usual rate of retail 
power in towns supplied by municipalities is 8 cents to 
12 cents a kilowatt hour. 
T h e success of the government in this enterprise is 
highly gratifying and flattering to Porto Rico. Entrance 
into the public util ity field was faced with the opposi-
tion of the Government in Washington in line w i t h the 
traditional policy of the national Government in oppos-
ing public ownership of utilities. 
T h e present power developed is only about 20,000 
horsepower, but the potential horsepower is more than 
75,000, and if the Government had a market for its 
power this could be produced by water which now runs 
to the sea. T a k i n g over the private companies would 
effect a double saving to the people of Porto Rico , as the 
profits now made by private companies and exported 
would be retained in the Island, and the excessively high 
rate of 15 cents a kilowatt hour would be lowered at 
least to 12 cents and in many cases even less. T h i s i n -
creased development of power would be available for the 
stimulation of greatly needed industries. T h e railroad 
could be electrified and many other plants which today 
are importing oil and coal could be r u n with natural re-
sources, paying a profit to the natives o f Porto R i c o . 
RAILROADS 8 
T h e Ponce and G u a y a m a Railroad Company was or-
ganized in N e w Jersey in 1903, wi th a capital of $500,000. 
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It took over all property and assumed the liabilities of 
the Amer ican Railroad Company of Porto Rico , op-
erated by Central Aguirre . This latter company was 
organized in 1902 and took over the private road owned 
by the Centra l Aguirre Syndicate, and leased the f ran-
chise for a road from Ponce to Guayama, previously 
granted by the Spanish Government to the C o m p a ñ í a 
de los Ferrocarriles de Puerto Rico (not to be confused 
with the American Railroad Company of Porto Rico , 
operating the Porto R i c a n Rai l road) . This transfer 
was approved by executive order and included the con-
cession for the franchise rights and exemptions granted 
to the Porto Rican Railroad Company for the construc-
tion and maintenance of a railway from Ponce to G u a -
yama. 
Later a franchise was granted to the French Sugar 
Company to build a road from Ponce to Coamo, and as 
this would have paralleled the Ponce and Guayama for 
six miles east of Ponce, this company was released from 
building that distance. T h e Ponce and Guayama road 
stops six miles from Ponce and the Central Fortuna, 
successor to the rights of the French Sugar Company, 
owns 5 Yz miles from that point to within one-half mile 
of the city. This last one-half mile is owned by the 
American Railroad Company of Porto Rico. T h e mile-
age of this road was, in 1923, 30.4 with 18 miles in 
branches, and its assets were $1,271,956. 
T h e Amer ican Railroad Company of Porto Rico had 
its beginning when in 1880 the Spanish Minister of 
Colonies was authorized to arrange for the construction 
of a system of railroads in Porto Rico . The Government 
guaranteed a return of 8 per cent to be paid from the 
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revenues of the Island on an estimated cost of $18,000 a 
kilometer. T h e offer was not accepted in 1880, but at a 
second sale in 1888, Ibo Bosch was given the concession, 
and organized the Porto R i c a n Railroad Company. A t 
the end of six years, only 100 miles were in operation. 
I n 1896, the Spanish Government offered an extension 
of four years to complete the line, but this was not ac-
cepted. U p to July 1,1897, the guaranty payments were 
made by the Spanish, but since that time no payments 
have been made by the Porto Rican Government nor by 
the Government of the United States. 
T h e question of vested rights was presented to the E x -
ecutive Counc i l of Porto Rico , which refused the claims 
made, but tried to have the road continue in operation, 
and in 1901 a new franchise was granted and the old 
charter was annulled. T h e new charter granted tax ex-
emption for 25 years, and a lease of land in San Juan 
at a nominal rent. 
T o 1901, the company had constructed 125.9 miles 
of road. I n 1902, a charter was granted to the American 
Railroad Company of Porto Rico, incorporated in N e w 
Y o r k for $1,000,000, to operate the Porto Rico Railroad 
Company. I t was to receive five per cent of the net earn-
ings after payment of interest on first mortgage bonds 
(about $96,000) and 3 per cent of sums spent in new 
work. O n June 1, 1902, it took over the Porto R i c a n 
Railroad Company, including all belongings of every 
kind, wi th a lease to r u n to 1957. T h e railroad is still 
operated by this company, and in 1925 had 222.4 miles 
of road and 30.4 miles of station yards and sidings. I t 
seeks concessions to extend its line around the eastern end 
of the Island on grounds that this was part of the original 
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concession given to the Porto Rican Railroad Company. 
In 1922, its assets were $2,634,196. 
There are a number of other roads operated and owned 
mainly as cane roads by the Centrals interested, and ex-
cept in rare cases they are not public carriers. T h e most 
important are given briefly: 
T h e Centra l Victoria Railway is owned by the Centra l 
Victoria, Incorporated, a Spanish and Porto Rican C o m -
pany. I t owns 18.6 miles of track. 
T h e Centra l Constancia Railroad is owned by the C o m -
pañía Azucarera del T o a , a company at Toa Baja. I t has 
about 31 miles of track. 
T h e Centra l Vannina Railway is owned by Spaniards 
who are both residents and absentees. The track is 
valued at $221,000 and the engines at $75,000. T h i s 
company is in the hands of receivers. 
T h e Centra l Coloso Railway is a Spanish Company 
with 8.6 miles of track. It is owned by the Centra l 
Coloso, Incorporated, at Aguada. 
T h e Uni ted Porto R i c a n Sugar Company owns four 
roads w h i c h serve its Centrals. T h e Central Santa Juana 
Rai lway has 24.2 miles of track; Central Pasto Viejo 
Rai lway owns 24.8 miles of track; Central Juncos R a i l -
way owns 37.2 miles of track, and Central Defensa R a i l -
way C o m p a n y has 6.1 miles of track. 
T h e Fajardo Sugar Company owns 150 miles of track 
of which 100 are portable. The Fajardo Development 
Company was formed to transport cane for the Centra l 
and was compelled to take a franchise by the Publ ic 
Service Commission of Porto Rico under the condition 
that the road form part of the transportation system of 
the Island, and operate passenger trains from end to end 
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of the line. T h e road was completed in 1908, and its 
assets in 1923 were $1,279,676. 
The Centra l Canovanas Rai lway is owned by Loiza 
Sugar Company , and has 8 5 miles of track. 
The South Porto Rico Sugar Company owns 8 .Í miles 
of track and is used for cane transportation only. 
The Centra l Aguirre Rai lway, owned by the Centra l 
Aguirre Company, has 31 miles of track. 
The Centra l Cortada Rai lway, controlled by the C e n -
tral Aguirre , has 13 miles of track. 
The R a i l w a y of Centra l Machete Company was con-
structed as a cane road and is operated by Central M a -
chete Company , controlled by Luce and Company. I t 
owns ten miles of track. 
B A N K I N G 
T h e banking business in Porto R i c o is conducted by 
eighteen banks of which three must be considered absen-
tee. These banks are the National C i t y Bank of N e w 
Y o r k , the Bank of N o v a Scotia and the Royal Bank of 
Canada. T h e National C i t y Bank of N e w Y o r k pur-
chased on A p r i l 15, 1930, the outstanding shares of the 
American Colonial Bank of Porto R ico , which had been 
considered a local institution, although about 85 per 
cent or more of its stock was held by F r e d M . Schall of 
Will iam Schall and Company, of N e w Y o r k . " This bank 
was incorporated in West Virginia A p r i l 4, 1899, to con-
duct a general banking business, and operated six 
branches.10 I t organized and owned the American 
Colonial T r u s t Company with a capital of $100,000 and 
total assets of $111,012 as of October 3, 1928. 
Dividends paid by this company f rom 1910 to 1929 
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ranged from 8 per cent to 26 per cent, and averaged 
better than 14 per cent. 
T h e remaining absentee banks, operating as branches 
of banks on the North American mainland, do not make 
declaration of capital paid in, surplus, etc., but as of 
June 30, 1929, the resources of these banks was as fol-
lows: 
National City Bank of New York $12,540,914 
Royal Bank of Canada 8,587,99} 
Bank of Nova Scotia 6,707,098 
Total $27,836,005 
This , taken with the resources of the American Colo-
nial Bank, $16,497,162 as of June 30, 1929, gives a total 
of $44,333,167. Compared with this figure is that of the 
resources of all banks in Porto Rico as of June 30, 1929, 
$88,18^,102. Absentee banks, as may be seen, owned 
some 50 per cent of this total.11 
Local banks are not free from partly-absentee owner-
ship, nor are the foreign banks held exclusively by absen-
tees. Investigation showed that something like 95 per 
cent of the capital of absentee banks was held abroad, and 
that more than 2 5 per cent of the capital of local banks 
was similarly held. T h e ful l extent of absentee-owner-
ship in the banking business exceeded 60 per cent of the 
whole.12 
T h e usual rate of interest charged by all banks, local 
and absentee, is from 8 to 10 per cent. T h e higher rate 
falls on the small borrower who needs, or can get, only 
$2,000 or less. A s has been pointed out in the discussion 
of the sugar industry, many farmers are regularly paying 
12 per cent and more, due to the fact that they borrow 
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from the sugar companies at the maximum legal rate and 
from individuals who demand even higher rates than 
those allowed by the law. The general effect of the loan 
policy of the banks is to make money cost 8 to 12 per 
cent in Porto Rico, where that same money would earn 
certainly not more than 6 per cent in the United States. 
It is sometimes argued that the risk is greater due to the 
fact that the tropical latin-American countries are in an 
unsettled condition, and that the interest rates are no 
more than they are in Santo Domingo and Haiti.13 If 
Porto Rico were subject to the same probabilities of 
political revolutions and consequent loss of property 
value and commerce as Santo Domingo and Haiti, this 
argument would be valid. But no serious revolution 
has ever occurred and while Porto Rico remains a colony 
of the United States the possibility of any revolution, of 
sufficient force to endanger property, is exceedingly re-
mote. The soundness of banking institutions is illustrated 
in the case of the American Colonial Bank, which has 
averaged dividends of something more than 14 per cent 
over a period of 20 years from 1910 to 1929, inclusive. 
During this period dividends of not less than 6 per cent 
have been paid every year, and during three years the 
dividends were 26 per cent. 
The prosperous condition of the banks is further shown 
by the earnings of eight local banks, which in 1928 
averaged 14.7 per cent on capital stock and 11.6 on 
capital stock and surplus, while an absentee bank re-
ported net earnings of 26.3 per cent on capital and 15.8 
per cent on capital and surplus.14 
The Farm Loan Bank and the Intermediate Credit Bank 
have been responsible for securing the extension of con-
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siderable credit to Porto Ricans at much lower rates than 
those current among commercial banks. However their 
available loan capacity is inadequate, and Porto Rico 
needs an increased loan capacity on the part of these i n -
stitutions before the burden of high interest on money, 
by means of which a great part of the farming and local 
industry is carried on, can be escaped. 
P O R T O R I C O A N D T H E C O A S T W I S E S H I P P I N G L A W 
Since 1900 Porto Rico has been subject to all the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of the Coastwise Shipping 
Act . T h e first Organic A c t of the Island provided that 
"the coasting trade between Porto R i c o and the United 
States shall be regulated in accordance with the provi-
sions of law applicable to such trade between any two 
great coasting districts of the United States." 15 A s the 
law relating to such trade restricts commerce to ships fly-
ing the American flag, the effect has been to cut Porto 
Rico off from a free choice in shipping her exports and 
imports, as the tariff is so high as to preclude any con-
siderable trade with any nation other than the United 
States. T h e principal companies serving the Island are 
the N e w Y o r k and Porto Rico Steamship Company, the 
Atlantic and Caribbean Steamship Company, the B u l l -
Insular L i n e , Incorporated, and the Lykes Line of 
Steamships.16 
The N e w Y o r k and Porto Rico Steamship Company 17 
was incorporated in Maine, Apr i l 8, 1907, and acquired 
the property of the United States and Porto Rico Steam-
ship Company (of N e w Y o r k ) which operates lines be-
tween N e w Y o r k and San Juan, Ponce and other ports 
of Porto Rico , together wi th lines between Porto Rico and 
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N e w Orleans, and owns wharf properties in Porto R i c o . 
T h e Maine Company also owns all of the stock ($2 ,000) 
of the Un i t ed States and Porto R i c o Navigation C o m -
pany, and a fleet of thirteen ships w i t h a total tonnage 
of 51,36J. 
T h e At lant i c and Caribbean Steamship C o m p a n y , 
which is generally referred to as the " R e d D . L i n e , " op-
erates a fleet between N e w Y o r k and Venezuela, w i th 
stops at Porto Rico. 
T h e Bul l - Insular L i n e , Incorporated,18 operates ships 
from Baltimore to Porto R i c a n ports, and also maintains 
a service between Porto Rico , Santo Domingo and the 
V i r g i n Islands. Its capital was estimated at $2,500,000 
in 1918, and the assets were placed at $6,672,524 in 1920. 
T h e L y k e s Line serves the southern ports of Galveston, 
Houston and N e w Orleans. Most of the rice and l u m -
ber brought into Porto R i c o is carried by ships of this 
company. 
T h e principal lines connecting Porto Rico with other 
ports of the world are the C o m p a ñ í a Transa t lánt i ca , the 
Compagnie Transatlantique, the H o r n L i n e and the R o y a l 
Netherlands Steamship Company. These companies 
carry less than 10 per cent of all the trade, since 90 per 
cent of this is with the Uni ted States. 
C O M P A R A T I V E S H I P P I N G COSTS 
T h e fact that Porto R i c o is forced to trade w i t h the 
United States in Amer ican ships only is not in itself an 
evil. O n l y when rates applying between Porto R i c o and 
the United States are higher than those Porto Rico could 
obtain i f she had free bargaining power would such a de-
cision be justified. T o test out the effect the shipping 
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laws have on Porto R i c a n shipping, the table of compari-
son on pages 124 and 125 has been prepared.19 
T h e table shows comparative rates for shipping from 
N e w Y o r k to Porto Rico and from N e w Y o r k to other 
parts of the West Indies and South America. I t also 
shows the cost of shipping certain articles, such as rice 
and dried vegetables, which Porto R i c o imports in great 
quantities, as compared wi th the cost of shipping these 
articles from other countries such as Japan and European 
ports. Sti l l a third comparison is made between shipping 
costs from Porto Rico to N e w Y o r k and American ports 
and from Porto Rico to European ports; also the cost of 
shipping from Porto R i c o to N e w Y o r k , for certain 
articles such as coffee, sugar, tobacco and fruit, is com-
pared w i t h the cost of shipping these same articles from 
the chief competitor nations to American ports. 
I f there is any discrimination against Porto Rico from 
N e w Y o r k to ports of the West Indies, it is not shown 
in the published shipping lists. T h e rate on canned 
goods from N e w Y o r k to Porto Rico is 46 1/2 cents a 
hundredweight with landing charge. A s the distance to 
Porto R i c o from N e w Y o r k is 1,399 miles this gives a 
rate of 33 cents a thousand miles for each hundred 
pounds. T h e rate to Havana is 50 cents a hundred-
weight, wh ich makes the cost per 1,000 miles 41 cents, and 
to ship to H a i t i costs about 44 cents a thousand miles 
per hundredweight. T h e advantage here is clearly on 
the side of Porto Rico. T h e same thing applies for ship-
ping cotton goods to H a i t i , where the rate is 26 cents a 
thousand miles for each cubic foot as compared w i t h a 
little more than 12 cents to Porto Rico . I n the case of 
dried vegetables, Colombia must pay 25 cents a thou-
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sand miles for each hundredweight, as compared wi th 
23 cents paid by Porto Rico . T h e same rate applies to 
shipping flour to Colombia, and T r i n i d a d is forced to 
pay 29 cents a thousand miles as compared with Porto 
Rico's 23 cent rate. 
I n strong contrast w i th these rates, however, are those 
applying to South Amer ican ports. T o ship canned 
goods from N e w Y o r k to Chile , a distance of more than 
4,000 miles, the cost is only 20 cents a thousand miles 
for each hundredweight. For the same product, R i o de 
Janeiro pays only 15 cents per 1,000 miles for each h u n -
dredweight; whereas, as has been seen, Porto Rico must 
pay 3 3 cents. T o import cement, the cost to Porto R i c a n 
shippers is 25 cents a hundredweight, while Panama, 600 
miles further from N e w Y o r k pays only 30 cents, and 
Colombia, still further from New Y o r k , pays but 2 1 1 / 2 
cents. H o w great this difference is may be more readily 
seen in the difference in costs per 1,000 miles. Where 
Porto Rico must pay more than 17 cents, Colombia's 
rate is only 10 cents. T o ship canned milk also costs 
Porto R i c o a great deal more than it does her neighbors 
to the south: Chile pays but 23 cents, Panama but 20, 
and Ecuador but 15 cents a thousand miles for each h u n -
dredweight, as compared with the rate of 33 cents 
charged to Porto Rico. I t costs Colombia only 17 cents 
and H a i t i only 22 cents a thousand miles for importing 
rice, while Porto R i c o must pay a rate of 27 cents for the 
same product. Chi le and Panama pay but 16 and 18 
cents respectively a thousand miles for shipping flour, 
and the same product costs 23 cents when sent to Porto 
Rico. 
W e also find that the rate on certain products is a great 
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deal more from American ports to Porto Rico than from 
European ports to Porto Rico . Dried vegetables from 
Europe pay 17 cents a thousand miles for each hundred-
weight, and, as has been said, the same products pay 23 
cents when brought from N e w Y o r k . Just how great 
the discrimination is and how much Porto Rico loses in 
some cases by being cut oif from foreign markets is 
vividly shown in the cost of importing rice. Porto Rico 
must pay 37 1/2 cents a hundredweight from N e w Y o r k , 
whereas the cost from Japan to San Francisco, a distance 
three and a half times as great, is but 20 cents. I n this 
case, Porto Rico is paying almost seven times the shipping 
rate that San Francisco has to pay. 
I t is also clear that in some cases Porto Rico is paying 
more than she should to market her products. T o ship 
coffee to N e w Y o r k costs 28 cents a thousand miles for 
each hundredweight. T o ship the same product to 
Europe costs but 21. T h e Island must pay 10 cents per 
thousand miles for each hundredweight of sugar sent to 
N e w Y o r k , but to Europe it costs only 9. T h e same thing 
applies in the case of tobacco, where the N e w Y o r k rate 
is 32 cents a thousand miles for each hundredweight, and 
the European rate is only 23. 
A final comparison wi l l show that Porto Rico also suf-
fers by having to pay a higher rate for shipping her chief 
exports than is paid by the principal competitor countries. 
T o market coffee in N e w Y o r k , Colombia pays 25 cents 
a thousand miles per hundredweight; from Para, the 
cost is only 20 cents, and R i o de Janeiro can ship coffee 
to N e w Y o r k for 14 cents, whereas Porto Rico must pay 
exactly double the rate from Rio. For fresh fruit, C u b a 
and Porto R i c o pay the same rate, 48 cents a thousand 
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miles for each box; but H a i t i can ship to N e w Y o r k for 
42 cents, and Jamaica, for 43; while Honduras can ship 
to Canada for 25 cents and to London for 20. I n the 
marketing of its tobacco, Havana is in a better position 
than Porto R i c o since it pays but 93 cents a bale for leaf 
tobacco, and Porto R i c o must pay $1.25 a bale. T h e 
most impressive difference is in the rates which Porto Rico 
pays to ship canned fruit as compared w i t h the Philippine 
Islands. F r o m the Philippines to N e w Y o r k , a distance 
of more than 10,000 miles, the cost for each hundred-
weight of fruit is only a little more than 4 cents per 1,000 
miles. Porto Rico pays 21 cents a thousand miles for each 
hundredweight of the same product. T h e difference in 
the cost of shipping sugar is about as great. I t costs 
Porto R i c o 10 cents a thousand miles for each hundred-
weight, while the Philippines pay but a little more than 
2 cents. Since the Philippine Islands are not subject to 
the Coastwise Shipping A c t this appears to be an eloquent 
argument for liberating Porto Rico from its provisions. 
T o summarize these observations i t would appear that 
Porto Rico is in neither a better nor a worse position than 
her neighbors, Hai t i and Cuba , in regard to products 
shipped from N e w Y o r k , but that m a n y products com-
ing from Europe or Japan pay a m u c h lower rate than 
those coming from N e w Y o r k to Porto R i c o or f rom the 
foreign countries mentioned to the Un i t ed States. A s far 
as Porto Rico's exports are concerned, she seems to be at a 
decided disadvantage since Colombia and B r a z i l can 
market their coffee, Santo Domingo and the Philippine 
Islands, their sugar, and Honduras, H a i t i and Jamaica, 
their fresh fruits, at a lower cost, while in the field of 
tobacco, C u b a pays less than Porto R i c o . 
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Final ly , the disadvantage which Porto Rico suffers 
by inclusion within the Coastwise Shipping A c t of the 
United States cannot all be expressed in figures. I t is the 
undisclosed shipping rates which hurt most. I n any 
free shipping market, the merchants or industrialists con-
cerned have the privilege of getting competitive bids for 
their products, but Porto Rico is denied this right. I f , 
for instance, ships not flying the American flag could 
traffic between Porto Rico and the United States, her 
sugar, tobacco and coffee rates would be made in an 
open market , whereas, as things now stand, they are 
not. T h e present system serves to give each of the four 
principal American companies shipping to Porto Rico 
a monopoly over one product.20 T h e Bull-Insular L ine 
ships most of the sugar, the New Y o r k Porto Rico L i n e 
handles passengers and fruit, the Lykes Line brings rice 
and other products from southern ports of the United 
States, and the "Red D " Line ships most of the tobacco 
and coffee. I f foreign ships were free to offer com-
petitive rates, the shipping cost would inevitably come 
down. 
Nor is this the only way in which Porto Rico would be 
benefitted by allowing free competition. The shipping 
facilities to foreign ports are decidedly limited at present. 
I f such ships were allowed to pick up cargo in Porto R i c o 
for the Uni ted States they would be enabled to accept 
smaller cargoes for Porto Rico and thus increase the 
traffic of Porto Rico wi th Europe. Porto Rican fruit , 
sugar, tobacco and coffee would thus have a better outlet, 
and in turn Porto Rico could buy in the cheaper European 
markets. I t is difficult to see how Porto Rico derives 
even a single advantage from the present arrangement. 
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B U Y I N G F R O M T H E A B S E N T E E 
T h e foregoing summaries do not adequately express, 
probably nothing could adequately express, the extent 
to which Porto Rico is dominated by absentee owners. 
A s has been shown, practically every paying export is 
controlled by absentees. T o a still greater extent the 
Island must depend upon absentees to supply her w i t h 
all of the necessities and luxuries of life. I f one rides 
in an automobile, it is one which has been brought, in 
almost every case, from the United States. I f one rides 
on the train, one knows that the ties, rails, locomotive and 
cars are all sold to Porto Rico by absentees. Porto R i c o 
has no coal nor petroleum deposits of her own; therefore, 
such products are supplied by the Standard O i l Company 
of N e w Jersey, the Texas Company, the Royal D u t c h 
Shell Company, the Asiat ic Petroleum Company, or the 
West India O i l Company. Natura l ly automobile tires 
are supplied by Goodyear, Goodrich, General or F i r e -
stone. 
I f you are a fortunate Porto R i c a n , so wealthy as to be 
able to own a bed, it is almost certainly supplied by the 
Simmons Company. W h e n you eat, it is with the reali-
zation that your rice, beans, meats, bread, or almost any 
other food has paid a profit to absentee owners and grow-
ers before it is brought to Porto Rico . I f you are a busi-
ness man, you keep your cash in a register made by the 
National Cash Register Company, and make your ca l -
culations on a Burrough's Calculating Machine. Almost 
every k i n d of machinery for the industrialist, for the 
sugar-grower, the tobacco farmer and the fruit farmer 
must be brought from the United States. 
P U B L I C U T I L I T E S , I N V E S T M E N T S 129 
The clothing maker and the housewife pay an annual 
tribute to the Singer Sewing Machine Company. E v e r y 
local trip pays a small sum to bus companies, such as the 
Porto R i c o Blue Line, and the White Star Line, which are 
at least partially absentee-owned. T h e owner of a house 
must pay to the Bliss Plywood Corporation, or some other 
American lumber company, a substantial sum for bui ld-
ing material. T h e clothing and garment business, amount-
ing to $12,000,000 or $15,000,000 a year, is controlled 
to a certain extent by foreign companies, such as D . E . 
Sicher and Company, makers of garments, the Spool 
Cotton Company, E . Heller and Brother, and other for-
eign concerns. I f you fall i l l , you must take medicine 
supplied by the E b r y Chemical Works, E . R . Squibb and 
Sons, Parke & Davis, or perhaps the Lederle Antitoxin 
Laboratories. T o fertilize your land you must patronize 
an absentee. T o photograph your baby or your sweet-
heart you must buy an American-made camera and films. 
T o send a message abroad, you must utilize an absentee-
owned cable line. Y o u r radio must be purchased from 
the Radio Corporation of America. Y o u r picture shows 
are brought from Hollywood. Even if you want to mort-
gage your home, you wil l find it difficult unless you wish 
to patronize an absentee firm. I n fact, there is scarcely a 
product, whether it is a luxury of a necessity, whether 
used by poor or rich, which does not in some form or an-
other pass through the filter of absentee-ownership, leav-
ing the profit in the hands of companies outside the I s -
land. 
T H E I N C O M E T A X AND T H E A B S E N T E E 
The tax system in Porto Rico is one of the best indi-
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cations of the hold of the high income group on the I s -
land. A comparison of the sources of revenue of the 
United States and of Porto Rico shows that in the years 
from 1920 to 1927, inclusive, the Federal Government 
derived from 42 to 59 per cent of its revenues from i n -
come and profit taxes,21 while Porto R ico , in 1927-28, 
collected but 13.7 per cent from income and inheritance 
taxes combined. O n the other hand, the consumption, 
excise and other taxes fall ing on gross and not net i n -
come accounted for the remaining 86.3 per cent of the 
Island's tax collection.22 I n the Uni ted States such taxes 
were only 41 to 58 per cent from 1920 to 1927, inc lu-
sive-23 T a x collections of 1928-29 were some $11,000,-
000. T h e excise taxes accounted for about $6,000,000 "4 
of this total, or slightly more than 54 per cent, whereas, 
in the United States, excise taxes since 1920 have not been 
more than 28 per cent and have fallen as low as 15 per 
cent. These figures make it perfectly apparent that the 
tax burden is heaviest on those least able to pay. L e t us 
look further at the rates on various types of incomes. 
Income taxes have been copied closely after those of 
the United States and have been assessed since 1913-14. 
The normal tax on incomes is from 2 to 6 per cent and the 
surtax is levied on incomes above $10,000 at the rate of 
1 per cent for the first $4,000, and up to 25 per cent. 
Corporations pay 12 1/2 per cent fixed rate and receive 
no exemptions unless the net income is under $10,000. 
Partnerships pay the same rate as corporations.25 A s 
compared with the Un i t ed States it has been shown that 
whereas 3.5 per cent of the people of the United States 
make income tax returns, only 0.3 per cent make such 
returns in Porto Rico ; and that in the United States the 
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income tax 2.5 per cent of the national income, while in 
Porto R i c o it is but 1.36 per cent. T h e total effect of the 
taxation policy is to give the absentee in the high income 
group a much more favorable rate than the resident Porto 
Rican receives, and in addition furnish opportunities for 
evasion not possible to the resident.26 
The individual rate for non-residents is 6 per cent, wi th 
no exemption. This tax takes the place of the normal 
and surtax imposed on the resident; as most of the non-
residents paying this tax derive a considerable revenue 
and many of them enormous revenues from the Island, 
the effect is to place a very low tax on a high-income class. 
T h e corporation rate of 12 1/2 per cent on incomes of 
$10,000 and over is still more adverse to the interest of 
Porto Rico . As the income tax on non-resident indivi-
duals is low, the corporation tax offers more opportunity 
for graduating the tax according to ability to pay. T h e 
corporations having the high incomes are mainly sugar, 
tobacco, fruit , power and railroad corporations, which 
are absentee owned. T h e 12 1/2 per cent rate is, there-
fore, falling equally on the large sugar companies with 
incomes running into the millions and on the Porto 
Rican capitalist with an income of only $10,000. W h e n 
the chances for evasion are considered the discrepancy is 
still greater. These taxes are not collected at the source, 
and the result is that many corporations and individuals 
deriving their income from Porto Rico do not pay taxes 
when the income is sent out of Porto R i c o to a corporation 
or elsewhere. T h a t Porto Rico does not derive her ful l 
share of such high incomes is attested by the fact that 
collection is difficult or impossible in some cases; some 
$2,333,712 was pending in 192 8.27 Furthermore, the 
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resistance to taxes is manifested in low returns and the 
necessity of inspection and revision. I n 1927-28 the i n -
come reported by corporations, individuals and partner-
ships was some $16,229,000, but was found to be $25,-
832,000 by the Income T a x Bureau. T h e part reported 
was only 58 per cent of the tax and 63 per cent of the 
income.28 
Porto R i c o is apparently powerless to remedy such 
abuses at present. A s has been shown the corporations 
control the Legislature and any hope of reform there 
seems remote. T h e situation is the same in the Un i t ed 
States Congress where "American Interests" are con-
sidered to be those of the corporations. T h e present ad-
ministration has shown no inclination to raise the rates. 
Porto R i c o can hope for little in this respect unti l there is 
a change which wil l place the rights of her people above 
those of the absentee. 
T O T A L A B S E N T E E - O W N E D P R O P E R T Y 
What is the total of outside holdings in Porto R i c o ? 
There are two ways to answer this question: first, the 
value in dollars of the investments of absentees; second, the 
percentage of absentee holdings in relation to the total 
of each of the most important industries and of the total 
wealth of the Island. I n either case the figures can be 
only an approximation, but they are close enough to give 
us a view of the great significance of these holdings in 
the Island's economic life. 
A recent study placed the total of foreign and m a i n -
land holdings at $176,000,000, and the net over Porto 
Rican holdings outside the Island at $145,000,000.29 T h e 
same estimate shows the total wealth of the Island to be 
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$6J0,000,O0O. W i t h these figures, the total foreign hold-
ings are 27 per cent of the entire wealth, and the net for-
eign holdings are 22 per cent. 
But there is still another way of judging the extent of 
absentee ownership, and that is the percentage of such 
holdings in each of the principal industries. Sugar is the 
leading industry. Just what is the total value of all of 
the sugar plantations and Centrals it is possible to state 
only approximately, but it would seem from all figures 
that it is more than half of the total wealth. I n 1928, 
the exportation of sugar was more than $54,000,000, or 
52 per cent of the total export. W e have already seen 
that the absentee companies control 60 per cent of the 
sugar industry, so that their exports in this industry alone 
represent 31 per cent of the Island's total foreign trade. 
I n the case of tobacco, the percentage is still higher. 
About 85 per cent of the total tobacco business is done 
by absentee companies. Tobacco exports of all kinds in 
1928 were in excess of $20,000,000 or some 19 per cent of 
the whole. Since absentees control 85 per cent of this, 
they have in the tobacco trade a sum equal to 16 per cent 
of the total. I n the same way we find that they have a 
little more than 31 per cent of the fruit exports, since 
absentees control about one-third of the total of more 
than $7,000,000. W i t h i n the three chief sources of agri-
cultural wealth, as we can easily see, the absentee holdings 
amount to 50 per cent of the total export trade. There 
are besides these, numerous industries where absentee 
capital has entered. T h e needlework and clothing indus-
try exported more than $12,000,000 worth of goods in 
1928. T h o u g h relatively not so great as the other indus-
tries, there is a considerable amount of outside capital 
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invested in this business. A great m a n y Spaniards are 
still interested in the coffee plantations. Small industries, 
like button manufacturing and distilling of alcohol, are 
controlled largely, or entirely, by non-residents. 
But all of the wealth is not represented by the goods 
exported, though this item is far more important in judg-
ing wealth than it would be in the Uni ted States and is 
by far the most important factor to consider in Porto 
Rico. Banks, public utilities, railroads, steamship lines 
are other forms of wealth which must be considered. 
A n d in every one of these absentee capital is paramount 
in importance. 
I n the discussion of Banks it was shown that 60 per cent 
of the business is controlled by the National C i t y Bank 
of N e w Y o r k , two Canadian firms and other absentees. 
The case of public utilities is approximately the same, 
where the Government serves about hal f the Island and 
private companies, owned outside, control the balance. 
Railroads are still more completely in the hands of non-
residents. T h e Ponce and Guayama and the Amer ican 
Railroad of Porto Rico , the two most important public 
carriers, are both absentee concerns. I n addition, the 
majority of the roads serving sugar centrals are in the 
hands of the companies owning these plants, which means 
that they are about 60 per cent absentee owned. 
T h e steamship lines are all in the hands of Continental 
Americans or foreigners. Porto R i c o has no mercantile 
marine of its own. A l l ships in the Porto R ican-Amer ican 
service belong to firms whose principal stockholders re-
side in the United States, and the trade of the Island with 
foreign ports is all carried in boats belonging to the H o r n 
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Line, French Line or some other non-Porto Rican com-
pany. 
There are still other important items to consider in t r y -
ing to arrive at the total of outside interests. Mortgages 
on land in Porto Rico held by individuals, and land held 
by the same, are placed at $25,000,000. Branches of out-
side firms located in the Island are estimated at $5,000,-
000. Loans from the Federal Land Bank and the Inter-
mediate Credit Bank are given at $12,500,000. Loans 
obtained from foreign banks and individuals are about 
$15,000,000. 
Final ly , the bond issues floated by the Insular and 
Municipal Governments were approximately $46,000,000 
on June 30, 1929, and since that time additional M u n i c -
ipal and Insular bonds amounting to more than $4,000,-
000 have been floated.'50 T h e total bonded indebtedness 
in 1930 was approximately $50,000,000. These bonds 
are held in the United States and American investors real-
ize an annual income of more than $2,500,000 a year 
therefrom. 
C a n we summarize these facts so as to make the picture 
of absentee control of Porto Rico more graphic? Sugar 
is 60 per cent absentee-controlled; frui t is 31 per cent, 
or more; tobacco is 85 per cent; banks are 60 per cent; 
railroads, 60 per cent, or more; public utilities, 50 per 
cent; and steamship lines, approximately 100 per cent. 
There is no important source of wealth that is not partially 
in the hands of outsiders, and in some instances, such às 
steamships, outsiders control the entire business. A n y 
estimate of Porto Rico's dependence on abentees which 
places the total at less than 60 per cent of the Island's 
wealth is certainly too low. Not all of the industries be-
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long to absentees, but those which do not are so indebted 
to continental banks as to be virtually in their possession. 
Not all of the good land is in the hands of outsiders, but 
a large portion of it is, and much of the remainder is 
heavily mortgaged. A n d finally, there is that type of 
dependence on absentees which Porto R i c o suffers, because 
of her long dependence on a monopolizing mother coun-
try, the necessity of importing vast quantities of food, 
clothing, machinery, chemicals and drugs. T h e control 
of the absentee is all but complete and wi th the aid of the 
Coastwise Shipping A c t and the Amer ican Tar i f f bids 
fair to absorb all of the profitable enterprise. 
C H A P T E R V I I 
T H E T A R I F F 
"American dollars paid to the peons are so many tokens, re-
deemable in the American market exclusively at tariff-inflated 
prices. The same tariff that protects the prices of sugar and 
tobacco, controlled by the few, skyrockets the prices of com-
modities that must be consumed by all."—Luis MUÑOZ 
MARIN * 
THE SPANISH TRADE MONOPOLY 
FOR four hundred years Porto Rico lived under all of the 
disadvantages which Spain's exaggerated mercantilism 
imposed. There was no pretence about encouraging the 
native industries of the Colony, since the legitimacy of 
using colonies as a source of raw material and as markets 
for the finished product was not questioned. I t was 
frankly intended that all, absolutely all, of the benefits to 
be derived from the ownership of colonies was to accrue 
to the mother country. Such laws, regulations and means 
as were necessary to effect this mercantilist Utopia were 
adopted and enforced to the limit. I t was supposed that 
a Colony would produce what the mother country needed 
and need what the mother country produced. I t was 
commonly considered that all obedient and patriotic 
colonies would do this without demur, and the disobedient 
* See note at beginning of Chapter III. 
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child was quickly brought to account for whatever i n -
fractions—discernable infractions—it committed. T o 
attain this favored position for her merchants and ship-
pers, E n g l a n d had passed the maligned Navigat ion A c t s , 
which outraged the Amer ican interests aifected. N a t u r a l l y 
these acts have little to do with Porto R i c o , but the fami l -
iarity of Americans w i t h them is convenient as an i l lus-
tration, since Spain was applying similar acts, or acts 
with similar intention, to her colonies long before any 
English colony was established. Porto Rico , like all of 
the colonies to the south of her, was forced to confine her 
trade, or at least her legal trade, to Spanish ships and to 
Spanish firms. Monopolies were granted for a large share 
of the possible products, and since Spain used sugar, sugar 
gained an early foothold, as did coffee. 
But Hol land and E n g l a n d used sugar and coffee also, 
and the temptation to trade w i th these nations was a 
temptation which Porto Ricans did not resist. A t one 
time a thriving trade in ginger sprang up with the D u t c h 
and at all times the monopoly rights were infringed. T o 
restrict and regulate trade as closely as possible there were 
adopted such expedients as granting trade rights to 
Madrid and C á d i z only, making San J u a n the sole port 
of entry in Porto R ico , and confining shipping to ships 
under Spanish registration. I t was natural that the I s -
landers should resent such limited commercial privileges 
and attempt to escape them. 
T h e process was very slow, and it was not unt i l the 
19th century that Porto R i c o gained the right of trading 
with the non-Spanish islands of the West Indies. G r a d -
ually during the course of the century, Spain, fol lowing 
the new way of reaping the full benefit of ownership of 
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colonies, dropped the older methods of closed ports, pro-
hibition of foreign commerce and other such expedients 
in favor of the tariff. T h e old method had never given 
the monopoly desired, as there was always a considerable 
amount of trade wi th the piratical and semi-piratical ves-
sels of other nations. T h e tariff method was likewise to 
fail of giving all of the trade to Spain, for in spite of the 
preferential rates which levied m u c h higher charges on 
goods coming from foreign countries, the trade of Porto 
Rico w i t h the United States and other countries increased 
steadily during the 19th century. I n 1897, Spain con-
trolled but little more than 40 per cent of the Island's 
imports, while the Uni ted States had increased her trade 
to the point where she furnished some 21 per cent of all 
the products which Porto Rico found it necessary to bring 
in from the outside.1 
U N D E R U N I T E D STATES T A R I F F LAWS 
D u r i n g the following year came the transfer of the 
Islands to the United States. Such a transfer was certain 
to br ing wi th it a new orientation in the history of Porto 
Rico , since the center of her universe had been shifted. I n 
so far as tariff was concerned, Porto R i c o became an i n -
tegral part of the Un i t ed States. A l l her products were 
to enter the United States duty free. A new world of 
markets was thus offered to the sugar, coffee and tobacco 
of the Island. A t the same time all products entering 
Porto R i c o from a foreign country were to pay the same 
tariff duties as those coming into the United States, and 
thus a great many products which Porto Rico did not 
produce in sufficient quantities for her own use, notably 
foods of various kinds, continued to pay high duties ac-
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cording to whether American producers were receiving 
protection. 
E F F E C T O N L A N D T E N U R E A N D CROPS 
Natura l ly , it is not possible to k n o w what the effect 
would have been on Porto Rico i f another course of action 
than the one actually adopted had been tried, but that the 
change of sovereignty has wrought very apparent changes 
is not debateable. B y no means the least of these changes 
can be traced in a considerable degree to the door of the 
tariff policy in force. 
T h e most striking change is that in the agricultural 
economy and land tenure. T h e chief product before 
Amer ican occupation was coffee. Some 41 per cent of the 
cultivated area was devoted to this plant and it was the 
chief export. Sugar occupied only about 15 per cent of 
the land in cultivation, and tobacco only a little more than 
one per cent. T h e extent of the change since 1898 has 
been regulated largely by the tariff protection received 
by each of these crops. Coffee, w h i c h enters the United 
States duty free, has received no protection. T h e former 
markets of Porto Rico for this food have been largely cut 
off since it must pay an import duty on entering Spain 
and the consequent slackening of trade between Spain 
and Porto Rico has curtailed the demand. There was 
never any market in the United States for Porto Rican 
coffee, which is of a very superior quality and sells for a 
price about double that of Colombian coffee, and much 
more than double that of Brazil ian. T h e American coffee 
taste has been educated to the cheaper brands and by rea-
son of this fact, Porto R i c o lost one coffee market without 
gaining another when the tariff policy changed. 
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O n the contrary, sugar, which was of secondary i m -
portance in 1898, has since grown to be by far the most 
important product of the Island, and today claims about 
44 per cent of the total cultivated area. The explanation 
seems to lie in the tariff. W i t h full protection against all 
foreign sugar and wi th 80 per cent protection against 
sugar from Cuba , the sugar growers have been able to 
expand in a phenomenal manner. 
Tobacco also has expanded tremendously and today 
covers more than five times its former area, while fruit , 
a crop not grown for export before the American period, 
is now the third agricultural export. 
These changes in crops would not necessarily be of any 
importance within themselves if it were not that they 
have brought along in their wake others of primary i m -
portance. Changing from one crop to another, if the new 
crop brought in as much or more revenue, might be no 
more disastrous than losing a one dollar bill and finding 
a two, provided the two were not counterfeit. But this 
is what has happened to Porto Rico. T h e new bill looked 
bigger and glittered more, but time has shown that it was 
a counterfeit note. 
I n 1898, there were almost 200,000 acres of coffee 
lands, which were largely in the hands of small farm 
owners. Coffee is primarily a little man's crop. I t can 
be financed on a small scale, and it wi l l grow on steep 
mountain sides. T h e tending and marketing is not an ex-
pensive process, since no elaborate machinery is required. 
T h e final virtue of the coffee farm is that it furnishes 
work to a great number of workers, a kind of work which 
is not difficult. T a k i n g everything into consideration, 
coffee was a crop which did not make many wealthy, but 
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gave the opportunity of home ownership to large n u m -
bers of the rather poor. 
Sugar, on the other hand, has proved to be a crop de-
manding an ever-increasing concentration of lands de-
voted to its culture. Its planting, financing, manufactur-
ing and marketing are expensive processes which require 
large capital. Gigantic machinery, costing millions, is 
an absolute necessity for the successful production and 
refining of this crop. F r o m a little more than 70,000 acres, 
sugar cane has expanded to more than 2 50,000, and where 
there were thousands of owners and several hundred mills, 
there are today only 41 sugar mills which manufacture 
the entire production and four Amer ican companies con-
trol half of the sugar business of the Island. I t is no 
longer possible for the Porto R i c a n of average financial 
condition to engage in the chief wealth-producing indus-
try of the Island in any capacity other than that of day 
laborer. Sugar is today producing m a n y times more in 
income than coffee ever produced, and very probably 
many times more than coffee would ever have produced, 
but the extent to which the natives are sharing in this 
wealth is diminishing just as surely as the wealth is in -
creasing. 
T o a somewhat lesser extent the same is true of tobacco 
and fruit . T h e growing of tobacco is still in the hands 
of Porto Ricans, but the industry of manufacturing and 
marketing, and therefore the profit, is monopolized by 
Americans from the Continent. F r u i t farming is much 
less concentrated than sugar, but the relatively high ex-
pense attached to bringing an orchard to bearing and of 
marketing the product serves to prevent any extensive 
entrance of natives into this type of farming. 
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The shift of emphasis to sugar, tobacco and fruit has 
had one other eifect even more disastrous than the de-
cline of coffee planting. I t has been shown that sugar 
and tobacco today occupy lands which formerly were de-
voted to food products. The tariff, then, can be held 
directly responsible for the decrease in food crops since 
it has made possible the growth of the sugar industry. 
B E N E F I T S O F T H E T A R I F F 
But by no means all of the results of the system of tariffs 
had been harmful to Porto Rico. T h e very fact that the 
sugar industry grew from 70,000 to 250,000 acres, that 
exports expanded to where they amounted to more than 
$54,000,000 in 1928, and tonnage increased more than 
12 times in a period of 32 years is eloquent proof of the 
effectiveness of this legislation. Sugar is now valued 
at two and one half times its nearest competitor, tobacco, 
and tobacco is, in turn, more than two and one half times 
the next agricultural export, fruits. These are the prod-
ucts receiving the most protection, and there can be small 
doubt that this protection is an essential element in their 
growth. 
Let us examine the result of this protection in the case 
of sugar. T h e tariff on sugar has ranged from a low of 
1.256 cents per pound, under the A c t of 1914, to 2.50 
cents per pound under the latest Tariff A c t . Porto 
Rico's advantage over C u b a has never been less than 
1.0048 cents a pound and at the present time it is two 
cents. T h i s means nothing less than that Porto R i c o is 
receiving just two cents a pound more for sugar than 
Cuba . W h e n sugar is quoted at 1.25 cents a pound in 
N e w Y o r k , Cuba is receiving only 1.25, whereas the 
144 P O R T O R I C O : A B R O K E N P L E D G E 
Porto R i c a n producer is paid the ful l price plus two cents. 
This great advantage is only one of several reasons, but 
an indispensable reason, w h y companies operating there 
have been able to pay dividends which have averaged, in 
one case, 6 9 per cent a year on the original investments 
over a period of 20 years. I f Porto R i c o Central owners 
were forced to sell their products in the United States 
without benefit of tariff they would find that the cost of 
producing and delivering a ton of sugar in N e w Y o r k 
would be about $100. T h e present price is about $65 to 
$70! W h e r e would they be without this protection? Just 
how m u c h this protection means may be shown in a more 
concrete way. 
I n 1928, sugar crop export was close to 605,000 tons 
of sugar, or in excess of 1,211,000,000 pounds. T h i s 
sugar received an average of 1.76 cents per pound over 
Cuban sugar, the value of this in money being more than 
$21,300,000. Under the new tariff, the margin in favor 
of Porto R i c o is two cents per pound, and the same amount 
of exports in 1930 wi l l receive $24,000,000 by reason of 
the tariff.2 I t is no mystery why a high sugar tariff has 
been given strong support by the owners of the Island's 
sugar Centrals. 
T h e second source of income to Porto Rico is the to-
bacco crop. I n 1928, the Island exported tobacco to the 
value of more than $20,000,000. T h e type produced is 
mainly a superior k ind of filler used for cigars and the 
tariff on unstemmed tobacco of this type is 35 cents a 
pound, and on stemmed tobacco, 50 cents. I t would 
seem that Porto Rico would have received protection equal 
to some $14,000,000 on her export of leaf and scrap filler 
tobacco, but that this is the case seems very doubtful. 
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The export value is given in the Governor's Report for 
1928 as more than $17,000,000 for the approximately 
30,000,000 pounds of leaf and scrap tobacco exported.3 
This indicates a price of about 57 cents a pound. T h e 
Porto R i c a n farmer did not receive this price, nor even 
half of it for his tobacco, however. T h e same Report 
says that4 the average price received was 27 cents a pound, 
and at such a price the amount received would have been 
about $8,000,000 in place of the $17,000,000 indicated. 
I t is obvious from these figures that it is not Porto Ricans 
who are receiving the full benefits of the protection af-
forded by the tariff. T h e minimum tariff on the above 
types of tobacco is 3 5 cents a pound and the selling price 
of the tobacco was eight cents less than the protection 
provided. I f the protection was operative in this case, 
which seems very doubtful, it could certainly not be 
calculated at more than the value of the crop to the 
grower, or about $8,000,000. 
T h e agricultural export third in importance is the 
combined grapefruit, orange and pineapple crop. I n 
1928, there were exported 891,940 boxes of grapefruit 
alone, worth $2,704,310. As the average weight of a 
box of grapefruit is about 80 pounds, this gives a total of 
more than 71,000,000 pounds, and a tariff protection of 
about $714,000.5 Oranges were exported in 1928 to 
the extent of 546,463 boxes worth $1,286,039. T h e 
tariff was the same as on grapefruit, or one cent a pound, 
making the total protection about $437,000. Pineapples 
worth $1,654,108 were exported, the protection on 549,-
280 crates reaching $121,000.6 T h e new tariff levies 50 
cents a crate on this fruit and a similar amount of pine-
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apples entering the Uni ted States in 1930 would receive 
protection of about $275,000. 
T h e total amount of canned fruits exported were worth 
$1,159,175. T h e tariff of 1922 levied 3 5 per cent on 
canned fruits, and on this schedule the grapefruit, pine-
apple and other fruits would be protected to the extent 
of about $406,000. T h e new tariff raised this schedule 
to 40 per cent and a similar amount of fruit wi l l now re-
ceive some $464,000 protection. T h e coconut crop was 
$23,088,000 in 1928. E a c h coconut has a tariff of one-
half of one cent, or for the total $115,000. F r u i t juices 
received no protection under the old tariff, but under the 
new schedule receive 70 cents per gallon. T h e Porto 
Rican export to the Uni ted States was small in 1928, 
reaching only 12,000 gallons. Under the new tariff this 
quantity of fruit juice wi l l receive about $8,400 advan-
tage over the foreign product. 
T h e molasses exported in 1928 was worth $830,891, 
and the total amount was 19,390,302 gallons. T h e old 
tariff on blackstrap was one-sixth of one cent a gallon 
and the new tariff is equivalent to 0.183 cents a gallon. 
A t the rate in force in 1928, Porto R i c a n molasses had 
an advantage of some $32,000 over a similar amount 
coming in and paying the tariff, and under the new 
schedule the advantage is about $3 5,000. 
Under the new schedules long-staple cotton bears a 
duty of seven cents a pound, while the old tariff admitted 
this product free. Porto Rico has a growing cotton f a r m -
ing district and may expect to benefit from this protec-
tion. T h e 1928 export to the Uni ted States was 526,824 
pounds, and future crops of a similar amount wi l l have an 
advantage of about $37,000 over the foreign product. 
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Far more important than the tariff on long-staple cot-
ton is the general protection which all classes of cotton 
fabrics receive. These duties amount in some cases to 7 5 
per cent ad valorem. Since the American occupation 
there has grown up a rather extensive industry in making 
cotton wearing apparel and in needlework, until by 1928 
this had come to be the third in export value of the coun-
try's products, being surpassed only by sugar and tobacco. 
This business is not carried on by the utilization of native 
products, but depends on imports from the United States 
for its materials. T h e cloth for the manufacture of gar-
ments or garments with designs to be embroidered on 
them are shipped into Porto Rico to take advantage of the 
cheap labor supply there. Thousands of women and girls 
are employed in this industry and the main reason for 
bringing so much of this kind of work into Porto R i c o is 
to take advantage of their labor. Obviously, it would 
be much less profitable to the industrialist if a tariff were 
charged on the goods when they re-enter the Uni ted 
States. I n the year 1928-29, more than $3,000,000 in 
wages were paid to the workers in the embroidery and 
needlework shops. Though very small, and entirely i n -
adequate as compared wi th what is necessary for a l iv ing 
wage, the sums received by these workers is just so m u c h 
that would not fall to the Island if the needlework indus-
try were removed. T h e ranks of the unemployed would 
be augmented with the loss of this industry, and for this 
reason it must be considered that the tariff is benefiting 
Porto R i c o to the extent of the wages paid. 
Though the above enumerated articles form the bulk of 
the Island's exports, there are a number of other articles 
which find a market in the United States. Straw hats, 
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which receive a protection of as m u c h as $4.00 a dozen, 
plus 60 per cent ad valorem have long been manufac-
tured. I n 1928, more than 33,000 dozens were shipped to 
the United States, and immediately on the passing of the 
last Tarif f A c t several of the hat manufacturing estab-
lishments signed contracts with Amer ican firms for lar-
ger amounts than they had ever manufactured before. 
Denatured alcohol valued at $332,608 in 1928, but-
tons worth $ 131,770, hides and skins amounting to $ 170,-
000 and an innumerable inventory of articles of lesser 
value come into the Uni ted States without paying the 
tariff w h i c h they would pay i f Porto R i c o were not wi th in 
the tariff wal l . I t is difficult to determine exactly what 
percentage of the products receive protection, but if we 
count the main items alone, not less than $94,000,000 of 
the export total of some $96,000,000 in 1928 received 
protection. Certainly the tariff has been and wi l l con-
tinue to be of great importance to Porto R i c a n products. 
T h e amount of total benefit to the Island is not sus-
ceptible to close calculation, because it is not k n o w n to 
what extent certain items really profit by the tariff. "Con-
cerning sugar there seems to be little doubt, since the 
price of this article is quoted in N e w Y o r k at the current 
rate plus the tariff, and in selling its crop Porto R i c o re-
ceives the quoted price plus the amount of the tariff. 
Tobacco is much more elusive since the Porto R i c a n crop 
sells for less than the duty. I f the fu l l amount of the 
duty were counted as the amount of protection, the re-
sult would be to make protection appear as several million 
dollars more than the amount received by the growers. 
Such a procedure is obviously out of the question. D u e 
to the fact that the Island producer could not sell his crop 
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in the Uni ted States i f he were out of the tariff barrier, 
it must be assumed that his protection amounts to at least 
as much as he receives for his crop. 
Fruits are in the favored class, but less dependent on 
protection than tobacco and sugar. I t is reasonably cer-
tain that Porto Rico is receiving the ful l benefit of the 
tariff on her grapefruit, oranges, and pineapples. There 
are practically no other crops of any great importance, 
except coffee, to be sold in the American market. Coffee 
does not receive any protection under the tariff. 
One of the most important of Porto Rican industries, 
as has been pointed out, is the embroidery and needlework 
trade. I f we assume that this industry could not exist as 
it does, i f Porto Rico were outside the American tariff 
system, then it would appear that the ful l amount of this 
trade must appear as protected. T h i s procedure, how-
ever, does not give even an approximation of the real 
benefits. T h e cotton goods employed in this traffic are 
shipped from the United States and come back as soon as 
they are made up, so that the protection received can be 
no more than Porto Rico actually realizes from the com-
plete transaction. This is represented by wages, taxes on 
the buildings used, local transportation of the goods, and 
so on. 
I f we calculate in dollars the protection on different 
items as they have been listed above and add to this a fixed 
sum of about $1,000,000 to cover the numerous small 
items, we find the probable protection received would 
have been about $3 5,000,000, in 1928. 
But there is a still further important fact to be con-
sidered before we can arrive at the fu l l extent of the pro-
tection afforded. N o t all of the goods exported from 
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Porto R i c o belong to Porto Ricans. W e have seen that 
about 60 per cent of the sugar belongs to absentees and 
that about 31 per cent of the fruit and 8 5 per cent of the 
tobacco are similarly held. I n addition much of the 
needlework and embroidery are in the hands of absentees. 
Quite obviously then the ful l benefit of the tariff to 
Porto R i c o dos not accrue to the people themselves. O n l y 
to the extent that these industries are held by natives, or 
employ natives, does the Island profit. 
T o find out to what extent the natives are benefited by 
the tariffs, we shall have to calculate the percentage of 
the apparent benefits that really accrue to Porto Rico . 
As given above, the benefits to sugar were more than 
$21,000,000, to tobacco more than $17,000,000, and to 
other industries the benefits varied in amount. T h e total 
of such benefits would have amounted to less than $45,-
000,000 even if we assume that Porto Rico realizes the 
maximum return in every case, which is apparently not 
true. T h e Porto Ricans own less than 40 per cent of the 
sugar industry; therefore the $21,000,000 given shrinks 
immediately to about $8,400,000. I n the case of tobacco, 
which is only 15 per cent Porto R i c a n owned, the actual 
benefits fall to a little more than $2,500,000, while the 
benefits of fruit are only two-thirds the apparent benefit, 
with other products in proportion. T h e apparent bene-
fit to the Island is $45,000,000 but the actual is only about 
one-third of this sum, and the profit to Porto R i c o by 
reason of the tariff something like $15,000,000.7 
W H A T T H E T A R I F F COSTS P O R T O RICO 
I f , as is undoubtedly true, the tariff is largely respon-
sible for a great many benefits to the major industries and 
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for exports amounting to more than $100,000,000 in 
1928, what is its effect on the $92,000,000 in imports 
for the same year? B y an examination of the principal 
items imported we shall be able to decide this. 
The amount and percentage of goods brought from 
the United States is in itself significant as about $80,000,-
000, or 8 5 per cent of the total imports were furnished by 
continental merchants. T h e monopoly, then, is 85 per 
cent effective. Due to the barrier placed by the tariff, 
the Porto R i c a n people are forced to trade in the markets 
of the Un i t ed States, the markets with the highest prices 
in the world. O n l y a small percentage of their imports 
can come from markets other than those of the United 
States and the ever-increasing tariff is constantly cutting 
this percentage down. T h e number of items directly 
effected is too great to examine in detail, but from the fol-
lowing an idea may be drawn of the extent to which the 
tariff is adding to the l iving cost of the Islanders. 
The main food of the people is rice. I n 1928, there 
were imported from all countries more than 187,000,000 
pounds of this food, and all but a little more than 3,000,-
000 pounds of this came from the United States. I n 
other words, the tariff on rice was almost 100 per cent 
effective. A t that time the tariff was two cents a pound, 
but it is now two and one half cents. T h e duty paid on 
rice from foreign sources was more than $67,000 and the 
price of this product was raised not less than two cents 
a pound by the tariff. A prominent importer of Porto 
Rico8 told the authors that if there were no tariff on rice 
it could be imported for from two to three dollars less a 
hundred pounds. T h e people of Porto Rico paid some 
$3,732,000 more for rice in 1928 than it would have cost 
152 P O R T O R I C O : A B R O K E N P L E D G E 
them if they had been free to purchase in the cheapest 
markets. Under the new tariff of 2 1/2 cents a pound 
this wi l l be about $4,678,000 for an equal amount of rice. 
Second only to rice among food imports is salted and 
dried fish and other fish products. I n 1928 some 3 5,000,-
000 pounds were imported from the Uni ted States and 
other countries. T h e tariff was at that time 1 1 / 4 cents 
on dried and salted fish, and on some other classes of fish 
it was 2 1/2 cents. I n addition to dried fish there were 
3,000,000 pounds of canned fish, etc. T h e increased cost 
added to all classes of fish because of the tariff was about 
$460,000, while under the new tariff schedule, which 
doubled its former rate, Porto Rico wi l l pay around $ 8 3 3 ,-
000 annually on this one item alone. 
T h e case is similar w i th all of the principal foods i m -
ported: wheat flour costs about $580,000 under the old 
tariff and under the new this wi l l be raised to $750,000;9 
lard and lard compounds were about $650,000 higher in 
1928 than they would have been without the tariff; 10 
dairy products had about $410,000 added to their normal 
price; 11 beans had some $480,000 added; 12 meats of all 
kinds cost some $600,000 to $700,000 more than they 
would have cost in the cheapest markets; 13 potatoes cost 
$165,000 more;14 peas, $80,000; 15 corn meal, $45,-
000;18 onions, $75,000; 17 cocoa and chocolate, $10,-
000;18 garlic, $38,000; 19 canned and preserved fruits, 
$125,000; 20 and numerous other food items such as olive 
oil,21 $160,000; apples,22 nuts,23 edible oils,24 confection-
ery, beverages and fruit juices, $188,000.2:i 
Forage and foods for animals were also imported in 
considerable quantities. Oats cost some $35,000 more 
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by reason of the tariff, and corn, about $26,000. H a y , 
fodders, and so on, cost $100,000.2C 
The additional amount which the tariff adds to the 
cost of foods is only a part of the total cost to the Island. 
Quite as important is the duty on textiles, machinery and 
many other products. 
I n 1928 Porto Rico imported more than $12,000,000 i n 
cotton products. Since a large amount of this was re-
exported after being manufactured into clothing it is not 
possible to determine the exact amount of wearing ap-
parel brought into Porto Rico from the outside. More 
than $5,000,000 of this was, nevertheless, finished goods 
and remained to be used by the Islanders, while much of 
the unfinished goods was manufactured into garments 
there for the local trade. Certainly not less than the 
$5,000,000 worth of goods mentioned remained to be 
worn by Porto Ricans. T h e tariff on cotton goods is from 
10 to 25 per cent, so that a conservative estimate of the 
cost of this class of imports would be $1,000,000. W o o l -
ens, bearing a tariff of eight cents a pound on some classes 
and as m u c h as 50 cents a pound plus 60 per cent, cost 
not less than $ 100,000. T h e silk imports pay a minimum 
of 20 per cent and a maximum of 70 per cent. Porto 
Rico paid in this case not less than $100,000 because of 
the tariff. Silk furnished an illustration of how Porto 
Rico sometimes pays her tariffs into the Treasury of the 
United States instead of into her own Treasury. T h e 
silk which Porto Rico buys from the United States has 
been imported by American merchants from Japan and 
other countries, so that the duty on this product is paid 
at an American port. "When the product finally reaches 
the Porto Rican consumer, the price has been raised by 
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reason of the fact that a tariff has been paid, yet this i n -
creased price does not accrue to the advantage of Porto 
Rico in any way, since the Treasury of Porto R i c o does 
not receive the duties paid. I n the case mentioned, the 
American public is the beneficiary, through receiving 
the duties paid into the Treasury of the United States, 
of what is, in effect, a tariff on a Porto R i c a n import. T h i s 
is only one of the many instances where the burden of 
the tariff falls on Porto R i c o though the duties received 
go to the United States government. 
A mere listing of the numerous items on which a duty 
is paid is sufficient to show how m u c h the cost of l i v ing is 
increased thereby: flax, hemp, jute and rayon all pay 
duty; wood, furniture and wrapping paper pay a tariff 
of about $160,000, while other classes of paper pay not 
less than $75,000; 27 glass, china and porcelain, earthen-
ware, stoneware and crockery; iron and steel ware, such 
as galvanized sheets, structural steel, rai lway track m a -
terial, cast iron pipes and fittings, nails, cutlery, and 
tools, altogether valued at more than $5,000,000, pay tar-
iffs up to 50 per cent ad valorem. Machinery of the type 
used in sugar mills, automobiles, engines, etc., worth more 
than $7,000,000 was imported, duties on it r u n n i n g as 
high as 40 per cent. Chemicals and allied products worth 
more than $5,000,000 have duties reaching 60 per cent. 
There is scarcely a product used in Porto Rico w h i c h is 
not protected. 
T A R I F F A N D T H E STANDARD O F L I V I N G 
H o w m u c h does the tariff cost Porto Rico, and what 
is its effect on the Porto R i c a n standard of l iving? I t is 
impossible to answer the first part of this question w i t h 
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definite figures. So many and varied are the duties paid 
that it is impracticable to try to set a money value for 
the cost, but i f we assume that goods bought from the 
United States cost as m u c h more in proportion as the 
goods from foreign markets paid tariffs, the total cost 
would be about $ 17,500,000.28 This would not ade-
quately express the difference, however, as inadequate 
shipping facilities force Porto Rico to buy many products 
in the Uni ted States which she could ordinarily buy in 
other and cheaper markets i f she were free to develop 
her foreign commerce. 
I f we examine the details of food costs in relation to 
the tariff, -we can perhaps more nearly answer this part of 
the question as well as the second part. T h e first fourteen 
food products in value, all of which have been discussed 
above, reached something more than $24,000,000 in 1928. 
The increased cost of these products because of tariff was 
in excess of $7,500,000, or about 30 per cent. A s the 
total food imports were close to $30,000,000, the i n -
creased cost of food must have been almost $9,000,000, 
in that year. 
Under the new tariff the cost is much greater, the same 
products paying a tariff of $10,000,000 instead of $7,-
500,000 or about 40 per cent in place of 30. The entire 
addition to the cost of food will be, therefore, about 
$12,000,000, in place of $9,000,000. N o w let us look 
at what this 40 per cent does to the standard of l iving. 
The average worker earns from 60 to 80 cents a day on an 
average, and $ 1 3 5 t o $ 1 6 9 a year. I f we take his 8 0 cents 
a day and take from it the 40 per cent extra cost which 
the tariff puts on it, we find that his daily wage it not 80 
cents but 48, and his yearly wage, not $169 but $102. 
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T h e age of feudal tenure passed long ago, but the Porto 
Rican laborer still must pay 40 per cent of his earnings 
for the privilege which his masters—not the laborer h i m -
self—enjoy of selling in the Amer ican market. T h i s 
tribute does not end, moreover, w i th his food alone, 
though as we have seen there is little enough left after he 
buys food. H i s shoes and clothes are likewise made more 
expensive by the tariff. There was a time when he could 
buy foreign shoes without paying duty but the new tariff 
act. has placed a rate of 20 per cent on boots and shoes and 
10 per cent on the leather of which they are made. T h e 
seriousness of this to the peasant and laborer cannot be 
understood without a short explanation of what the shoe 
means to h im. 
F r o m the point of view of health, clothes may not be 
an absolute necessity, but such is not the case wi th shoes. 
L u r k i n g in the soil is the dreaded hook-worm disease and 
through cut places in the laborer's feet it enters his body, 
unti l 50,000 to 100,000 of these small parasites are sap-
ping his strength. T h i s disease is no longer a problem for 
the physician; the germ can be eliminated in a few days, 
but this is merely the beginning of the problem. I f the 
laborer is to remain cured he must have shoes to protect 
his feet from the germs which are everywhere in the soil, 
and the little that he can spare from his earnings must 
go to supply him and his family w i th shoes. T h e strug-
gle, wh ich was already hopeless for hundreds of thou-
sands, is just 20 per cent more impossible, i f it is con-
ceivable to add to impossibility. T h e new tariff makes 
it very probable that the 600,000 people now suffering 
from this disease wi l l be increased when this duty raises 
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the price of shoes—as it undoubtedly wi l l . A tariff is a l -
ways to enable the manufacturers to set a higher price. 
The textile tariffs, too, increase the burden of masses 
of Porto Ricans who are wretchedly poor. It is not pos-
sible for this to add much to the burden of the very poor, 
of course, since they have next to nothing to spend on 
their clothing, but a dollar or two a year means as m a n y 
per cent of the total earnings. However serious the i n -
creased costs resulting from purchases made in a pro-
tected market may be to Americans in the United States 
proper, they are as zero to infinity as compared with what 
they mean to the Porto Ricans. For the majority of them 
tariff protection is decidedly one-sided. T h e man who 
has no farm, manufactures nothing and sells no produce 
to the Uni ted States is not by any stretch of the imagina-
tion receiving any great aid from the tariff. Quite true, 
he works for a protected industry, but such labor is not 
paying h im on an average of more than 80 cents a day 
and with this sum he cannot buy any more of the neces-
sities of life than could be found by foraging before mod-
ern industry destroyed the tropical fruits which grew wild 
on the mountains and in the valleys. Some can wear 
shoes, but the majority of the peasants cannot. Many 
go to school, but more than half the children are still u n -
provided for. A great many have the privilege of work, 
but more than 3 5 per cent are unemployed. T o all these 
people the tariff is not a benefit, but, on the contrary, an 
added burden. 
P O R T O R I C O C A N N O T C H A N G E T H E T A R I F F L A W S 
A l l these things are but the surface evidence of the I s -
land's tariff troubles. T h e real tragedy of the situation 
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lies, not so much in the actual harm which the tariff does, 
but in the present helplessness of the people to aid them-
selves. T h e tariff is made by a legislative body which has 
no pr imary interest in the welfare of the Island. Many 
of the Congressmen who vote laws affecting the life 
of Porto R ico , know nothing of the Island, its history, 
its people, its economic problems. Some of them scarcely 
know where it is. I t so happens that certain products 
grown in the United States, sugar, tobacco, citrus fruits, 
are also grown in Porto Rico , and these are given protec-
tion. B u t it is also true that certain others, rice, beans, 
meat and dairy products are not now produced in suffi-
cient quantities to supply the demand. These, too, must 
pay high duties on entering the Island from a foreign 
country, although it is to the interest of the people of 
Porto R i c o to buy such things in the cheapest markets. 
But what can Porto R i c o do about this under the present 
system? Nothing! She cannot change the tariff; this 
must be done by the Congress of the Uni ted States. She 
cannot encourage production of more food products, for 
the land is taken up by large sugar and coffee estates. Four 
hundred years were spent under Spanish rule before a 
reform brought Porto R i c o the right of a voice in its tar-
iff legislation. American occupation snatched this right 
away before it could be used to advantage. T h i r t y - t w o 
more years have now passed since Americans took pos-
session of the Island, offering a new economic era, and 
the situation remains the same. Porto R i c o wi l l sometimes 
benefit by the tariff and sometimes lose, but this w i l l al-
ways be incidental. W h o believes that a tariff w i l l be 
framed for the best interest of Porto R i c o regardless of 
how it affects the Uni ted States? W i l l those who sell 
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$80,000,000 worth of merchandise there each year w i l l -
ingly forego this just to let Porto R i c o seek produce i n 
the cheapest markets? 
The Spanish monopoly, maintained by forbidding out-
right trade with foreigners, has few defenders today, but 
their names are legion who profess to see no wrong in the 
type of monopoly which the United States now main-
tains in Porto Rico. Though some of the facts given in 
the following quotation have changed since the statement 
was made, the principal theme enunciated is still true 
today. Speaking to American Congressmen in 1919, 
Señor Barcelo, leader of the Unionist Party of Porto Rico , 
said: 
" Y o u framed your tariff in accordance with your ideas, 
from your point of view and in harmony with your ideas 
irrespective of ours. For example, wool, the clothing of 
your poor, is on the free list, but the same does not occur 
with cotton, the clothing of Porto Rico's poor. I wish 
to impress upon you the extraordinary enormity result-
ing from the fact that we are obliged to live under the 
protecting margin of your tariff by virtue of which your 
products monopolize our markets and prices increase to 
twice or three times the amount for which we could ob-
tain products elsewhere, or for which we could buy them 
from your own selves i f the tariff protecting your indus-
trial products did not hold here." 20 
But Porto Ricans can at present do nothing about this 
except protest and struggle for a change in statutes. T h e y 
are citizens of the United States and, theoretically, their 
voice should carry weight, but in fact it does not. T h e 
one representative they have in Congress cannot speak 
without permission and cannot vote at all. They have 
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nothing to offer in exchange, as has the average Congress-
man, and for this reason the fact of their citizenship, l ike 
their geographical location, is easy for Congressmen to 
forget. T h e following incident, told by D r . Thomas E . 
Benner, former Chancel lor of the Univers i ty of Porto 
Rico, is indicative of the "American" attitude toward the 
Island. D r . Benner says: 
" O n the occasion of the visit to Washington of a legis-
lative commission from the Island, a few years ago, an 
important member of Congress stated to one of the dele-
gation: ' I t is well to be frank. I should not favor any 
further extension of self-government to Porto R i c o unt i l 
you show in your legislation more friendliness to A m e r -
ican interests in the Island.' 
" 'What do you mean by Amer ican interests i n the 
Island?' he was asked. 
" 'American investments there, of course.' 
" 'But do you not consider the welfare of 1,500,000 
Porto Ricans , upon whom you have conferred A m e r i c a n 
citizenship, to be "American interests" also?' 
" I n fairness to the Amer ican Congressman it should be 
said that the question struck home. I t had not occured to 
him before that there were other aspects of the sugar i n -
dustry than those of chief concern to the stockholders 
from his own constituency." 30 
But nothing came of i t—nothing practical to help the 
Porto R i c a n . 
H o w can Porto Rico expect justice as long as Congress 
considers her agitation against the existing condition as 
un-American? Porto R i c a n troubles have not been lis-
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tened to with a sympathetic ear and her complaints 
against the tariff, in particular, have aroused resentment. 
Americans, especially those living in Porto Rico and those 
receiving large benefits from industries of the Is land, 
have often accused the people of lack of appreciation. 
The Congressman cited above is by no means an isolated 
case, and many honestly believe that only a perverse, 
grumbling disposition is the sole ailment troubling Porto 
Rico. T h e large benefits derived by the main industries 
from the tariff, and these benefits are real, has blinded 
them to the fact that the majority of the people are re-
civing very left-handed benefits at the best, and that 
hundreds of thousands are affected only adversely by the 
present regime. 
C H A P T E R V I I I 
O V E R P O P U L A T I O N A N D L A B O R 
"Still farther to the east, in the smaller island of Porto Rico, 
is the outstanding example of American imperialism. We took 
the island from Spain by force of arms and kept it without a 
question as to the desires of its people. We have installed a 
social and political r é g i m e after our own conception of what is 
right and proper. What, then, has American imperialism meant 
for the Porto Rican?"—HENRY KITTREDGE NORTON * 
"But when . . . there appeared the old, familiar face of the 
sweatshop, scarred and wrinkled, it seemed young and hopeful 
to Porto Rico, and now it goes by the name of industrial 
progress. In the United States the sweatshop is recognized as 
a menace to workers and consumers; in Porto Rico it is thought 
of as the bearer of a kind of industrial salvation and is welcomed 
by the government, business organizations and the unem-
ployed."—G. L . JONES f 
POPULATION AND PER CAPITA WEALTH 
IT is usual to make the statement that one of the funda-
mental problems of Porto R i c o is an excessive population. 
There is certainly an abundance of proof for such a view. 
The last census shows 1,543,043 people l iv ing in this small 
Island of 3,435 square miles,1 or about 450 people to the 
* See note on Chapter V. 
tFrom "Sweatshop on the Spanish Main," Survey, Vol. SI, p. 209. 
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square mile. Since the cultivatable area of the Island is 
scarcely one-fourth of the total, it is apparent that every 
square mile of land in cultivation must support some 
1,800 people. T h e actual amount of land devoted to 
the types of foods destined for consumption in the I s -
land is even smaller, being approximately one twentieth 
of the entire area. For every square mile of such food crops 
there are about 9,000 people who must be fed, clothed, 
housed, insured, doctored and educated. The overpopu-
lation problem of Porto Rico , when viewed in this light, 
is certainly a difficult one, and to solve it requires the best 
efforts of all who are responsible for the welfare of the 
people. 
G R O W T H O F P O P U L A T I O N 
I f the population is compared in some of its aspects with 
those states which have a rural population about equal 
in proportion to Porto Rico, the plight of the Island may 
more readily be seen. Nevada, N o r t h and South C a r o -
lina, N e w Mexico, Alabama and Mississippi are repre-
sentative states of this type. The first of these has a popu-
lation slightly more than 80 per cent rural , but averages 
less than one person to the square mile. The per capita 
wealth of Nevada is $6,3IS,3 nearly thirty times Porto 
Rico's $230. South Carolina, the most thickly populated 
of these states, has some 80 per cent rural population, and 
averages 55 persons to the square mile. Its per capita 
wealth is $1,593, or more than six times the $230 per 
capital wealth of Porto Rico . Mississippi, the poorest of 
the predominantly rural states, has $ 1,242 per capital, or 
more than five times as much as Porto Rico. Porto Rico's 
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problem is, then, not merely one of overpopulation, but 
one of extreme poverty as well. 
This problem of overpopulation and poverty is not 
new. I t was not carried into the Island wi th the Un i t ed 
States A r m y , but was of long standing before 1898. T h e 
population of Porto R i c o increased from some 144,000 
in 1798 to about 953,000 in 1899; some 560 per cent for 
the century. I n the latter part of this pre-American pe-
riod, the rate had slowed down noticeably, and from 1877 
to the census of 1899, the increase was from 731,000 to 
about 953,000. This decrease in rate seems to indicate 
that the saturation point had almost been attained by 
1898. Since 1899, the rate of increase has been acceler-
ated, however, and the population of more than 1,540,-
000 equals an increase of some 62 per cent for slightly 
more than 30 years. F r o m 1920 to 1930 the increase 
was 18.8 per cent.3 
Since it is often said by those who are inclined to blame 
the Porto Ricans for being the main cause of their o w n 
misery that i f they would retard the natural increase in 
population the condition of the masses would improve, 
it is not amiss to compare the Porto R i c a n increase w i t h 
that of other territories of the Un i t ed States, and w i t h 
the United States itself. T h e United States gained 16.1 
per cent from 1920 to 1930; N e w Y o r k gained about 21 
per cent and N e w Jersey about 28 per cent in population 
over the previous ten-year period; Cal i fornia gained more 
than 65 per cent in the same period. A m o n g the out ly-
ing possessions we find that Samoa had above 24 per cent 
more than in 1920, while G u a m and H a w a i i gained 39.4 
per cent and 43.9 per cent respectively. T h e 18.8 per 
cent gain registered in Porto Rico for the same ten-year 
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period does not appear to be excessive in view of these 
comparisons, and this increase cannot be used as a val id 
reason for the bad conditions existing in the Island. T h a t 
the population is excessive has already been shown, and 
there is no doubt that a decrease would serve to alleviate 
the widespread suffering; but the density of the popula-
tion must be accepted as one of the difficulties to be met 
in working for better social conditions, and not merely 
as a lame excuse for the inactivity so far characteristic of 
the United States Government. 
U N E M P L O Y M E N T 
With the increase in population has come an accentua-
tion of the unemployment problem unti l it has reached a 
point where it is not merely a temporary condition, but 
one which the country faces year after year and all the 
year around. Still it does not follow that a decrease in the 
number of people would relieve this situation. There 
are too many people in Germany by some 4,000,000; 
England has some 2,000,000 surplus; and in the United 
States where the population per square mile is but slightly 
over JO, there is a surplus of more than 6,000,000. T h e 
excessive population of Porto Rico is doubtless a con-
tributing cause of unemployment, but it cannot be re-
garded as the sole cause, nor even as a main one. The re-
port of the committee appointed to investigate unem-
ployment found that, in 1929, during the months of 
January, February and March, the busiest season of the 
year, when the cane crop is being ground, there were 
33,000 men without work out of a total male population 
of 485,000 ten years old and over.4 These figures are 
in themselves a condemnation of conditions. As the com-
166 P O R T O R I C O : A B R O K E N P L E D G E 
pulsory school laws require children from eight to 14 to be 
in school, obviously they should not be included as a part 
of the total. According to these figures about seven per 
cent of the male workers have no employment during 
the busy season. A s this busy season lasts about five or six 
months of the year, and during the remaining half of the 
year there is little w o r k to be found, the figures for that 
season are interesting. M r . Carmelo H o n o r é , in a report 
made to the Commissioner of Agricul ture and Labor in 
December, 1929, showed that there were some 460,000 
persons available for work in industry and that of these 
there were about 170,000 who had no employment. H o w 
does this labor situation compare w i t h the years before 
American occupation? There are no reliable figures for 
the years before 1899, but the following table shows the 
number of available workers, the number employed and 
unemployed, and the per cent employed and unemployed 
in 1899, 1910, 1920 and 1926.5 
Year Male population Number Number Per cent Per cent 
10 yrs. & over occupied unemployed occupied unemployed 
1899 322,567 267,764 54,803 83.0 17.0 
1910 386,516 317,256 69,260 82.1 17.9 
1920 447,777 322,466 125,311 72.0 20.0 
1926 485,337 338,876 146,461 69.8 30.2 
W A G E S A N D I M P O R T E D FOODS I N 1898 AND T O D A Y 
Obviously the situation has been growing steadily 
worse since American occupation. F r o m 17 per cent 
in 1899, the number of unemployed has grown consist-
ently unt i l in 1920 it reached 28 per cent and in 1930 
more than 30 per cent, while by converting the 170,000 
unemployed above mentioned into terms of percentage, 
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it may be seen that by December, 1929 the unemployed 
were more than 36 per cent of the male population. I n 
his annual Report for 1930, Governor Roosevelt of Porto 
Rico described the unemployment situation as follows: 
"More than 60 per cent of our people are out of em-
ployment either all or a part of each year. . . . Hundreds 
come to the government offices weekly, wi th but a single 
request—work. They do not ask for a dole, merely the 
opportunity to earn a livelihood." 6 
It may be asked what has been the effect of this sur-
plus labor supply on wages for the laborer. A survey 
of the workers' wages of 1928-30 as compared with those 
of 1897-99 in the light of how much food they will pur-
chase wi l l help answer this question, such an examination 
to include food costs, per capita food imports, and so on. 
T a k i n g some of the individual items of food imports, 
it will be found that rice importation increased from 78,-
000,000 pounds for 950,000 people in 1897 to 187,000,-
000 pounds for 1,500,000 people in 1928. This is 82 
pounds per capita in 1897 as against 125 pounds per 
capita in 1928. Is the Porto Rican, then, importing more 
of his food or is he eating more? I f in the same period 
the domestic crops had increased or kept in step with the 
increase in population, it might be assumed that a better 
economic condition permitting a heavier food consump-
tion is prevailing, but it has already been seen that the 
food crops are less than half, having fallen off from one 
acre per six persons to one acre for 15 persons. A s far 
as rice is concerned, at least, Porto Rico is having to i m -
port more food. Does this hold good for other crops? 
The consumption of cod and other dried fish in 1897 
was 24,737,399 pounds or about 25 pounds for each of 
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the inhabitants of the Island. I n 1928, there were 22 
pounds per capita. Since the domestic catch of fish was 
negligible in both the periods considered, it seems that 
fish consumption has remained about the same. 
T h e importation of flour showed an increase that was 
phenomenal. I n 1897, about 30,852,030 pounds of flour 
were imported. T h i s was a little more than 32 pounds 
per person. T h e 1928 import was 114,034,492 pounds 
(377,727 barrels) or a little more than 76 pounds per 
capita. T h e per capita flour imports have increased al-
most two and one half times, and that there is more wheat 
flour being consumed today is obvious, since neither 
in 1897 nor in 1930 was there any considerable amount of 
wheat grown. I t is equally obvious that imported flour 
is now used where formerly native bread stuffs, such as 
cornmeal, accounted for the bulk of the food of this 
type. 
I n 1897, some 73 5,560 pounds of cheese were im-
ported, or less than one pound per person. I n 1928 the 
import was 3,762,249, or a little more than 2 1/2 pounds 
per capita, an increase of more than two and one half 
times. 
T h e importation of meat and lard was 11 pounds per 
capita in 1897, and had increased to more than 48,000,-
000 pounds, or about 32 pounds per capita. T h i s is an 
increase of about three times. 
O n e more food product may be examined i n an en-
deavor to determine whether there is any basis for the 
claim that big business has absorbed the land and forced 
the working man to import his food. D r y vegetables 
and garden produce amounted to a little more than 
15,000,000 pounds or about 12 pounds per head in 1897. 
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I n 1928, the combined importation of these products 
was 82,000,000 pounds or about Í 4 pounds per head, 
an increase of three and one half times.7 We have seen 
that the proportion of land devoted to food products 
has decreased. I t , therefore, seems reasonable to con-
clude that the increased importation of dry vegetables 
and garden produce is due to the decrease in native food 
crops, forcing a larger importation of rice, beans, peas, 
meat and other foods. 
W A G E S T O D A Y 
Perhaps, though, the laborer can buy more of these 
imported foods in 1930 than it was possible for h im to 
buy of the native food of 1897, with a smaller outlay. 
Perhaps also his wages in 1930 are better as compared 
with the general cost of food. Wages received in Porto 
Rico in 1897 were 20 to 30 cents a day according to the 
report of General Davis.8 The second Annual Report 
of the Governor gives the wages as 20 to 50 cents a day 
in Spanish coin, and 3 5 cents in American gold. Skilled 
laborers got as much as $1.Í0.9 A s these two reports 
agree, it seems justifiable to take a wage range of from, 
say, as low as 20 centavos in extreme cases to U 0 pesos 
in others. The farm laborer could not have averaged 
more than 50 centavos (at this time the value of the peso 
was 60 cents gold) . 
I n order to arrive at a true picture of wages in the 
various industries, we shall have to consider a period of 
several years and a variety of types of labor. Sugar is 
the industry employing the largest number of laborers. 
The Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture and 
Labor for 1925 states that there was "a reduction of from 
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15 to 25 per cent in salaries." 10 T h e range for tlie year 
was from 40 cents a day to $2 in extreme cases. The 
usual maximum wage in the southern and eastern sec-
tions, the high wage area, of the Island was around $1.50, 
although rare cases of a higher wage were reported. The 
minimum wage for exactly the same types of worlt was 
reported to be 60 to 70 cents a day. T h e workers of the 
northern and western parts were paid considerably less 
and maximum and min imum wages for the same types 
of work ranged from $1.25 down to 40 cents a day.11 
I n 1926, the wages were reported as the same, except for 
a slight rise in the northern section where the maximum 
was $1.30 a day for nine hours work.12 I n 1927, the 
same wages prevailed w i th some slight changes,13 while 
in 1928, although the large crop gave employment to 
about 10 per cent more workers, the wages received were 
the same.14 The situation in 1929 was distinctly worse, 
for although wages varied little, the short crop which 
resulted from damage done by the hurricane, resulted in 
a 20 per cent decrease in the number of laborers. T h e 
predominating wages for the five-year period, 1925-
1929, were from $1.25 to 60 cents a day. 
I n the tobacco plantations the position of the laborers 
was less stable. Concerning the wages in this industry 
the Commissioner says: " T h e reduction in wages, in spite 
of the better prices secured for the product, was due, ac-
cording to employers' statements, to a scarce production. 
However, the officials of the bureau believe that the 
precarious situation the laborers in the tobacco industry 
have to meet is the result of an excessive labor supply 
brought about by overpopulation." 15 T h e maximum 
wages reported for both men and women were $1.00, 
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while the children received not more than 60 cents a day. 
Minimum wages were 40 cents for men and 25 cents 
for women and children.16 The position of those work-
ing in the tobacco stripping establishments was worse 
than in the previous year. The reason for this may be 
readily seen from the following statement: "The one 
dollar min imum wage for women, lowered to 25, 30 and 
50 cents once the Minimum Wage A c t was declared u n -
constitutional, caused a little increase in the number of 
stripping establishments through the northern towns 
of the Island. I n the rest of the country conditions and 
wages remained the same, although it is true that ski l l -
ful workers doing piece-work in the tobacco stripping 
shop often make as high as eight dollars a week, they are 
nevertheless clamoring for legislation that may afford 
them a fixed wage high enough to meet the present high 
cost of l iving. There are over nine thousand of these 
laborers." 17 
What the condition of the tobacco plantation worker 
was in the following year may be judged from the state-
ment that "in spite of the fact that the price of tobacco 
has been the highest during the last four years, the labor-
ers received the same low wages as last year. This is the 
report from 160 plantations investigated." 18 The to-
bacco strippers were no more favored. "More than 
14,000 women workers were investigated in 153 shops 
dedicated to the stripping of tobacco. T h e highest daily 
wage reported for an operative was $ 1 for 9 hours work. 
. . . A great number of workers in this work, it has been 
proved, contract tuberculosis and other contagious 
diseases." 19 
The wages in the cigar factories were reported at $4 
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a week for women and $ 10 for men, while the cost of l iv-
ing for a single woman or girl was not less than $6 to $12.20 
T h e year 1927 produced a bumper crop, a great de-
mand for labor, but no better wages on the plantations,21 
or in the stripping and manufac tur ing plants.212 The 
crop for 1928 was smaller and two-thirds of the tobacco 
plantation workers were idle. T h e r e was also a tendency 
to lower wages.23 T h e salaries in the cigar factories, as 
well as the number of laborers, was smaller. F r o m 1918 
to 1928 the salary decrease was 60 per cent. T h e wages 
in the tobacco industry are lower than in the same indus-
try in C u b a . " C u b a n leaf tobacco is brought to Porto 
R i c o to be stemmed, part ly because of tariff advantages, 
but largely because of low Is land wages. T h e cost of 
stemming one pound of leaf tobacco is reported to be 
m u c h higher in C u b a than in Porto R i c o . . . . " 24 
There are some indications that the wages in frui t or-
chards were slightly better on the whole, but not mark-
edly so. "Laborers in this industry are mostly women and 
minors. . . . A s a rule , wages paid to men and women 
engaged in unskilled w o r k fluctuated from 50 cents to 
one dollar ($1) per day of eight or nine hours; children 
[were] permitted to w o r k under wages of f rom 20 to 26 
cents per day of seven hours in cult ivat ion, w i t h a small 
increase i f employed in packing jobs." 25 I n 1926 the 
conditions were at most no better. T h e nominal wage 
received by women was one dollar a day, but may have 
been only 60 cents, and in order to earn a dollar a day 
they had to work long hours into the night. T h e use 
of women for night w o r k and for periods of 10 or more 
hours was protested b y the workers and the Bureau of 
Labor , but without effect. Since 1927 there has been 
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some betterment in the salaries on the fruit farms and 
in the canning factories. The wage scale is reported as 
running from 60 cents to $1.50, the majority receiving 
in excess of one dollar. I n the principal agricultural i n -
dustries since 192J, there has been but slight variation 
in the wages received. Sugar and fruit pay laborers 
slightly more than coffee and tobacco. T h e wage of 
1928 is fair ly indicative of the five year period and we 
can use statistics for that year as a criterion. 
B U Y I N G P O W E R O F WAGES 
I n 1928, wages ran from 60 cents for common labor-
ers to $4 for skilled labor. In cane, $1.25 and in fruit , 
$1.50 were maximum wages paid field laborers. T h e 
predominating wage in the four principal industries 
seems to have been from 70 cents to $1.24 for sugar, 
50 cents to 79 cents for tobacco, 50 cents to 69 for coffee 
and 60 cents to 99 cents for fruit. These figures seem to 
indicate that the majority of laborers received from 60 
to 80 cents a day.28 Let us compare the buying power 
of the laborer's 50 centavos in 1897 with his 80 cents in 
1928. 
I t must be borne in mind that the following conclu-
sions are arrived at by taking the average price per pound 
in the currency of the time, of a given product imported 
in wholesale lots in 1897, and comparing the price per 
pound wi th the daily wage. The figures for 1928 are 
arrived at by a similar procedure, and do not indicate 
how m u c h the laborer could actually buy in 1897 and 
1928, but how his wage compared with wholesale prices. 
I n 1897, the price per pound of imported rice was 
slightly over 3 centavos.27 For his 50 centavos, the 
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laborer could have bought at the wholesale import price 
about 16 pounds of rice. O f course, the retail price was 
higher, and he was not, therefore, able to purchase so 
much, but relatively there was no difference in the amount 
retailing added in 1897 and 1928. I n 1928, the price 
per pound was about 4 cents American money.28 W i t h 
his 80 cents, the laborer, in 1928, could have bought 20 
pounds of rice, or 1/4 more than in 1897. I t is evident 
that his wage has increased in rice buying capacity. 
I n 1897 the price of codfish was about 6 centavos per 
pound.29 A t this rate, the laborer could buy about 8 
pounds at the wholesale price. I n 1928, the price was 
about 7 cents.30 The 80 cents of the laborer today wi l l 
buy about 11 pounds of codfish, and even if he makes no 
more than 60 cents a day he can purchase as much cod-
fish per day as his father could in 1898. 
Consideration of the cost of wheat flour gives a still 
more striking picture of the value of the laborer's daily 
earnings. Flour cost a little more than 3 centavos in 
1897.31 I n 1928, flour cost about 3.4 cents a pound.32 
Às compared with the 16 pounds which the laborer could 
buy in 1897, the laborer of 1928 can buy about 23 pounds. 
This cannot, however, be accepted as an index of his 
wages without further consideration. I t has already been 
seen that the native foods of the Island decreased to half 
during the 32 years of American occupation and that 
in the case of the chief foods now consumed rice has 
been more than half. Since the bananas, plantains, m a n -
goes, etc., which formed the bulk of the food consumed 
in 1897 were obtainable at small cost, or in most cases 
at no cost, the food of the jibaro was very cheap. W i t h 
his small wage in 1897, he could have bought only 16 
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pounds of rice, as compared with 20 pounds today, but 
in 1897 he had to purchase only 82 pounds a year of i m -
ported rice, whereas he now must buy 125 pounds from 
abroad. T h e average family of five today must have 
625 pounds of foreign rice a year, as against only 410 in 
1897. T h e 410 pounds bought in 1897 cost about 12 1/2 
pesos, as against $25 for the 625 pounds today. T r a n s -
lated into a day's work, we find that the jibaro today 
must devote about 33 days to earning his rice as against 
25 days in 1897. 
The amount of codfish imported in 1897 reached about 
130 pounds to the family, for which the laborer would 
have paid about 8 pesos. O n this basis something like 15 
days a year would have been necessary to supply each 
family w i t h a sufficient quantity of this food. I n 1928, 
there were only 110 pounds consumed per family and 
the cost at the wholesale price would have been about 
$8.00. T o buy the codfish needed in 1928, the average 
man with a family of five would have worked about 10 
days. 
T h e importation of wheat flour reached some 160 
pounds for each family in 1897, as compared with 380 
pounds in 1928. T h e cost rose from about 5 pesos to 
some $16.50. Transferring this into terms of the n u m -
ber of days necessary to purchase this flour, it is found 
that an increase of ten to more than 20 days has taken 
place. 
The cost of the import of dry vegetables and garden 
produce cembined in 1897 was about 1.70 pesos per 
family. About three and one half days work were needed 
to pay this part of the grocery bill. B y 1928 the imports 
had increased to 54 pounds per capita as compared wi th 
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16 pounds in 1897, and the price had gone from slightly 
more than two cents to about four cents. E a c h family 
in 1897 consumed some 80 pounds of imported vegetables 
and garden produce, whereas in 1928 the import for each 
family was around 270 pounds. T h e cost rose from 1.70 
pesos a family to about $10.80 a family; and the number 
of days' work necessary to earn this part of the food 
rose from three and one half days to more than 13. 
Meat imports grew from Í 5 pounds for each family to 
160 pounds. The increased cost was from eight pesos 
to more than $22. T h e head of each family of five 
worked 16 days for meat in 1897 but in 1928 he had to 
work 28 days to buy imported meat. 
As compared to 1897 when the laborer spent only 70 
days of his year in paying for the imported foods such as 
rice, codfish, wheat flour, dry vegetables and garden pro-
duce and meat and lard, the wage earner of 1928 had to 
work 104 days to buy these things from abroad. These 
products account for more than 65 per cent of the food 
of the rural laborer and his food bill requires about 94 
per cent of his total income. T h e tribute he is paying to 
the American farmer for the privilege of growing the 
precious sugar cane is assuredly not small. 
The figure cited above for the proportion of income 
spent for food is doubly interesting in the light of recent 
comparison made for Oriental and European countries 
and the United States. D r . Julius K l e i n states that Asia 
spends 90 per cent for food and but 10 per cent for the 
ordinary comforts of life; Europe uses some 80 per cent 
for food and 20 per cent for extras which make life 
liveable; the United States spends 30 per cent for food 
and 70 per cent for luxuries; 33 while the Por ¿o Rican 
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peasant devotes 94 per cent of his income to food and has 
only 6 per cent left for the other essentials of life! W e 
are accustomed to hear a great deal about the miserable 
condition of the coolie, but it is seldom that we learn 
that Amer ican citizens are living in worse conditions to-
day than Orientals! 
T h e above calculations have been made with whole-
sale costs as judged from total imports. Perhaps it would 
be more pertinent to use present day retail prices since 
they represent the actual cost to the consumer. I t is 
ordinarily thought that Porto Rico, like other countries 
of the West Indies, can buy food for a very small cost 
and that this fact minimizes the evil of low wages. I n 
order to find how far this belief holds true the following 
comparisons of food costs in Porto Rico and in N e w 
Y o r k C i t y were made. Since the cost of food consumes 
more than 90 per cent of the total earnings, no compari-
sons of other costs were necessary. N e w Y o r k prices 
are taken from the lists published by the Atlantic and 
Pacific T e a Company, Oppenheimer, Daniel Reeves, 
Butler Brothers and other retail stores, in May, 1930. 
T h e Porto R i c o prices were secured in San Juan, Fajardo, 
Ponce and several small interior towns, in June, 1930. 
The range in cost may be judged from the following 
table: 
Commodity New York Porto Rico Per Cent 
Price Price Difference 
Asparagus 
(White Rose, large) $.35 $.40 21 
Campbell's Soup 
(three cans) .2Í .30 20 
Coffee .39 .50 28 
Corn (No. 2 Can) .10 .15 50 
Crisco (3 lb. can) -69 .85 23 
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Diced carrots (No. 2 can) .15 .25 66 
Flour (Pillsbury or Gold Medal) 
7 lb. sack .3 5 .50 42 
Grapefruit (No. 2 can Porto Rico) .21 .18 -14 
Heinz beans (med. can) .15 .18 20 
Lima beans (No. 2 can) .2 5 .25 •— 
Lux (3 packages) .25 .2 5 — 
Milk (Eagle) .19 .20 0 5 
(Van Camps, 3 cans) .25 .30 20 
Palmolive soap (6 cakes) .3 5 .50 42 
Pears (Del Monte) .2 5 .3 5 40 
(White Rose) .2 5 .40 60 
Plums (canned) .20 .30 5 0 
Prunes (Sunsweet) .15 .18 20 
Raisins .10 .10 — 
String beans (No. 2 can) .25 .30 20 
Sugar (pound) .05 .06 20 
Tea (Tetley, % lb.) .25 .30 20 
Welch Grape Juice (pt.) .29 .3 5 20 
The above 23 items are almost all standard canned 
goods or commodities sold in ready-made packages. O n l y 
the more prosperous of the Porto Ricans can buy such 
articles, and of the entire list of 21 standard commodities 
only one, a native Porto R i c a n product, sells for less than 
the price in New Y o r k . Three articles, raisins, l ima 
beans in cans and L u x soap are the same price, while the 
remaining 17 articles sell at prices which r u n as m u c h as 
66 per cent higher. T h e increase in the average cost of 
the 23 items ís 25 per cent. 
The day laborer cannot afford such high priced foods. 
I n order to examine the prices of articles which he buys, 
it is necessary to study the figures at which rice, beans, 
cheap coffee, sugar, flour, milk, codfish, cornmeal, etc., 
which make up the bulk of his diet, sell for. 
Commodity New York Porto Rico Per Cent 
Price Price Difference 
Butter beans $.14 & .15 $.14 & .15 — 
Butter (Brookfield) .45 .60 33 
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Canned milk (Van Camps, 3 cans) .25 .30 20 
Cheese (Kraft 1 lb.) .50 .60 20 
Crackers (1 lb. tin) .45 .45 — 
Coffee (Brazil) .19 to .29 .25 31 &-14 
Codfish .18 & .20 .18 & .20 — 
Cornmeal .05 .04 -20 
Flour (7 lbs. Pillsbury) .3 5 .50 42 
Garbanzos .12 & .14 .12 & .14 — 
Lard (3 lbs.) .51 .55 08 
Lentils .12 & .14 .12 & .14 — 
Milk (fresh—quart) .19 .19 — 
Navy beans .10 to .12 .12 20 & 0 
Potatoes (100 lbs.) 3.00 4.00 33 
Red beans .10 & .15 .14 40 & -7 
Rice .05 & .06 .05 & .06 — 
The above list of 17 articles comprises more than 67 
per cent of the food used by rural families. For seven of 
these foods the price is the same as in N e w Y o r k . For one, 
corn meal, the Porto R i c a n price is lower. I n two other 
cases, coffee and red beans, the prices are sometimes 
higher and sometimes lower. N a v y beans are sometimes 
the same price and sometimes higher while in six cases 
the price is always higher and it may even reach 42 per 
cent more. I f the low price range is accepted, the average 
price of these 17 articles in Porto Rico is about 24 per 
cent higher than in N e w Y o r k . O n the basis of the higher 
price range, the Porto R i c o price is more than 20 per cent 
above N e w Y o r k . T h i s is very far from the low cost 
which is generally supposed to go hand in hand with low 
wages. N o great imagination is necessary to conceive 
the enormous difference between the standard of eating, 
not to say the standard of living, of the American citizen 
of Porto R i c o and of the United States. 
T H E S W E A T S H O P S Y S T E M 
The characteristics of the sweatshop system are too 
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well k n o w n and too similar in all parts of the world to 
need any definition here. W i t h i n the last few years 
this system has made its appearance in Porto Rico , and 
probably as many as 50,000 women and children are 
now working under sweatshop conditions. I t is some-
times difficult to see the disadvantage of supplying work , 
however small and il l-paid, to people who would prob-
ably not be employed otherwise. I n a country where 60 
per cent of the people are unemployed it is obviously de-
sirable to furnish labor in any possible manner, and it is 
this surplus labor supply that has brought the sweating 
system into the Island. 
I t has not been many years since the needlework and 
embroidery of Porto R i c o sold on the N e w Y o r k market 
as work of extra fine quality. T h e native women had re-
ceived from Spain a heritage of fine needlework, and dur-
ing the centuries had kept alive a home industry which 
was of material aid in supporting the family, and was, 
in addition, distinctly artistic. American merchants were 
not long in discovering this talent after our occupation 
of the Island and N e w Y o r k shops imported practically 
all of the output and called for more. More could not 
be produced without added effort and it was at this j u n c -
ture that accomodating continentals appeared. 
The system as it now works is this: a continental agent 
takes to the Island all of the necessary materials for t u r n -
ing out the completed product, sets himself up in a rented 
storehouse and announces that he is ready to put out the 
goods he has brought. H e seldom deals w i th the workers 
directly, for being alone or at best having only one or 
two partners, he cannot supervise the entire process. T h e 
cloth and other materials are put out to a number of sub-
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agents who, in turn, make contracts with the women for 
doing the work. Most of the work so done is carried to 
the homes of the workers where it is made up. The effect 
of this innovation on the quality of Porto Rican needle-
work has been disastrous. The once fine quality has now 
deteriorated until the same women who once did work 
for exclusive Fi f th Avenue shops today turn out a great 
mass of articles for basement stores. W h y this great 
change? H a v e the women of Porto Rico turned m a -
terialistic in contact with Americans? T h e answer is to 
be found in a closer examination of the whole system. 
D u r i n g 1926 more than 40,000 women were employed 
by almost 500 agencies and "the conditions of the women 
and children employed in this industry are deplorable, as 
compared wi th those of the workers in other industrial 
occupations. More than 75 per cent of the home workers 
receive a wage which fluctuates between 15 and 2 5 cents 
a' day. . . . A s there is absolutely no legislation regulating 
home work, there are hundreds of girls of less than twelve 
years of age, who devote themselves to such work, and 
with the product of their work help to sustain their 
parents." 34 Far from improving as time goes on, the 
report of 1927 was that "in this industry the wages are 
constantly becoming lower. The work done in the shops 
is paid by the eight-hour day and also by the piece or con-
tract. T h e home work is done by contract only, the 
basis of which is the dozen pieces. I n the s h o p s . . . it is 
not easy to find a woman or girl employee who earns 
more than a dollar a day. The weekly pay lists which 
were inspected show wages of 50 cents to a dollar a day 
for shop workers, and an income of from $1 to $2.70 
weekly for those who work in their homes. Not less than 
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25 home workers were questioned in every ward of the 
manufacturing districts of M a y a g ü e z , Aguadilla, A ñ -
asco, Lajas , Maricao, Cabo Rojo, San G e r m á n , Sabana 
Grande, Lares, San Sebast ián, Moca, R i n c ó n , San J u a n , 
Coamo and Ponce. T h e majority admitted that in order 
to earn two dollars weekly not less than sixty hours work 
every six days was necessary. . . . There are cases where 
girls of less than twelve form part of the working group. 
"The situation of the workers in this important indus-
try is more distressing every day that passes W e are in 
danger, therefore, of having to face a new social problem, 
created by thousands of women and children suffering 
from malnutrition, debility or sickness brought on by 
this condition of things." 3u 
I f there is any tendency toward the betterment of 
this situation it is not apparent. I n 1928 the wages were 
still given at $1 to $4 a week, only one per cent receiving 
more than this amount.36 Nor is there any tendency 
for the number of sweatshop workers to decrease. T h e 
statement of the Bureau of Labor that "there are few 
houses in our countryside occupied by working families 
that are not converted into shops tr ibutary to some ex-
porter" is indicative of the trend. W h y the w o r k of 
women and children is not better regulated has more 
than one explanation but the regular and systematic vio-
lation is admitted by the responsible authorities who re-
port that "the laws protecting the labor of women and 
children continue to be made fun of in these places of 
work in spite of the efforts and frequent inspections made 
by the Bureau to obtain their performance." 37 A g a i n 
in 1929 the official reports said: "The prevailing weekly 
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wages were $.50, $1, $1.50 and $2, although wages of 
$3, $3.50 and $4 were also recorded." 38 
T H E W O R K E R S C O N D I T I O N 
W h y does such a situation continue to exist? Has there 
been no legislation to check such conditions or to assure 
better wages? Yes, there was a law, a law which set the 
minimum wage at one dollar a day. Its strict enforce-
ment would have raised the wages of thousands of women 
out of the dollar a week class and put them in the more 
prosperous group of workers who earn six dollars a week. 
But such a law was not possible under the much lauded 
policy of "rugged individualism" worshipped by the 
American Government today. "Business must have a 
free rein," and in Porto Rico it certainly gets it. A daily 
wage of one dollar would have curtailed the profits of the 
sugar, tobacco, fruit and needlework industries, and such 
a policy is simply not "good business." T h e law was de-
clared uncontitutional! 
Overpopulation could doubtless be blamed for the 
low wage level, but not for the high prices. The drop in 
food producing crops, due to the usurpation of the land 
by sugar and tobacco, and the high tariff, are the pr in-
cipal reasons for the excessive cost of food. The first of 
these is largely due to the efforts of Americans, and 
naturally the second is entirely due to the inclusion of 
Porto Rico in the American tariff walls. 
There are, no doubt, laborers in the world whose con-
dition is worse than that of the Porto Rican, but the 
more than one million American citizens living in the 
Island have none of life's comforts and few of its neces-
sities. T a l k of the blessings of American occupation 
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sounds hollow enough to the peasant born in a leaky pole 
and straw hut, such as his ancestors used four hundred 
years ago; growing up without shoes, clothing or suf-
ficient nourishment; contracting the hook-worm disease 
in the land where its cause and cure were discovered, and 
where its discoverer, D r . Bailey K . Ashford, has labored 
in vain for a generation because he had not sufficient 
funds and because the people are too miserably poor to 
buy the absolutely indispensable shoes which prevent the 
spread of the disease; forced to work through life for 12 
to 15 hours a day in order to earn 60 or 70 cents; w i t h no 
bed, chair, mirror, table or lavatory in his home; forced 
to see his children follow his example, wi th scant or no 
education; and if he falls ill or dies, dependent on charity 
for treatment or burial. 
I n some respects, the rural laborer is in better condition 
than his town-dwelling brother, who must live in a ram-
shackle hut on Government lands along the sea shore. 
Here his hut must too often be built in the swamps which 
surround the entire Island. There is no road, no street; 
the tide washes under the house twice daily. I n many 
cases his house stands in mosquito-infested water during 
twenty-four hours a day, and is always surrounded by 
the filthy rubbish heaps which everywhere clutter the 
suburbs. There is nothing to carry away the filth, and 
stagnant ditches serve as back alleys, and in some cases, 
streets. I t is indeed an inglorious spectacle for the visitor 
to this Island where American imperialism may be seen 
at its best. 
C H A P T E R I X 
T H E D E S I R E F O R I N D E P E N D E N C E 
"Perhaps the sharpest difference between Porto Rican develop-
ment and that of the rest of Latin America lies in the fact 
that there has never been a serious movement for independence. 
Such political expression of a feeling for independence as we 
have had came—some say strangely, and some say naturally— 
under the American regime."—Luis MUÑOZ MARIN * 
"There can be but one explanation—petty politics—or in 
other words, the insistent cry for independence is merely politi-
cal propaganda, for it is conceivable that the intelligent leaders 
of the Unionist Party realize that Porto Rico, without the aid 
of the United States, from the economic standpoint would die 
overnight. Among the Latin-Americans the cry 'Independen-
cia' has always exerted a magic influence, and in the case of 
Porto Rico it appears to be the wand which the politicians wave 
over the masses to produce political offices."—H.. P. KRIPPENE t 
" I saw always increasingly the strong anti-American feeling 
which, though not universal, is the most potent influence in 
the island."—MARY WELD COATES $ 
The belief that there has never been a real movement 
for independence in Porto Rico is supportd by many; in 
* See note on Chapter III . 
tFrotn "Porto Rico's Playful Politics," Current History, Vol. XV, pp. 
610-615. 
tFrom "What's the Matter in Porto Rico? Growth of Anti-American 
Sentiment," Current History, Vol. X V I , pp. 108-14. 
18f 
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particular the statement that there does not exist any for-
midable movement wi th this end in view was expressed 
recently by an authority well qualified to judge. T h i s 
same belief was expressed on the occasion of the President's 
visit, in March, 1931, when the reports coming f rom 
Porto R i c o were to the effect that the independence move-
ment had collapsed completely. Perhaps what those 
holding this opinion mean is that no movement for i n -
dependence ever came near success. Certainly there has 
been no revolution comparable to the American revolu-
tion or the "Wars for Independence in Lat in A m e r i c a , 
but during the Spanish regime, it was not exactly a politi-
cal pastime to advocate such a movement. I t could not 
be made a part of a political platform and become a politi-
cal rallying cry to carry office seekers into power, for the 
time was not yet ripe for such a liberal point of view. 
Neither is it conceivable that the Uni ted States G o v e r n -
ment would permit a real revolutionary movement to re-
main unnoticed, though it tolerates practically unl imited 
discussion. Porto R i c o would, moreover, have been pe-
culiar i f it had not had its insurrections, and it has had 
them. 
G R O W T H O F T H E I N D E P E N D E N C E M O V E M E N T 
T h e desire for independence, or more liberal self-gov-
ernment, has been active in Porto R i c o since the early part 
of the nineteenth century.1 Accord ing to B r a u the 
municipal government of San G e r m a n at this t ime i n -
structed the Deputy to the Cortes of Spain that Porto 
Rico recognized the sovereignty of Ferdinand V I I , but 
only on condition that "in case the said sovereignty does 
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not prevail, the Island wi l l regain her natural right to 
govern herself according to her own views." 
I n 1810, the independence spirit of the government 
of Caracas was brought to the notice of thinking people 
throughout the Island. T h e independence of Venezuela 
came in 1811, and that of Santo Domingo in 1821, both 
strongly stirring Porto R i c a n tendencies in the same d i -
rection. O u t of this feeling grew the conspiracies of 
1823 and 1824 for the independence of Porto Rico and 
Saint Thomas. 
The failure of a military eifort to seize the government 
in San J u a n in 183 5 resulted in the exile of Captain L o i -
zaga, and according to court records, 1,500 civilians were 
implicated in the aifair, several prominent leaders suf-
fered exile, and light penalties were visited on others i n -
volved. T h i s conspiracy marks the first definite move 
toward separation from Spain. This attempt was fol-
lowed in 1838 by a project of military rebellion in San 
Juan, resulting in the exile of several leaders and the 
death of others. 
I n 1864, an army captain was sent to Spain on suspicion 
of being the leader of a proposed insurrection, and in 
1867 the leader of a battalion of artillery was shot as 
guilty of another project of military insurrection, and 
others involved were exiled. I n 1868 came the insur-
rection' of Lares, the strongest armed protest up to that 
time. T h i s uprising was the result of the revolutionary 
activities of D r . Betances, who said of its participants: 
"No one knows the hardship, the anxiety and the dan-
gers which they underwent, the mourning endured nor the 
recognition deserved." Manuel Rojas, another leader, 
returned to his native land, Venezuela, where he died. 
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O u t of 479 prisoners of the insurrection, 79 died of 
yellow fever in the jails of Aguadil la and Arecibo, and 
the leaders caught were condemned to capital puni sh-
ment. A provisional government was constituted b y 
Francisco Ramirez , a Dominican, and several other 
prominent men, and a republic was declared w h i c h the 
present day "Independentistas" still recognize. 
I n 1873 came the uprising k n o w n as the "Estrel lada." 
This constituted an assault by the volunteer corps and 
the C i v i l Guard on the home of the Estrella fami ly in 
Camuy . I t is believed by some historians that this at -
tack was due to political intrigue, but it is nevertheless 
true that after the insurrection of Lares, Betances c o n -
tinued to spread revolutionary propaganda from Saint 
Thomas. Many who were imprisoned died, while almost 
all who were eventually liberated were mortally i l l . A c -
cording to the report of the mil itary police of Arrec ibo , 
10 C i v i l Guards and 11 civilian volunteers dispersed 
three hundred rebels, wi th three deaths, two wounded 
and sixteen taken prisoner. I t is the opinion of C o l l y 
Toste, that the C a m u y movement is of more importance 
than the Lares insurrection. 
I n 1874, arms were imported by Betances through 
Guánica , and in 1875 another insurrection would have 
occurred, except for betrayal on the part of one of the 
conspirators. T h e activity of certain secret societies, 
fourteen years later, became so strong that inquisitional 
measures were taken by the C i v i l G u a r d under the gov-
ernment of General Palacios, and a number of prominent 
men of the Autonomist Party were tortured. F r o m these 
extreme measures, this period became k n o w n as the reign 
of terror. A l l who were captured maintained that they 
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were innocent of participation in these societies, but ac-
cording to one writer Pedro Maria Descartes, a prisoner 
in " E l Morro" fortress in 1887 later confessed to h im 
that he was president of the secret society " L a Torre del 
Viejo." Records exist of the outrages which occurred 
in 1887 and on the wall of a vault in the Morro Castle, 
where captives were held, there is a bronze tablet giving 
the names of the most prominent prisoners. These men 
gained their liberty and lives through the prompt re-
moval of General Palacios. 
The Y a u c o Uprising in 1897 was the work of a n u m -
ber of prominent men from adjoining towns. The pris-
ons were filled with conspirators and several were ex-
patriated, but all connected with the uprising were freed 
eight months later by the establishment of the Autonomy. 
The invasion of American troops in 1898 was welcomed 
by the independence party, confident that Americans 
came to bring independence to the Island. Feliz Matos 
Bernier offered his services, with a number of men, to 
General Miles, and Pedro Maria Descartes, with a group 
of followers, aided the forces of Colonel Hullings. Be-
tances, however, warned that if the long-sought indepen-
dence were not secured at once, Porto Rico would remain 
forever an American colony. 
OPPOSING T H E A M E R I C A N R E G I M E 
"With the American occupation, the L iga de Patriotas 
Puertorr iqueños , founded by Eugenio Mariá de Hostos, 
raised the white flag, and requested a plebiscite, mani -
festing a desire for the independence of the Island. H o w -
ever, through lack of strong political leaders and the op-
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position of the United States, the ideal was set aside, re-
manifesting itself later in Porto R i c o in the Unionis t 
and Nationalist parties. Realizing that the league had 
failed of its purpose, de Hostos abandoned the Is land, 
joining his adherents in Santo Domingo, where he died. 
T h e first anti -American party organized was the 
Federal. Later it was dissolved to form a stronger party , 
the Unionist , under L u i s M u ñ o z R i v e r a , the desire for 
independence being expressed in the fifth plank of its 
platform. Luis M u ñ o z Rivera defended independence 
in various political campaigns and after his death in 1916 
the Unionist Party, presided over by Antonio Barcelo, 
continued to express its desire for independence unt i l 
February, 1922, when the following Declaration of P r i n -
ciples was substituted: 
"The foundation of a free country, master of her own 
destiny for the present and future, having always been 
the supreme ideal of this party, as of all worthy peoples 
throughout history, and as it is highly desirable for the 
best interests of the liberty of our country that there ex-
ist between Porto Rico and the United States of A m e r i c a 
a noble associaion of permanent and indestructible char-
acter, the advantages and fittingness of which can be seen 
from that already derived by both countries during their 
twenty-three years of association; and as such an as-
sociation would carry its good effects outside the ter-
ritorial limits of Porto R i c o and the Uni ted States, serv-
ing, as it would, to sustain many hopes and banish m a n y 
fears, it is resolved by the Unionist Party , here assembled, 
that there be created in Porto Rico a state, a nation or a 
community, which shall be free, associated w i t h the 
United States of America , this being the consummation 
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of the aspirations of Porto Ricans, which wi l l solve in an 
honorable, satisfactory and definite manner, a problem 
whose solution has been long pending as to what are to be 
the relations of these two nations." 2 
N A T I O N A L I S M A N D SOCIAL U N R E S T 
The Nationalist Party was formed in 1922 by men 
from the Unionist Party, disciples of M u ñ o z Rivera, who 
advocated complete independence and opposed the above 
declaration. Associations known as Nationalist Asso-
ciations joined in the formation of this new party, to-
gether wi th the Juventud Nationalista composed of stu-
dents in larger centers. These parties indicate that after 
a full generation of Americanization the ideal of inde-
pendence is stronger than it has ever been in Porto Rico . 
When Spain ruled the Island no party ever advocated 
more than a full and complete autonomy, but now there 
are two parties in the Island which have independence as 
vital planks in their platforms. 
What is the cause of this strong independence move-
ment after thirty-two years of "the benefits of American 
democracy"? Does it come from the "ingratitude" of 
a people who do not appreciate the good which the United 
States has brought, or is it confined to a small circle of 
idealists who might be found in any nation? Final ly , 
have the independence advocates a just cause or are their 
reasons based on unfounded complaints against the 
United States? Let us examine the program of the N a -
tionalist Par ty to see what their complaints are. T h i s 
party declared in 1922 and reaffirmed in 1930 the fol-
lowing program:3 
T h a t the People of Porto Rico should reassume the com-
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píete direction of the system of public instruction for the 
reason that the present plan is contrary to the natural 
ideals of Porto Rico and represents an endeavor to create 
a system of American patriotism ethnically and his-
torically inconsistent wi th Porto R i c a n traditions. 
T h a t Spanish should be the official language of Porto 
Rico and that the use of any other in the schools "is an at-
tack on Porto Rican personality and a belittling of our 
civilization." 
T h e greatest protest of the People of Porto R i c o is 
against the economic system which has grown up since 
American occupation. "We condemn," say the Nat ion-
alists, "the regime of exploitation to which Porto R i c o 
is subjected, by great absentee interests, individual and 
corporate, which have converted Porto Rico into an 
immense factory and its inhabitants into miserable peas-
ants. . . . W e maintain that wealth well distributed is the 
best guarantee of the happiness, prosperity, liberty and 
independence of the people, and for this reason we con-
demn the administration of public finance in Porto R i c o 
by the responsible parties in control of the government 
during the last 28 years, which has caused the disappear-
ance of more than 5,000 small land owners, and the con-
centration of wealth in the hands of a few, the majority 
of whom are foreigners. . . . We denounce the latifundia 
and we believe, considering the smallness of Porto R i c o , 
that the ownership of land by individuals or social or cor-
porate interests in excess of J00 acres is an evil wh ich re-
quiries immediate remedy and that for this reason . . . the 
members of the Nationalist Party wi l l concentrate their 
efforts to make the ownership of land in excess of 500 
acres as provided in the Organic L a w punishable. . . . 
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"We denounce absentee ownership as one of the great-
est evils w h i c h prey on the national wealth of Porto R i c o . 
. . . W e condemn the lack of consideration to which the 
sugar farmers are subjected by the sugar centrals, w h i c h 
by reason of the power w h i c h they exercise in the zones 
where their factories are established, impose unbearable 
conditions on the small farmers. . . . 
"We condemn the concession of franchises which give 
to the large interests the exclusive management and 
domination of railroads, water power and wharfage w i t h -
out bringing greater benefits to the treasury of the n a -
tion. . . . 
" W e are decided partisans of the nationalization of 
all public service enterprises. 
"We declare that banking institutions should be con-
ducted in the interest of the public good and never to 
dominate the commerce of the country for the benefit 
of a few. W e favor the development of a merchant m a -
rine able to compete w i t h decided advantages for the 
economy of the country w i th the existing lines of steam-
ships and passenger ships which unite us to the Uni ted 
States and to the Anti l les ." 
T h e Nationalist Par ty further declares for the de-
velopment of native factories to supply manufactured 
articles n o w brought f rom the United States; the estab-
lishment of a system of taxation which wi l l exempt the 
poor from contribution and place the burden on those 
with high incomes; the establishment of a scientific 
C i v i l Service System; the building of decent homes for 
workmen; the eight-hour day and the 44-hour week; 
state insurance for the protection of accident, old age, 
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and illness; compulsory arbitration in labor conflicts; 
and a maternity protection act. 
I t can be seen from the above program that the na-
tionalism of Porto Rico is founded principally upon dis-
satisfaction with the injustices done to the laborer and 
native farmer under the present economic system. 
It is not the Nationalist Party alone that is protesting 
against the latifundia and absentee ownership nor is it 
that party alone which is advocating independence. 
From 1904 to 1922 the Unionist Party which was con-
sistently the majority party had an independence plank 
in its platform. I n 1922 that platform was temporarily 
withdrawn but it has since been reincorporated as one of 
the desires of the party. A t a convention of the Par ty at 
Ponce, Porto Rico, as late as May 22, 1931, a declaration 
for absolute independence was adopted. The Republican, 
the only party which has ever consistently advocated 
statehood for Porto Rico, has been since 1904 such a small 
minority that it could never elect more than a very few of 
its candidates to the Porto Rican Legislature. A t the con-
vention of the Nationalist Party held in San Juan on A p r i l 
11, 1930, Sr. D . Antonio Barcelo, leader of the Unionist 
Party, who had been invited to address the convention, 
said: " I feel among you as i f I were in m y own house, be-
cause I am in the midst of those who sustain the ideal 
of independence of the fatherland above everything. I 
am one of you, I feel that I am one of you. I do not know 
where destiny wil l carry me, but wherever I go m y voice 
and m y soul will always support a nation free, sovereign 
and independent. . . . I prefer the liberty of my country 
before everything else. I prefer it although we die of 
hunger." 4 
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In the same convention, D r . Victor Gutierrez O r t i z , 
representing the All ianza Portorriqueña, the party which 
won the last election, said: " I have said that i f I were 
to decide for the future of my country, that i f I were 
called upon to point out the road for m y country to fol-
low and to determine its final status, I would vote for its 
independence because it is inborn in every conscientious 
man to desire above everything else the liberty of his 
homeland." 5 
This meeting closed wi th the following solemn oath, 
taken by all of the members of the convention: " W e 
solemnly swear that we wi l l defend the ideal of inde-
pendence and that we wi l l sacrifice our goods, and i f 
necessary our lives, for the independence of our coun-
try." 6 
The campaign for independence was put into full 
swing by this convention. A few weeks later a group of 
young men belonging to the Unionist Party made an ap-
peal to the country to defend the ideal of nationalism, 
and among their pleas they said: "We take advantage of 
this situation to appeal to the workers. Their coopera-
tion is absolutely necessary in any work of national recon-
struction and their problems require dispassionate study 
and a just solution. T h e absurd system of economic ex-
ploitation which the invader has imposed on our country 
by means of the tariff, the Coastwise Shipping Laws, the 
latifundia and absentee ownership, weighs directly on 
the working masses and condemns them to the indigence 
which exhausts their bodies and the servility which de-
grades their consciences." 7 
The Unionist and Nationalist Parties have not stood 
alone in their protests against the present economic sys-
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tem in Porto Rico. T h e great similarity of the language 
of the Socialist Party to that of the other parties, shows 
that the origins of Nationalist and Socialist are very 
closely allied; both spring from the common knowledge 
that one of the basic ills of the imperialist economic sys-
tem is to be found in the startling extent of absentee 
ownership. Senator Santiago Iglesias, leader of the So-
cialist Party which has grown from nothing in 1914 to 
where it holds just short of a majority in each House 
of the Insular Legislature, in 1930, sums up the reason 
for the growth of his party as follows: 
"The wrongs inflicted on Porto R i c o cannot be re-
moved by doles. These people do not want to be classed 
as 'beggars' or dependents by those who cruelly exploit 
them and who throw them a crumb. Unto ld wealth is 
taken from the Island by absentee landlords, who have i l -
legally seized the people's land and driven workers into 
the cities and towns, where tobacco and sugar barons 
pay them a pauper wage for uncertain employment. 
"Since the United States occupied Porto Rico, follow-
ing the Spanish-American W a r , the Island's exports 
and imports total $2,700,000,000. Two-thirds of this 
business and profits obtained by bankers, commerce and 
industries reach the Uni ted States, to be distributed and 
reinvested. This economic absorption together w i th i l -
legal land seizures, a wage rate of 40 to 60 cents a day 
and the refusal of powerful individuals and corporations 
to pay taxes, has brought every conceivable ill to this 
prostrate people." 8 
A B S E N T E E O W N E R S H I P AND N A T I O N A L I S M 
I f there is dissatisfaction in Porto R i c o today suffi-
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cient to justify the inclusion of an independence plank in 
the platform of the party which has gained every election 
from 1904 to 1928, it is because of the operations of ab-
sentee capital. I f we seek an explanation of the great 
growth of the Socialist Party , it lies in the program they 
offer in opposition to absentee-ownership. When we go 
still further and ask " W h y a strong Nationalist Party 
after a generation of Americanization?" the reason is 
two-fold: the conviction of a large number of Porto 
Ricans that the Unionist Party will not be aggressive 
enough in the campaign for independence, and the belief 
that the program of socialization preached by the So-
cialist Party wi l l never be possible as long as Porto Rico 
is subject to the United States, since "socialism without 
sovereignty is nothing more than a travesty of true so-
cialism." 9 
Nationalism in Porto R i c o today is mainly due to the 
realization that General Miles' promise that the Amer i -
cans had come "to bring you protection, not only to your-
selves but to your property, to promote prosperity, and 
to bestow upon you the immunities and blessings of the 
liberal institutions of our Government" has never been 
respected by the Government of the United States nor 
by the Insular Government set up by the United States 
Congress. T h e bars of the American flag have become to 
Porto Rico the symbol of an economic prison from which 
there is no escape by any constitutional means. H e r 
people are locked behind a system which has neither pro-
tected Porto R i c a n property, nor prosperity, but which 
is perpetuated by a constitution giving more protection 
to property than to life—a constitution which cannot 
be effecually attacked. 
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Porto Rico is small; its population is small. Compared 
with the United States it is weak, it is unarmed. How 
great is its anguish, may be judged from the words of 
the leader of the Nationalist Party when he said: " I f 
they do not hear us, i f they pay no attention to us, if they 
continue to maltreat us, then we must recur to arms, and 
I wish to remind you that a people which loves and knows 
how to defend its independence cannot be enslaved!" 10 
C H A P T E R X 
P O R T O R I C O T O D A Y 
"Only a scrupulously unselfish policy—inaugurated soon— 
on the part of the United States is likely to induce the Porto 
Rican people, as distinguished from their politicians, to remain 
loyal at heart to the United States."—Luis MUÑOZ MARÍN 
"We found the people of Porto Rico poor and distressed 
without hope for the future, ignorant, poverty-stricken, and 
diseased, not knowing what constituted a free and democratic 
government, and without the experience of having participated 
in any government. We have progressed in the relief of 
poverty and distress, in the eradication of disease, and have at-
tempted, with some success, to inculcate in the inhabitants the 
basic ideas of a free democratic government. . . . We have 
now progressed to the point where discouragement is replaced 
by hope, and while only 3 0 years ago one was indeed an opti-
mist to see anything promising in Porto Rico, to-day one is in-
deed a pessimist who can see any reasonable human ambition 
beyond the horizon of its people."—CALVIN COOLIDGE (1928) 
AFTER thirty-two years of American occupation, what 
is a fair judgment of conditions in Porto Rico? T h i s 
question, like all others, can be answered in more than one 
way, but anyone who wishes to face the truth of the 
situation must recognize that the progress made in cer-
tain lines has been astounding. N o country ever started 
nearer the bottom than Porto Rico did and few, i f any, 
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have ever set about cl imbing in any more determined 
manner. N o praise is too flattering to the men who have 
contributed to the growth of the Island, and yet they 
have struggled against odds that were too great. T h e 
problems that still face them are the ones that faced them 
a generation ago. L e t us review the progress that has 
been made and see what is yet to be done. 
E C O N O M I C PROGRESS 
A m o n g the most prominent changes that have oc-
curred are those in the realm of economics. W e have 
seen that fruit growing sprang from nothing in 1898 to 
occupy the third place in value of the agricultural ex-
ports in recent years. I t promises to make even greater 
progress in the future. This crop is more nearly domi-
nated by local men than any other important agricul-
tural industry, but still the percentage of absentee own-
ership is large, and w i l l probably increase. I t should 
not be inferred, however, that native Porto Ricans are 
not active in this field. Some of the larger fruit estates 
are owned and managed by Porto Ricans . 
Tobacco has likewise experienced a phenomenal 
growth. About one per cent of the cultivated area was 
in tobacco in 1898 and today the percentage is more than 
five. I n value the increase has been even greater, cigars 
gaining more than ten times in value and other classes of 
tobacco as much as 20 times. T o d a y it is the second i n -
dustry in importance, being surpassed only by sugar. 
T h e sugar industry has grown from a secondary i n -
dustry to occupy a preeminent place in the country's 
economic life. I t furnishes more than half of the ex-
ports and at least half, i f not more, of the wealth is due 
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to this one business alone. Occupying but 15 per cent 
of the cultivated area at the time of American occupa-
tion, it today claims more than 44 per cent of all the land 
in cultivation. The entire crop was slightly more than 
72,000 tons in 1898 and in 1930 amounted to more than 
860,000 tons. T h e science of cultivation improved along 
with the acreage as is shown in the fact that during this 
period the acreage increased less than four times while 
the tonnage reached an amount some 12 times greatej^O; 
than its total in 1898. / • ^ l ^ ^ ' V 
Other industries have likewise shown amazing prog5 íjCifl ®] 
ress. T h e needlework industry, famous for its quality^, ' ^ A / 
but not for its quantity in 1898, reversed this and by 1929 
showed an export trade of approximately $15,000,000. 
T h e total export trade, made up in the main of the four 
industries just named, grew from less than $5,000,000 
gold in the last year before American occupation to more 
than $100,000,000 in 1928. The apparent trade balance 
has been in favor of Porto Rican products almost con-
tinuously in the last 32 years, becoming adverse only 
when some unusual upset like the hurricane of 1928 
struck the Island. 
T H E F I C T I T I O U S F A V O R A B L E T R A D E B A L A N C E 
But this favorable trade balance has long been pro-
claimed the "joker in the deck" by the Islanders. N o r 
have Porto Ricans been mistaken in their judgment of 
this seeming advantage. I n 1928 the apparent excess in 
favor of the Island was more than $14,000,000. T h i s 
includes the excess of exports over imports, gifts and con-
tributions to the Island, Federal expenditures and adver-
tising. T h a t this was a false balance may be seen, never-
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theless, in casting up the items resulting in a net outgo 
from Porto Rico. Freight payments to steamship com-
panies and marine insurance, commissions collected by 
outside houses, remittances to Porto Ricans abroad, tour-
ist expenses, other types of insurance, motion picture 
royalties, lottery tickets bought in the lotteries of Spain, 
Santo Domingo and other nations, interest, dividends, 
rents and miscellaneous items amounted to more than 
$25,000,000, leaving a net deficiency for all trade and 
service operations of something over $10,000,000. What 
customarily seems to be a permanent net income for the 
Island is really a net outgo.1 
H o w is this net deficiency met? I n the same year Porto 
R i c a n holdings abroad in outside government obligations, 
corporation securities, real estate, mortgages, deposits in 
foreign banks and commercial credits all decreased by 
several million dollars and these, taken with the increases 
in loans from abroad, outside holdings of securities is-
sued by the Insular and Municipal governments, increased 
mortgages held by absentees, and additional real estate 
passing into the hands of outsiders were used to balance 
the deficit.2 I n other words each year shows a net deficit 
of several million dollars which has been met so far by 
handing over Porto R i c o , bit by bit, to the absentee. 
O n e prominent Porto Rican writer has likened this 
favorable trade balance to a burglarized house, where the 
exports exceed the imports,3 and the feeling of Porto 
Ricans is well expressed in the words of the same author 
who speaks of the income of the leading American sugar 
companies and says: "Profit has been known to surpass 
100 per cent per annum, and a very large share of it leaves 
the Island never to return. T h a t is the secret glory of 
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the colonialists. A n d even this ghastly spectacle of 
wealth drained from a starving population into the r i c h -
est country on earth is sanctimoniously entitled in the 
official reports ' A Favorable Trade Balance.' " 4 
W E A L T H A N D R E V E N U E S 
It is only natural that the total wealth should have 
grown in keeping with progress in the chief industries. I n 
1898 the entire wealth was at no time estimated at more 
than $100,000,000, whereas a recent reliable report placed 
the total at $650,000,000. 
O f interest also, and complimentary to the people of 
Porto Rico , is the amount of revenue the government re-
ceives from the total wealth. Previous to 1898 this re-
venue was something less than 8,000,000 pesos (about 
$5,000,000 gold) a year for Insular, Provincial and M u -
nicipal Governments. T h e Insular revenue was less than 
4,000,000 pesos (around $2,500,000 gold) yearly. W e 
have already observed that almost one-half of the I n s u -
lar revenue was used for the expenses of the Colonial 
Ministry and the Departments of W a r and N a v y and that 
such very necessary items as education and health were 
insignificant. Nothing could be more complete than the 
reversal in the use of public money in the last generation. 
I n 1898 about 6 per cent was used for sanitation and 
health, whereas in 1928 some 11.34 per cent was so used. 
I n the field of education the disparity is even greater. 
About 4 1/2 per cent of the revenues were spent for edu-
cation in the last year of Spanish rule and in 1928 educa-
tion claimed 38.81 per cent of the operating expense of 
the Insular Government. Nothing could more eloquently 
express the interest of the Porto Ricans in progress than 
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this expenditure for public education. N o r are these 
expenditures such a burden on the people today as they 
formerly were. T h e revenues collected in 1898 repre-
sented about one-twelfth of the insular wealth, but in 
1928 the total revenue of both Insular and Municipal 
Governments was only one-seventeenth. 
S O C I A L A N D E D U C A T I O N A L PROGRESS 
L e t us turn now to what social improvements have been 
made w i t h this vast new wealth and revenue. N o t the least 
of these improvements has come in the realm of road 
building. I t has already been pointed out that Porto 
Rico possessed 275 kilometres of unexcelled hard-surface 
roads. T h i s proved to be wholly insufficient, however, 
and most of the roads were full of m u d holes "where oxen 
have fallen in and perished." 5 There are few countries 
which can match the road building achievements of the 
Porto Ricans in the last generation. Unaided they have 
built more than 1,500 kilometres of hard-surface roads 
in regions which would defy a mountain goat. This 
class of roads has increased more than five times and is 
now something like 1,800 kilometres (about 1,200 miles) . 
I n addition, there are hundreds of miles of graded roads 
quite passable for automobiles even in rainy weather. 
Public health, too, has engaged the interest of Porto R i -
can statesmen. Attention has just been called to the 
expenditures, equal to more than 11 per cent of the 
budget, for this purpose. A s a result, the death rate was 
lowered from an average of 3 0 per thousand for the period 
from 1888 to 1898 to about 23 per thousand for the ten 
year period ending wi th 1930. 
But it is in the field of education that we find the most 
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decided progress and the greatest efforts. I t has just been 
shown that the expenditures increased to where they claim 
more than 3 8 per cent of the Insular budget. T h a t such 
efforts have not been in vain may be seen from a few 
facts concerning the remarkable progress made in this 
field. Illiteracy has decreased from around 80 per cent 
to something less than 50. The number of schools i n -
creased from 560 G to 2,23 8. T h e total registration of 
pupils was less than 30,000 in 1898 and by 1929 had i n -
creased to 230,000. Some seven times as many teachers 
are giving instruction today as in 1898.7 A t the top of 
the system is a well-organized university with Colleges 
of Liberal Arts , Education, L a w , Pharmacy, Business 
Administration, Agriculture, and Engineering. There is 
also a School of Tropical Medicine sponsored by Columbia 
University. The budget of the University alone is more 
than three times the amount spent on all education a 
generation ago. Indeed, the educational progress of 
Porto R i c o under American rule has been such as to make 
Americans proud of their share in it. 
T H E S H A R E O F T H E U N I T E D STATES I N PORTO RICO'S 
PROGRESS 
But what is the American share in Porto Rican prog-
ress? There are some who point to every forward step 
as the work of the United States. Let us look at the con-
tributions we have made to the building of roads, schools 
and better health conditions. 
Hundreds of American teachers have gone to Porto 
Rico to teach English, but they were paid with Porto 
Rican dollars. None of this came out of the public purse 
of the Uni ted States. T h e i r salaries, along with the other 
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expense attached to Engl ish instruction, have been a 
crushing burden on the slender resources of the Island. 
Why spend millions of dollars to teach English to people 
who were 80 per cent illiterate, in preference to teaching 
them their own language? W h y teach them Engl i sh 
when the majority live and die within twenty miles of the 
ocean and never see it? W h y teach them English when 
they are ragged, hungry, unskilled and might better have 
learned a trade or been taught something of scientific 
agriculture? The last thing that the Porto Rican masses 
needed was English. T h e last financial burden the I n -
sular budget should have had imposed on it was the m i l -
lions that have been spent teaching this language which is 
so utterly useless to the majority. A n d to the teaching of 
English the American Government has never contributed 
one penny. O n l y to the College of Agriculture have we 
given financial assistance. The progress made in Insular 
education is something of which to be proud, but A m e r -
icans can have small share in this pride. Almost our sole 
contribution has been the unnecessary and almost useless 
financial outlay imposed on the people of Porto Rico to 
learn a foreign language before they knew how to earn 
a decent living. But in spite of the burden placed on the 
Insular and Municipal Governments for education there 
are almost 300,000 children for whom there are no school 
facilities.8 
T h e cold facts of the case are that the United States 
Government has never interested itself in the educational 
problem. Once Congress had given Porto Rico a form 
of government, a less liberal form of government than it 
had in 1898, it followed its customary course of forget-
ting. T h e struggle to educate the people would have been 
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difficult enough with help and without obstacles; it has 
been impossible without help and wi th obstacles. 
I n the field of public health we have been equally as 
liberal. Outside of a meager amount of work carried on 
by the A r m y , there has never been any serious effort to 
stamp out the atrocious health conditions described in the 
first chapter of this book. Conditions today can be 
depicted in just about the same language as in 1898. 
Diphtheria has been increasing constantly since 1915, 
while in the United States it has decreased 9 5 per cent since 
1900. Typhoid tells a similar story. T h e last 30 years 
have seen the death rate from this cause fall from 34 to 
4.9 per thousand in the United States, whereas it has 
grown steadily in Porto Rico and in 1928 reached the 
"highest rate of mortality recorded," 24.76 per thousand.9 
The death rate from tuberculosis is likewise growing 
from year to year. Between 1915 and 1928 it went from 
175 per thousand to more than 237, and in the latter year 
caused 12 per cent of all deaths.10 Since 1900 the same 
disease has dropped from a mortality rate of 194 per 
thousand to 79 per thousand in the Uni ted States. T h e 
dreaded hook-worm disease has still the preferred place 
among the causes of sickness, and though thousands are 
cured each year the poor cannot afford the necessary shoes 
to protect them from re-infection. 
When v e come to our participation in road building we 
find a record wholly devoid of anything to which the 
continental American can point wi th his accustomed 
pride. I f no one had done more to improve roads than 
the Government of the United States, the roads "where 
oxen have fallen in and perished" would still exist as they 
were, except for the possible deepening of the holes. U p 
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to the hurricane of 1928, the Uni ted States Government 
had "never contributed one cent for road building in 
Porto R i c o . " 11 A l l of the more than 1,200 miles of h a r d -
surface roads have been built by Porto Rican initiative 
and w i th Porto R i c a n money. Congress recently took its 
first step to help in this work when it appropriated $1,-
000,000 for repairing roads damaged by the hurricane 
and to asphalt roads previously macadamized. There 
are sections of the country which are still poorly de-
veloped for lack of roads, but none of the Federal aid 
given to the States for road building applies to Porto 
Rico. I n this problem, as in others, the Island is fighting 
her battles alone. 
P E N E T R A T I O N O F F O R E I G N C A P I T A L 
But where the American Government has been neglec-
ful , American capital has not. I n every branch of Porto 
Rican business, American corporations have steadily ab-
sorbed the interest once belonging to Spaniards or natives. 
T h e sugar industry, tobacco manufacturing, fruit grow-
ing, banks, railroads, public utilities, steamship lines and 
many lesser businesses are partially or completely dom-
inated by outside capital. 
I n the discussion of the sugar industry we have seen 
how thoroughly this penetration has taken place. T h e 
growing of sugar has come to be the most important i n -
dustry of the Island, and is responsible for more than half 
the total wealth. Approximately 60 per cent of the crop 
is ground by American and other absentee companies. 
Sugar cane growing has absorbed about all of the fertile 
valley land, and the absentee companies dominate the 
four chief sugar cane sections. More than 100,000 acres 
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of the most fertile soil are the property of men who sel-
dom or never see the Island and who have no interest in 
it except to make it pay dividends. 
T h e assets of four of the principal companies, all A m e r -
ican companies owned by men who for the most part 
dwell outside Porto Rico , were more than $63,000,000 
in 1928. These properties have paid dividends over long 
periods sufficient to replace their original investment 
many times over. F r o m 10 to 3 0 per cent per annum is 
the rule and dividends exceeding 100 per cent a year have 
been k n o w n . 
E V A S I O N O F T A X A T I O N 
A n examination of the taxes paid on their holdings 
show them to be at most half and sometimes not even one-
fourth of the true value. I f the value of all the sugar 
land in Porto Rico were set in the usual way, by counting 
each acre of land as worth $ 10 for each ton of sugar cane 
produced, the total would have been something like 
$75,000,000 in 1930. T h e assessment is some $45,000,-
000. I f we capitalize the net income of some of the chief 
sugar companies at 10 per cent we find that they are not 
paying taxes on even half their full value. I n 1928, the 
Aguirre Sugar Company was assessed at less than $4,500,-
000 and its net income capitalized at 10 per cent was more 
than $27,000,000! T h i s is only an example of the general 
under-assessment of vested interests. H i g h profits and 
low assessments have not inspired these companies to be 
liberal w i t h Porto R i c o or the Porto Ricans. T h e colono, 
the farmer who grows cane, is receiving his substance 
from the little end of the funnel. H e gets less than 65 
per cent of the sugar from his cane, but has to pay ap-
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proximately 80 to 89 per cent of the cost of production. 
T h e cost of financing his crop, the low return he receives, 
the disadvantage in which he finds himself compared 
with the owners of the sugar manufacturing Centrals 
is tending to drive h im out of his farm and make of him a 
day laborer. T h e result is that his land is passing into the 
hands of a few large corporations in opposition to the 
Organic L a w of Porto Rico which forbids corporate 
ownership of land in excess of 500 acres. T h e Congress 
of the United States which passed this provision and 
placed it in the Organic L a w of Porto Rico has never 
bothered to make it effective. T h e men who own the 
sugar companies control both the Bureau of Insular A f -
fairs and the Legislature of Porto R ico , as was shown in 
the chapter on the sugar industry. 
T H E P R O F I T T O T H E A B S E N T E E 
T h e effect of this land concentration has been disas-
trous to agricultural economy. W h i l e sugar acreage was 
increasing almost four times, crops devoted to food were 
declining to about two-thirds their former acreage. The 
result is that Porto Rico has only one acre of food crops 
today for every 15 people, whereas only 30 years ago she 
had an acre for every six people. T h e growth of the sugar 
industry has no doubt given the country a money crop 
of great value, but it is money in which the Islanders 
share in only a limited way. T h e colono does not receive 
his portion of the sugar, the Government does not collect 
its just share of the profits, and finally the Porto Rican 
laborer is not paid a decent l iving wage. Af ter 3 0 years 
of sugar economy, during which time millions have been 
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made from Porto Rican soil, Porto Rico is facing the fact 
that sugar has not paid. 
Though to a lesser degree, because the volume of busi-
ness is smaller, the same thing is true of other industries. 
Tobacco may have paid the grower a little better return, 
but it is the absentee capitalist who has made the real 
profit. T h e laborer in the tobacco field and the tobacco 
factory receives a miserable wage which it just at the 
subsistence level. T h e machine has driven the men out 
and most of the work is done by women and girls who 
have thus had to become the support of men who have 
no work to do. 
T h e case of fruit is somewhat different. This crop is 
owned more largely by residents who live on the land and 
market their own product. Sugar and tobacco have paid 
the manufacturer; fruit has paid the owner; but none 
of them has paid the laborer! H e receives a little better 
wage on the fruit farm but seldom does this exceed $200 
a year—not even one-tenth the average annual income 
of his fellow citizen of the Continental United States! 
N o r is this monopolization confined to the agricultural 
products. I t is carried into every branch of business. 
Practically every mile of public carrier railroad in the I s -
land belongs to two companies—the Ponce and Guayama 
and the American Railroad Company, which are largely 
absentee owned. M u c h more than half and probably 
more than two-thirds of all the private roads carrying 
cane are the property of the absentee sugar companies 
The public utility service is likewise the property oJ 
those who for the main part live outside Porto R i c o 
E v e r y trolley ride taken by a Porto R i c a n pays a tributi 
to a foreign owner, and about half the towns depen< 
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on absentee companies for their lights and power, and 
more than half the telephone calls go over wires owned 
by outsiders. Everyth ing marketed comes from abroad. 
I f there are places in the world more dependent on 
absentees, they surely buy 100 per cent of what they 
have from others. Anyth ing short of this wil l not equal 
Porto Rico . 
W h a t is the effect of this utter dependence on the ab-
sentee has already been told. I n the first place, every-
thing is brought in a highly protected market. Porto 
Rico has two choices: she can buy from the United States 
and pay no duty or she can buy in foreign markets and 
pay the same duty placed on these goods when they enter 
the Uni ted States. I n some cases both these things are 
done since inadequate shipping lines compel Porto R i c a n 
merchants to buy from American jobbers merchandise 
previously bought from abroad. But the result is the 
same to the Island consumer: he is buying in the dearest 
market in the world, or he pays such a high tariff that the 
resulting price is many times what it would otherwise be. 
The price of rice, his chief food, is more than doubled. 
Beans, potatoes, bread—in fact everything he eats—cost 
him twice what they would in the cheapest market. A n d 
this same tariff, while apparently protecting him, is ren-
dering h im every day more subservient to the absentee 
interests. 
LABOR A N D L I V I N G CONDITIONS 
T h e native is forced to work for a wage far below his 
needs. T h e unemployment situation, like that of many 
other countries, is a temporary problem that has become 
permanent. Starting in 1899 with only 17 per cent ym-
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employed, Porto Rico has made such startling progress in 
this line that she had 36 per cent unemployed i n 1929. 
What is more natural than that the American business 
firms controlling industry should have taken advantage 
of this condition to keep wages down? I t is just good 
business! B u t this good business for the owner has driven 
the wage down to where the day laborer is compelled to 
work 3 3 days to supply himself with rice today, as against 
25 in 1898. H e spends more than 20 days for flour now, 
whereas only 10 were formerly necessary, and for his dry 
vegetables the number of days work rose from three and 
a half to more than 13. Altogether he must today spend 
104 days working to buy imported foods that once cost 
him only 70 days work! 
W e have also seen that the Porto R i c a n must spend a 
much larger portion of his income for food than the 
worker in the United States. H e even uses more of his 
income for food than the Oriental laborer does, about 
94 per cent being so spent, as compared with only 90 per 
cent in the F a r East. A n d what seems more incredible, 
he pays in actual money more for the same foods than the 
N e w Y o r k C i t y laborer! B y actual test 17 articles com-
prising 65 per cent of the food used by the Porto R i c a n 
jibaro cost from eight to 14 per cent more than the same 
articles in N e w Y o r k C i t y . W h a t can be the standard 
of l iving of a laborer who earns 80 cents a day and must 
pay more for food than the man who earns from $4.00 
to $10.00? There is no need to answer this question again. 
His l iv ing conditions, his food, his diseases and his death 
rate, twice that of the Uni ted States, are sufficiently elo-
quent testimony. 
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W H Y T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S HAS F A I L E D I N P O R T O R I C O 
W h a t is the real reason for such conditions a genera-
tion after the United States annexed Porto Rico "to give 
. . . the advantages and blessings of enlightened c iv i l i -
zation"? H a v e we designedly and maliciously consigned 
this small portion of our empire to an economic prison? 
T o what extent are the conditions the fault of the U n i t e d 
States, and to what extent are they inherited evils of i m -
perialism not yet eradicated, but soon to succumb to our 
benevolent Government? Natural ly those who attempt 
to answer these questions wi l l arrive at different answers. 
The average Continental American wi l l immediately say 
that Porto Rico's troubles are vestiges of the evil and 
incompetent Spanish regime. The patriotic Porto R i c a n 
nationalist believes just as firmly that the breeze w h i c h 
unfurled the stars and stripes was an evil breath which has 
since that time cursed the Island. Neither of these opin-
ions can be entirely correct. Not everything in Porto 
Rico in 1898 was bad nor was it all good; not everything 
today is wholly good, nor yet all bad. B u t for some rea-
son the distress of Porto R i c o augments instead of d imin-
ishing. Is it possible to say why? 
Porto Rico's troubles, like all similar ones, had their 
beginnings centuries ago. The motives for settlement 
and colonization lay in that exaggerated mercantilism 
which pervaded the economic thought of the time. A s 
has been said time and again, colonies were for profit. 
Spain, like her contemporaries, never considered the best 
interests of her colonies where these were not the best 
interests of Spain. There is no wish to throw any more 
stones at the unjustly maligned Spanish Colonial Pol icy; 
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but the inevitable conclusion is that Porto Rico was a 
sadly neglected little Island during most of its existence. 
The same statement can be made of Martinique, belonging 
to France, or of Jamaica, belonging to England. T h i s 
neglect kept Porto R i c o in bad condition, and it was in 
such condition when it fell into the wil l ing lap of U n c l e 
Sam. W h y it is still in about the same condition is a ques-
tion that should be of interest to every American and a 
true answer might do something to rectify our present 
policy of "muddling along" with our possessions. 
Primari ly , there is the fact that there is much room for 
difference about what Americans of thirty years and more 
ago meant by "enlightened civilization." There was a 
sublime faith in "American institutions" which was never 
adequately clarified. Go ing into Porto Rico with such 
a promise did not carry m u c h that was definite in the way 
of economic and social responsibility. T h e promise was 
meant to express a determination to grant political rights 
to which the Porto Ricans had been strangers until a short 
time before. These political rights were to solve all the 
troubles of the Island just as, it was taken for granted, 
they had solved those of Continental United States. Polit-
ical rights were the one and only remedy which American 
civilization had to offer for all problems. A n d from this 
conception of our mission came a multiplication of trou-
bles for us and for Porto Rico. W e have never met the 
problem face to face and decided which road leads to a 
solution. T h e injunction of President McKinley to the 
first governor to "prepare them for statehood as rapidly 
as possible" was in the mind of the Uni ted States the only 
solution needed. Once they had statehood they would 
automatically become a 49th section of paradise! 
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Fai l ing to concieve the problem in its true magnitude, 
there was never any extensive effort to find out just what 
was needed. There was no diagnosis. W e had a remedy 
which we intended to apply, and apply it we did without 
finding out in advance whether it were applicable, and 
without going back to the patient to see how it had suc-
ceeded. I t is significant that thirty years elapsed after 
American possession before a real effort was made to pre-
scribe remedies that applied to specific ills, and that effort 
was made by a private research institution, not b y the 
Government itself. Officially, the Un i t ed States has been 
doctoring its patient for thirty-two years without count-
ing the pulse or taking the temperature. T h e first reason 
we can assign, then, for American failure to remedy bad 
conditions is the failure to diagnose the trouble and to 
meet the issue squarely once the trouble was known. 
T h e second is a peculiar mixture of "laissez-faire" and 
mercantilism of the twentieth century type. W e are great 
worshippers of "give business a free re in" and of "rugged 
individualism." W e seem to believe honestly that all a 
man needs is a chance, to become a president or a H e n r y 
Ford, regardless of the fact that we have only one presi-
dent at a time and only one H e n r y F o r d . While hundreds 
of millions live long lives without aspiring to the presi-
dency, or live on the border line of want , we continue to 
believe in this doctrine. I t was this "give Porto R i c o a 
chance" spirit which went into half of the mixture spoken 
of above. T h e other half was our present day type of 
mercantilism. N o t fu l l regulation, but partial. W e 
formed a government which was supposedly a wise com-
pound of Island and American officials. T h e tariff laws 
were made to apply to Porto Rico, but many other ques-
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tions, including the application of the constitution were 
left undecided. A provision was put into the Organic 
L a w saying that no corporation was to hold more than 
500 acres of land, but Congress never made any move to 
enforce it. Today it stands as a barrier to legal owner-
ship of more than this amount and at the same time 
serves to allow corporations to mask their real holdings 
and dodge taxation. T h i s is just one case of Congressional 
dealings w i th Porto R ico , alternately paternal and for-
getful. I t was decided that Porto Rico should enjoy the 
"advantage" of the Coastwise Shipping Laws, but it has 
never been decided what body shall see to their proper 
enforcement as regards Porto Rico. T o d a y the shipping 
lines serving Porto R i c o are not subject to laws of Porto 
Rico nor are they under the jurisdiction of any Federal 
body. 
Again there is the problem, often discussed and easy 
to over-emphasize, of incompatibility of race and differ-
ence of values. Let us look at the subject broached above 
of what was promised to Porto Rico when "enlightened 
civilization" was offered. Obviously, judging from the 
last 32 years this was wholly political in nature. Y e t 
the bitterest complaint against us today is not on political 
grounds; nor are the main problems political. I t is the 
economic and social condition which draws the shafts of 
critics, and these are the ones most in need of solving. 
When President Coolidge said that we had never made 
a promise that had not been more than fulfilled, he spoke 
of political promises. T h e difference is even more strange 
because the Porto R i c a n is normally more politically i n -
clined than the Amer ican and more political than eco-
nomic. T h e two nations began by misunderstanding the 
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first message from the United States. T h i s is true in doz-
ens of cases: in the case of the schools, only two sets of 
figures are necessary to prove to the American that edu-
cation is an enormous success in Porto Rico—the number 
of pupils in 1898 and in 1931. B u t these prove nothing 
to the Porto Rican mind . I f all the new teachers and 
new buildings have turned out no men like D e Hostos 
and M u ñ o z Rivera, then what of it? T h e Porto R i c a n 
is no number worshipper. His sense of values is not the 
same. I t has been pointed out that what is progress to 
one is stagnation to the other—terms used are not inter-
changeable. T h e Amer ican points to the great growth 
of trade and the increase in wealth, but the Porto R i c a n 
says that all this means nothing to the illiterate, hook-
worm-infested jibaro. T h e third failure, and this is 
equally a Porto R i c a n and an Amer ican failure, is that of 
finding a common ground of agreement. 
Probably this is all caused by the inability of our sys-
tem of Government to adjust itself rapidly to an unlooked 
for situation. Too bulky to be moved suddenly, it found 
itself whol ly at a loss when several colonial problems, not 
contemplated by the Constitutional Fathers, were pre-
sented. T h e only previous experience pointed to all t e r r i -
tory as potential states, and this is the category into w h i c h 
Porto R i c o definitely did not fit. B u t the A m e r i c a n 
Government did not recognize this. T h e mold was made 
and Porto Rico was poured in. N o account was taken of 
the fact that Porto R i c o was a pretty well set ent i ty a l -
ready, and that it would not be remolded over night to 
fit snugly into even such a melting pot as the U n i t e d 
States. A n d yet, unt i l Porto Rico did become assimilated, 
it was to be a sort of legitimate ground for " A m e r i c a n 
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interests." I t was definitely not American but "foreign" 
until the time for statehood arrived. T h a t such was the 
case is wel l illustrated in the words of the Congressman 
cited in the discussion of tariff who considered Amer ican 
interests to be "American investments." The American 
system has no room for territory that is not a state; there 
is always a very distinct line between any such territory 
and the Uni ted States proper, and Porto Rico is on the 
other side of the line. H e r best interest can no more be 
considered by the United States than by Spain. A s long 
as there are Continental Americans owning millions of 
dollars in property in Porto Rico, "Porto Rico" and 
"American investments" wil l have an indistinguishable 
sound to the ears of Amer ican rulers. This is simply a 
statement of a human fact which has, does and probably 
wi l l continue to make Porto Rico an unassimilated part 
of the Amer ican system. U n t i l human nature undergoes 
a radical change, it w i l l be impossible for the United 
States to consider the problems of Porto Rico unselfishly. 
T h e fourth reason for American failure is our inability 
to consider the problems of Porto R i c o as the Island sees 
them and to do, in the large way which we could, what 
Porto R i c o would do for herself. 
A n d have we not found the fundamental difficulty 
with any type of foreign rule? Is this not the problem 
of all imperialism, whether benevolent or not? A r e we 
to look back over the colonial history of France, England, 
Spain and United States and pronounce their failures 
due to deliberate mistreatment of their subjects, or are 
we to recognize them as due to the common human failure 
of selfishness? England lost the United States and finally 
came to the knowledge that she could not hold even her 
220 P O R T O R I C O : A B R O K E N P L E D G E 
English-speaking offspring i f she did not give them the 
ful l right to make their own mistakes. Spain never learned 
this—her colonies were all lost eventually. Is any type 
of government sufficiently flexible and unselfish to be 
"colonial"? T h e problem of the Uni ted States in Porto 
Rico , in the opinion of the authors, resolves itself into 
one question: can we govern the Island for its o w n best 
interests? A s long as the United States Government has 
the ultimate word in policies, the Is land wil l be governed 
for the good of those interests considered "American ." 
Porto R i c o is at once the perfect example of what eco-
nomic imperialism does for a country and of the attitude 
of the imperialist towards that country. Ragged, hun-
gry, diseased and dispossessed Porto Rico has just been 
examined by the President of the Uni ted States and has 
been given his official approval. Its land owned b y ab-
sentee capital; its political rights resting in the hands of 
the Uni ted States Government; its people in the depths 
of deprivation, it has been told to help itself. T h a t is 
the "remedy" which the President prescribes—imperial-
ism's answer to problems of its own creation! N o solution 
further than a policy followed for the last thirty-three 
years—a policy which has not solved Porto Rico's prob-
lems. Porto Rico can hope for no relief under the exist-
ing system. This is wel l proved in the fact that the Presi-
dent of the United States visited Porto Rico and "saw that 
it was good." 
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29 (Page 51). Ibid., p. 60. 
30 (Page 51). Ibid., p. 51. 
31 (Page 52). Clark, op. ctt., p. 418, shows the total to be $650,000,-
000. 
32 (Page 52). Governor's Report, 1929, shows total assessment $344,-
865,104. 
33 (Page 52). Ibid., p. 235. 
34 (Page 52). Information furnished by Treasurer of Porto Rico. 
35 (Page 52). Manual of Sugar Companies, 1930, Farr and Company, 
p. 67. 
36 (Page 52). Ibid., p. 28. 
37 (Page 52). Ibid., 1930, Farr and Company, p. 9. 
p. 9. 
38 (Page 52). Clark, op. cit., p. 643. 
39 (Page 52). Information furnished by Treasurer of Porto Rico. 
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40 (Page 52). Manual of Sugar Companies, 1929, Farr and Company, 
p. 67. 
41 (Page Í3 ) . Governor's Report, 1928. The total agricultura! ex-
ports of Porto Rico in 1928 were about $80,000,000 and of this $54,000,-
000 was sugar. The total worth of sugar in 1928 was about $67,000,000. 
42 (Page 53). Governor's Report, 1929, p. 237. 
43 (Page 53). Clark, op. cit., p. 631, shows that 8.5 tons of cane were 
needed to make a ton of sugar and the Informe del Comisionado de Agri-
cultura y Trabajo for 1928, p. 7, shows that Aguirre produced 6.57 tons 
of sugar to the acre. 
44 (Page 54). Governor's Report, 1929, p. 236. 
45 (Page 54). Ibid. 
46 (Page 54). Ibid., p. 7. Translated from the Spanish version. 
47 (Page 54). Clark, op. cit., p. 630. 
48 (Page 55). This and most of the succeeding information on assess-
ment of sugar companies was obtained from Mr. Rafael de J . Cordero. 
Central Aguirre—3928 
Market value of stock $24,120,000 
Tax-exempt intangibles 4,719,932 
Government bonds $118,533 
Domestic corporations stocks and bonds 1,677,886 
Mortgages owned* 216,469 
Money loaned" 60,517 
Notes receivable* 2,646,537 
Taxable market value of capital stock 19,400,068 
Plus surplus and sinking fund 112,306 
Total taxable capital value 19,512,374 
Actual valuation for assessment 3,421,540 
Difference between actual assessment and possible value $16,090,8 34 
* It is doubtful whether these items should be deducted. 
49 (Page 56). Ibid. 
Actual 
Assessment Based Possible Assessment 
on Physical Assets Based on Capital" Difference 
1920 $3,051,230 $6,306,224 $3,254,994 
1922 2,991,050 5,853,589 2,862,539 
* Capital stock taken at par. 
50 (Page 56). Ibid. 
Assessments for 1919-1928 
Basis for Revised 
Year Vinal Assessment Pinal Assessment Down by Board} 
1919 $1,971,520 Physical assets Yes 
1920 3,051,230* " " No 
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1921 4,271,797 Capital value Yes 
1922 2,991,050* Physical assets No 
1923 5,878,710 Capital value No 
1924 3,986,110 Capital value No 
1925 3,000,000t " " Yes 
1926 3,600,000t " " Yes 
1927 3,832,250 Physical assets No 
1928 3,421,540t " " No 
* Capital value would have been more advantageous for Treasury as a 
basis of assessment. 
f Valuations brought down by Board of Review to par value of stock. 
Corporation reported surplus for 1924 was $873,547. 
51 (Page 57). Ibid. 
52 (Page 57). Manual of Sugar Companies, 1929, Farr and Company, 
p. 9. 
53 (Page 58). From report prepared by Mr. Cordero. 
The following table shows the actual assessments from 1920 to 1925, 
as compared with physical value and capital value: (55). 
final Valuation 
Year Capital Value Physical Value for Assessment 
1920 $5,546,816 $2,355,696 $2,563,377" 
1921 9,575,170 2,140,130 3,129,910* 
1922 3,942,165 2,263,860 2,263,860-f 
1923 6,871,800 2,845,640 6,871,800 
1924 7,051,420 2,397,930 7,051,420 
1925 7,207,710 2,804,340 7,207,710 
* Indicates valuation brought down without apparent reason, 
t Indicates exception in which lower valuation was used. 
54 (Page 58). Ibid. 
55 (Page 59). Number 3789, D. P. R., 917, given on July 29, 1926, 
and revised July 6, 1927, see Decisions de Puerto Rico, 1927, p. 114. 
56 (Page 59). Report of Mr. Cordero. 
57 (Page 59). Ibid. 
What the assessment of this company would have been in 1928 if based 
on capital may be seen from the following figures: (59). 
Balance of stock as given by company $6,477,800 
Surplus and sinking funds 346,640 
Total $6,824,440 
Less tax-exempt intangibles 2,268,070 
Government Bonds $98,000 
Bonds and shares of domestic corporations 2,170,070 
Valuation for 1928 on basis of capital $4,556,370 
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Actual valuation for 1928 2,484,890 
Loss in valuation for assessment $2,071,480 
58 (Page 59). Ibid. 
59 (Page 59). Manual of Sugar Companies, 1929, Farr and Company, 
p. 51. 
60 (Page 60). Report of Mr. Cordero. 
Year Assessment Year Assessment 
1919 $5,009,816* 1924 $3,907,73 5* 
1920 4,856,600 1925 4,418,350 
1921 4,716,440* 1926 4,813,860 
1922 4,082,890* 1927 5,002,550* 
1923 3,599,180* 1928 4,014,830t 
* Valuation slightly revised downward by Board of Review. 
t Was before Board of Review. 
61 (Page 61). From a monograph presented to Governor Roosevelt by 
Mr. Pedro Anglade of Guayama, Porto Rico, who has personal knowledge 
of the instances cited by reason of having acted as attorney and notary 
in the cases. 
62 (Page 62). Manual of Sugar Companies, 1929, Farr and Company, 
p. 26. 
63 (Page 63). Ibid. 
64 (Page 64). Ibid., p. 9. 
65 (Page 65). Mr. Walter McK. Jones of Villalba, Porto Rico. 
66 (Page 65). This information concerning "colonos" was obtained 
from Mr. González Quiñones, Secretary of the Asociación de Agricultores 
de Puerto Rico, Sa/i Juan, Porto Rico. 
67 (Page 66). Taken from information furnished by the Sugar 
Growers' Association, Gonzalez Padin Building, San Juan, Porto Rico. 
68 (Page 67). E l Agricultor Puertorriqueño, Vol. IX, No. 10, p. 10. 
69 (Page 68). Ibid. 
70 (Page 70). Section 32; given in full in Register of Porto Rico, 
1926, p. 219. 
71 (Page 70). Section 39; Ibid., page 247. 
72 (Page 71). p. 628. 
73 (Page 71). Ibid. 
74 (Page 71). Ibid. 
75 (Page 72). Mr. Enrique Bird, a member of the Legislature of Porto 
Rico, is authority for the information and was present and acting as in-
terpretor in the cases cited. 
76 (Page 74). Legislature of Porto Rico, First Report of the Legisla-
tive Committee to investigate . . , Unemployment in Porto Rico, p. 44. 
77 (Page 75). Clark, op. cit., p. 611. 
78 (Page 75). ibid., p. 612. 
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79 (Page 75). Ibid., pp. 1-6; Governor's Report, 1929, p. 235, gives 
2,085,902 acres. 
80 (Page 75). Cayetano Coll y Toste, Reseña del estado social, eco-
nómica e industrial de la Isla de Puerto Rico al tomar posesión de ella los 
Estados Unidos. 
81 (Page 78). Census of 1899, pp. 352, 356. The succeeding figures 
for 1899 are from the same source. 
82 (Page 78). Governor's Report, 1929, p. 235. The succeeding figures 
for 1929 are from the same source. 
83 (Page 80). Coll y Toste, op. cit. 
84 (Page 80). The following table shows the food crops of 1897 as 
compared with those of 1929. The 1897 figures are based on Coll y Toste, 
with the addition of the 40 per cent difference as given in the Census of 
J 899. 
J 899 1929 Difference 
3,200 3,017 183 
500 18 482 
5,355 3,035 2,320 
5,200 1,656 3,544 
960 2,51 5 1,5 5 5 (gain) 
1,470 929 541 
1,180 804 376 
3,400 3,135 265 
230 40 190 









Cabo Rojo .. 
Santa Isabel 
San Germán 
2 5,445 17,891 7,5 54 
85 (Page 81). 
86 (Page 82). 
87 (Page 82). 
88 (Page 83). 
of Porto Rico. 
89 (Page 83). 
90 (Page 84). 
laneous Series, No, 
91 (Page 84). 
92 (Page 84). 
Porto Rico. 
93 (Page 85). 
Puertorriqueño*. 
94 (Page 8 5). 
95 (Page 85). 
96 (Page 86). 
97 (Page 86). 
98 (Page 86). 
Clark, op. clt., p. 647. 
See the discussion of "The Colono Contract," p. — ? 
Clark, op. cit., p. 632. 
Information furnished by office of the Attorney General 
Ibid. 
The Sugar Cane Industry, Dept. of Commerce, Miscel-
53, passim. 
Clark, op. cit., p. 632. 
Information furnished by Commissioner of Interior of 
Information obtained from Asociación de Agricultores 
Clark, op. cit., p. 23 5. 
Ibid., p. 63 5. 
Ibid. 
Ibid., p. 560. 
Tie Sugar Cane Industry, pp. 63-68. 
244 R E F E R E N C E N O T E S B Y C H A P T E R S 
99 (Page 86). Monthly Labor Review, Vol. X X V I I I , pp. 1370-71. 
100 (Page 87). Report of the United States Tariff Commission on 
Sugar, 1926, p. 16. 
CHAPTER V 
1 (Page 89). The exact acreage of tobacco in 1899 according to the 
Census was J,693 acres. The Governor's Report, 1929, reports 29,40) 
acres. 
2 (Page 90). The figures for 1900 were given by Mr. Arthur Noble 
of the Porto Rican-American Tobacco Company. 
3 (Page 90). All figures since 1910 are found in the Governor's 
Report, 1929, p. 30. 
4 (Page 91). Ibid., p. 31. 
5 (Page 92). Ibid., p. 28. 
6 (Page 92). The history of the Porto Rican-American Tobacco Com-
pany was given to the authors by Mr. Arthur Noble. The statistics of 
assets, etc., may be found in investment manuals such as Moody's Indus-
triais, 1930. 
7 (Page 94). Moody's Industrials, 1930, p. 1449. 
8 (Page 95). Victor S. Clark and Associates, Porto Rico and its 
Problems, p. 22. 
9 (Page 96). Ibid., pp. 48-49, 5 60. 
10 (Page 97). This information was obtained from the Asociación de 
Agricultores de Puerto Rico. 
11 (Page 98). Clark, op. cit., p. 603. 
12 (Page 98). Census of Porto Rico, 1899, p. 3 56. 
13 (Page 98). Report of the Governor, 1928, p. 15. The figures of 
recent years are all taken from the Governor's Report. 
14 (Page 99). Hearings, Committee of WVys and Means, House of 
Representatives, 70th Congress, 2nd session, Schedule 7, p. 45 67. 
15 (Page 100). This information was supplied by the Treasurer of 
Porto Rico. 
16 (Page 103). Hearings, op. cit., p. 4567. 
17 (Page 104). Statement of Captain Lesesne of the Porto Rico Fruit 
Exchange. 
18 (Page 104). Clark, op. cit., p. 460. 
19 (Page 105). Hearings, op. cit., p. 4593. 
CHAPTER VI 
1 (Page 107). Moody's Public Utilities, 1930, p. 1619; Moody's Manual 
Service, August 9, 1930, p. 1459. 
Dividends paid since 1924 are shown by the following table: 
Year Preferred Common 
1924 $20,476 $96,000 
1925 20,136 96,000 
1926 20,144 96,000 
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1927 20,144 96,000 
1928 20,144 72,000 
1929 20,144 * 
* None on account of hurricane. 
2 (Page 108). Information supplied by Mr. Guillermo Esteves, Com-
missioner of Interior of Porto Rico. 
3 (Page 108). Moody's Public Utilities, 1930, p. 599; Moody's Public 
Vtilities, February 14, 1931. 
4 (Page 109). Ibid,, p. 1667. 
5 (Page 109). Ibid., p. 2307. 
6 (Page 111). From information given to the authors by Mr. Esteves. 
7 (Page 111). Floyd C. Carlisle, "Public Versis Private Ownership of 
Electric Power," Current History, Vol. X X X I I , No. 5, p. 894. 
8 (Page 112). W. Rodney Long, Railways of Central America and the 
West Indies (Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic 
Commerce, Trade Promotion Series, No. 5), pp. 336-359; See also Robert-
W. Dunn, American Foreign investments (New York, 1926), p. 137. 
Information given in Dunn does not distinguish between Porto Rican-
American interests and continental American interest. In the present case 
this distinction is made by considering all railroads absentee where they 
belong to sugar companies which are absentee. The classification of the 
sugar companies was obtained from the Treasurer of Porto Rico. 
9 (Page 116). The New York Times, April 16, 1930, p. 42. 
10 (Page 116). Moody's Banks and Finance, 1929, p. 889. 
Dividends paid by this company from 1910 to 1929 were as follows: 
1910 8 per cent 
1911 10 per cent 
1912 10 per cent 
1913 11 per cent 
1914 12 per cent 
1915 14 per cent 
1916 19 per cent 
1917 26 per cent 
1918 26 per cent 
1919 26 per cent 
1920 18 per cent 
1921 6 per cent 
1922 6 per cent 
1923 10 per cent 
1924 14 per cent 
1925 8 per cent regular and 8 extra 
1926 8 per cent regular and 8 extra 
1927 8 per cent regular and 8 extra 
March 1, 1928 2 per cent regular and 2 extra 
Payable quarterly. 
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11 (Page 117). Governor's Report, 1929, p. 225. 
12 (Page 117). Clark, op. cit., p. 377. 
13 (Page 118). Ibii. , p. 388. 
14 (Page 118). \bii., pp. 389-90. 
15 (Page 119). First Organic Act of Porto Rico, Section 9, printed in 
full in The Register of Porto Rico, 1926, p. 208. 
16 (Page 119). Mixer, op. cit., p. 291, gives a list of the American 
Steamship lines serving Porto Rico. 
17 (Page 119). Moody's Industrials, 1930, p. 2Í4J. 
18 (Page 120). The statistics of the Bull-Insular Line were drawn 
from information on file in the Marvin Scudder Library, Columbia Uni-
versity. 
19 (Page 121). The table included was compiled by comparing the 
rates of the following steamship companies: Munsen Steamship Line, oper-
ating ships to West Indian and South American ports; Di Giorgio Fruit 
Corporation, shipping to West Indian and Central American ports; Antilles 
Steamship Company, shipping to West Indies, but not to Porto Rico, as 
it does not operate American flag steamers; Bull-Insular Line, shipping to 
Porto Rico; New York and Cuba Mail Steamship Company (Ward Line), 
to West Indies; Panama Line, to Panama; Booth Ameriacn Shipping Cor-
poration, to South America; United Fruit Company, Central American 
and West Indian ports; Cia. de Navegação Lloyd Brasileiro, shipping to 
Brasil; Nippon Yusen Kaisha, Philippines and Japan; New York and 
Porto Rico Steamship Company, to Porto Rico and Santa Domingo; Com-
pañía Trasatlántica, to Spain; the Horn Line, to Europe; and the Com-
pagnie Transatlantique to France. 
20 (Page 127). Clark, op. cit., pp. 411-412, 443-4Í3. 
21 (Page 130). F. A. Ogg and P. O. Ray, Introduction to American 
Government (New York, 1928), p. 482. 
22 (Page 130). Clark, op. cit., p. 162. 
23 (Page 130). Ogg and Ray, ô . cit. 
24 (Page 130). Governor's Report, 1929, p. 205. 
25 (Page 130). Clark, op. cit., p. 201. 
26 (Page 131). Ibid., p. 209. 
27 (Page 131). Gownor's Report, 1929, p. 211. 
28 (Page 132). Clark, op. cit., p. 212. 
29 (Page 132). Clark, Ibid., p. 417, gives the following table: 
gives the following table: 
Foreign and Mainland Holdings in Porto Rico 
(figures in thousands) 
Insular and municipal government securities $43,894 
Stocks and bonds of corporations operating mainly or entirely 
in the Island 70,000 
Foreign-owned enterprises operating in Porto Rico (chiefly 
smaller branches of mainland or foreign enterprises) 5,000 
Individual ownership of foreigners and mainlanders in real 
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estate and mortgages of Porto Rico 25,000 
Mortgages and loans of Federal Land Bank and Intermediate 
Credit Bank 12,700 
Deposits of foreigners and mainlanders with Porto Rican banks 2,000 
Loans and advances of foreign and mainland commercial banks 
to Porto Rican corporations and individuals 15,000 
External holdings of Porto Rican short-term securities J00 
Commercial debts due to foreigners and mainlanders 1,000 
Government debts of the Insular government to the Federal 
government 1,200 
$176,294 
30 (Page 13 5). Governor's Report, 1929, shows Insular indebtedness 
of $25,285,000, and the same source, p. 118, gives the Municipal debt as 
$20,853,000. 
CHAPTER VII 
1 (Page 13 9). Henry K. Carroll, Report on the Island of Porto Rico 
(G.P.O. 1900), p. 391. 
2 (Page 144). The figures used here are cost calculated by using 
statistics given in the Report of the Governor of Porto Rico for the 
amount exported and tariff rates as they appear in the Tariff Act of 
1922 and 1930. 
3 (Page 145). Page 13. 
4 (Page 145). Page 28. 
5 (Page 145). Grapefruit tariff under Act of 1922 was one cent and 
under the new act this is 1 Yz cents a pound. 
6 (Page 145) Tariff 22 l/z cents a crate under Act of 1922. 
7 (Page 150) Clark, op. cif., p. 424. 
8 (Page 151). M. Lamadrid and Company of San Juan, Porto Rico. 
9 (Page 152). Wheat flour was 87 cents a cwt. under old act and 
$1.04 under the new. There were 377,727 barrels imported into Porto 
Rico in 1928. 
10 (Page 152). Under the Act of 1922, pure lard and imitations both 
paid 4 cents a lb. The new act levies 3 cents on pure lard and 5 cents 
on imitations. In 1928, Porto Rico imported 16,540,844 pounds worth 
$2,335,332. 
11 (Page 152). Importations in 1928 were: 
Condensed miik 4,705,843 lbs. worth $582,309 tariff rate 15 & I ' / z l 
52,479 " " 5,831 " " " 
Butter 530,598 " " 212,697 " " 12ç lb. 
155,598 " " 114,964 " " " " 
Cheese 1,687,267 " " 322,561 " " 7IM lb-
2,047,982 " " 324,762 " " " 
The new tariff levies 1 8 / l 0 ç on unsweetened milk and 2%ç on 
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sweetened milk; butter pays 14ç a pound; cheese 7ç, but not less than 
3 5% ad valorem. 
12 (Page 152). Bean importations 1928 were: 
From U . S. 399,311 bushels, or about 23,95 8,660 pounds. 
Foreign 5,622,623 pounds. 
The old tariff was l%ç a pound and the new is 3ç a pound. 
13 (Page 152). Meat imports in 1928 were: 
Hams and shoulders 7,604,815 lbs. value $1,189,406 tariff 2ç 
Canned meat 800,588 " " 113,499 " 20% 
Prepared meat 1,889,544 " " 231,715 " 20% 
Fresh and pickled pork 12,621,35 5 '* " 1,400,467 " %<i & 
2Ç lb. 
Fresh beef and veal 1,116,079" " 174,561 "20% lb. 
Sausage 2,265,615 " " 508,678 " 20% lb. 
Beef and meat canned 708,138 " " 81,913 "20% lb. 
Other meats 6,134,964 " " 650,441 "20% lb. 
The new tariff on hams and shoulders is 3 %ç a pound; fresh beef 
and veal is É Ç and not less than 20%; fresh pork 2 ^ ç ; pickled pork 
S'/̂ Q; sausage 6ç but not less than 20% ad valorem; beef and other 
meats canned 6ç but not less than 20% ad valorem; other meats 6ç 
but not less than 20% ad valorem. 
14 (Page 152). Potato imports in 1928 were: 
542,712 bushels, or 32,562,720 pounds worth $624,505 tariff 50ç cwt. 
From foreign sources 489,5 21 pounds worth 13,268 tariff S0ç cwt. 
The new rate is 75ç cwt. 
15 (Page 152). Importation of dried peas in 1928: 
From U . S. 113,311 bushels, or 6,458,727 pounds worth $145,123 
Foreign sources 697,368 pounds. 
The old tariff rate was l ç a pound and the new is l % ç on dried 
peas. Other classes cost up to 3ç a pound. 
16 (Page 152). Corn meal imported was: 
75,398 barrels, or 14,778,028 pounds worth $351,281. 
Old tariff 30ç cwt. and new 50ç cwt. 
17 (Page 152). Importations in 1928: 
From U. S. 113,311 bushels, or 6,458,727 lbs. worth $145,123 
Foreign 1,110,617 pounds worth $25,581 
Old rate l ç a pound before January 21, 192? and 154ç thereafter; 
new rate 2 54ç a pound. 
18 (Page 152). Imported in 1928 some 5 61,696 pounds worth $167,190. 
The old rate was 2ç a pound; new rate 3ç a pound on unsweetened 
and 4ç a pound on sweetened in bars or blocks weighing 10 pounds or more; 
40% in any other form. 
19 (Page 152). 1,980,082 pounds worth $122,966 in 1928. Old tariff 
2ç a pound; new tariff 1 J/áç. 
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20 (Page 1 52). 1,728,24) pounds worth $327,832 with tariff rate 
of 3 5% ad valorem under old act and 40% under the new. 
21 (Page 152). 1,695,062 pounds worth $312,899. Old tariff rate 7!M 
and new SVaÇ lb. 
22 (Page 152). To value of $44,119 in 1928. Old tarifif 35% and 
new 40% ad valorem. 
23 (Page 152). From U . S. 83,45 5 pounds worth $34,507, and from 
foreign to value of $12,378. 
The tariff rate varies from l ç to 14ç under the old tariff and from 
l'/íg to 2 5ç under the new. 
24 (Page 152). Cotton seed oil and other vegetable oils 1,800,855 
lbs. worth $226,710 with tariffs to i'/z^ a pound. 
25 (Page 1 52). 2,925,702 pounds worth $473,107 with tariff of 
40% ad valorem. 
26 (Page 153). Oats, 221,193 bushels; old tariff 15ç a bushel and 
new 1 ôç. 
Corn, 3 5,746 bushels from U. S. and 143,930 from foreign; old tarifif 
15ç and new 2 5ç on foreign corn. 
Fodders and feeds to value of $805,410 with duties averaging about 
10%. 
27 (Page 154). Wrapping paper, 8,872,514 lbs. worth $528,942 
with 30% ad valorem. 
Other paper, 175,197 lbs. worth $741,933. Rates from l ç lb. to 50% 
ad valorem. 
28 (Page 155). Total imports in 1928 from foreign sources: $12,-
599,241 paying $2,392,250 duties. 
Imports from the U. S. were $79,743,088 paying no duties. 
29 (Page 159). Quoted by Harold S. Sloan, "Tariff as a Cause of 
Poverty in Porto Rico," Current History, Vol. X X I X , pp. 993-998. 
30 (Page 160). Thomas E . Benner, "American Difficulties in Porto 
Rico," Foreign Affairs, Vol. V I I I , No. 4. 
CHAPTER vm 
1 (Page 162). 15 th Census of the United States. 
2 (Page 163). The New York Times, March 23, 1931, p. 1. 
3 (Page 164). The population figures for Porto Rico previous to 
American occupation are taken from Coll y Toste, Reseña Histórica. 
4 (Page 165). Legislature of Porto Rico, First Report of the Legis-
lature Committee . . . Unemployment in Porto Rico, p. 26. 
5 (Page 166). Ibid., p. 218. 
6 (Page 167). Theodore Roosevelt, "Children of Famine," in the 
Herald Tribune, December 8, 1929, quoted in Review of Reviews, Vol. 
L X X X I , pp. 72-73. 
7 (Page 169). Carroll, op. cit. (G. P. O., 1899), p. 152. Shows im-
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ports for 1897; Governor's Report, 1928, p. 4, gives imports for 1928. 
18 (Page 171). Ibid., 1926, p. 213. 
8 (Page 169). Report of Brig.-Geti. George W. Davis, p. 3 6. 
9 (Page 169). Governor's Report, 1901-02, p. 66. 
Z0 (Page 170). Page 232. 
11 (Page 170). Page 254. 
12 (Page 170). Page 213. 
13 (Page 170). Page 173. 
14 (Page 170). Page 221. 
15 (Page 170). Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture and La-
bor, 1925, p. 233. 
16 (Page 171). Ibid., p. 25 5. 
17 (Page 171). Ibid., p. 236. 
18 (Page 171). Ibid., 1926, p. 213. 
19 (Page 171). Ibid., 1926, p. 216. 
20 (Page 172). Ibid., p. 217. 
21 (Page 172). Ibid., 1927, p. 175. 
22 (Page 172). Ibid., p. 181. 
23 (Page 172). Ibid.,..p. 221. 
24 (Page 172). Clark, op. cit., p. 462. 
25 (Page 172). Report of Commissioner of Agriculture and Labor, 
1925, p. 234. 
26 (Page 173). Governor's Report, 1928, p. 33; Clark, op. cit., p. 22. 
27 (Page 173). Carroll, op. cit., p. 152. Gives imports of 35,45 1,874 
kilos at price of 2,481,631 pesos. 
28 (Page 174). Governor's Report, 1928, pp. 4-7. Gives imports of 
3,371,400 pounds at cost of $133,432 from foreign sources and 183,768,-
547 pounds at cost of $7,311,029 from the United States. 
29 (Page 174). Carroll, op. cit., p. 152. Shows 11,244,245 kilos for 
1,461,752 pesos. 
30 (Page 174). Governor's Report, 1925, p. 4. Shows 13,091,763 
pounds for $969,216 from the United States and 20,238,104 pounds 
for $1,409,153 from foreign sources. 
31 (Page 174). Carroll, op. cit., p. 152. Shows 13,852,030 kilos for 
969,642 pesos. 
32 (Page 174). Governor's Report, 1928, p. 4. Shows 377,727 barrels 
(74,045,492 pounds) for $2,547,632. 
33 (Page 176). Ladies Home Journal, Vol. X L V H No. 12. 
34 (Page 181). Report of Commissioner of Agriculture and Labor, 
1926, p. 216. (Translation). 
35 (Page 182). Ibid., 1927, p. 181 (translation). 
36 (Page 182). Ibid., 1928, p. 223 (translation). 
37 (Page 1842. Ibid., p. 228. 
38 (Page 183). Governor's Report, 1927, p. 742. 
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CHAPTER IX 
1 (Page 186) . The Blue Book of Porto Rico, E . Garcia Fernandez 
(Ed.)? gives an excellent account of the independence movement; Brau, 
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CHAPTER X 
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